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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The objective of this report is to contribute to the discussion of capital market
reform in Bulgaria in preparation for eventual integration into the European
Union. The report views the accession question on two levels. The first is
whether the necessary capital market institutions and legislation are in place.
The second is whether capital markets are functioning in a manner that sup-
ports economic growth and development.
The impetus for the development of the capital market in Bulgaria was the first
wave of the mass privatization program. This program was similar to the pro-
gram implemented earlier in the Czech Republic. At the same time the Czech
Republic is among the first countries in transition that has been invited to ne-
gotiate accession with the European Union. For these reasons it is useful to
compare the process of capital market developments in the two countries.
However, it should be taken into account that because of the problems that
have surfaced recently in the Czech capital markets, the Czech example does
not necessarily furnish solutions to the problems that are likely to arise.
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY1
While the period of transition has been difficult for the countries in Central and
Eastern Europe, the macroeconomic performance of the Bulgarian economy
has been among the weakest. After a sharp decline in output at the beginning
of the transition and a shallow recovery, there was a severe financial crisis in
1996 and 1997. The financial crisis created hyperinflationary levels of inflation
in early 1997. In July 1997 a currency board was established as a result of which
in 1998 inflation was only 1% and for 1999 the inflation remained at very low
levels Ð 6.2%.
Foreign investment in Bulgaria during the first years of transition has been very
low. Total foreign investment for the period 1992 Ð 1998 was barely about $225
per person. An important contributing factor for this unsatisfactory result was a
debt moratorium declared in 1991 and lifted in 1994.
Structural change has proceeded very slowly. This has been particularly true of
large-scale privatization. It is estimated that only between 5 and 7% of state en-
terprise assets were privatized cash between 1992 and 1997. An additional 12-
14% of state enterprise assets were included in the first wave of mass privati-
zation that was completed in the summer of 1997. There has been very little in-
vestment in or restructuring of state enterprises during the whole period. In ad-
dition to that the managerial turnover in those enterprises has been high.
Unclear perspective and short horizons in front of the managers of state enter-
prises had often reflected in ÒtunnelingÓ and decapitalization of those enter-
prises. For the last year and a half the Government has made a more concert-
ed effort to privatize the remaining large state enterprises through cash sales.
ORIGINS OF THE CAPITAL MARKET
The basic structure of the first wave of mass privatization was very similar to the
Czech program. Voucher books were sold to citizens for a small participation
fee. The vouchers could then be used to purchase shares directly in offered en-
terprises or the books could be transferred to privatization funds. The first wave
was completed in June 1997.
Shares in 1050 (out of a 3701) state-owned companies were offered in the auc-
tion and the percentages of shares in these companies that were offered varied
considerably. For many large companies only 25% of the total capital was of-
fered. For smaller companies as much as 90% might be offered. The program
was much smaller than the Czech program. As a result it should be underlined
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1 Further information could be obtained from Bulgaria Online (www.online.bg)
that the market capitalization of the Bulgarian market ($900-950 million) is
much smaller than the Czech ($14 billion).
The second wave of mass privatization was organized very differently. The sec-
ond wave is still proceeding, but presently it has insignificant influence on the
capital markets.
OVERVIEW OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS
Unlike the Czechs, who purposely attempted to minimize supervision of the
capital markets, Bulgaria established an extensive regulatory framework. This
included the Bulgarian Stock Exchange ÐSofia (BSE-Sofia), a Central Depository
(CD) and a State Securities Commission (SSC), the name of the State Securities
Commission according to the repealed Law on Securities, Stock Exchanges and
Investment Companies was Securities and Stock Exchange Commission (SSEC). 
To create price integrity and transparency, the law encourages trading with
shares of public companies on the BSE-Sofia. Block trades can be negotiated off
the exchange, but they have to be registered on the exchange. The only trans-
actions that can take place off the exchange are swaps or transactions that take
place between physical persons.
In spite of legal rules limiting off-the-exchange trading (OTE), there has been
substantial OTE trading as the number of OTE transactions have far exceeded
the number of BSE ÐSofia transactions. Between January 1998 and June 1999
period, the number of shares traded OTE exceeded BSEÐSofia trading by
33.9%. (In the first quarter of 1998 approximately 48% of the share turnover in
the Czech Republic was OTE.)
The size and volume of OTE trading raises serious questions about price in-
tegrity in the market. Prices of OTE transactions are not registered so there is no
way to know how prices in the two markets compare. At this point one can on-
ly speculate as to why so much trading is occurring OTE, but making OTE trad-
ing more transparent may encourage more trading to move to the BSE-Sofia. 
SIZE OF THE MARKET
There are a large number of companies listed on the BSE-Sofia, but in practice
many small companies have not been traded at all. While the unadjusted mar-
ket capitalization figure is about $950 million, this includes all investment funds
and holding companies and all shares in partially privatized companies that are
still owned by the State. The actual figure for shares not held by the
Government and available for trading on the BSE-Sofia is probably closer to
$425 million. This works out to $121 per participant in the mass privatization
program or a little more than one monthÕs wage.
The market also has very low levels of turnover. Turnover figures at the indi-
vidual company level are available only for trades on the BSE-Sofia. Most com-
pany shares have been traded very few times since the stock market opened.
Only eight companies have traded shares in more than half the sessions for
which they were registered. 
CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP
There is increasing concentration of ownership in Bulgarian companies.
Records obtained from the CD show that 614 (of 1142 ) companies have a ma-
jor shareholder with more than 50% ownership. Holding companies and in-
vestment companies which succeeded former privatization funds have restruc-
tured their portfolios typically aiming at more concentration. Holding compa-
nies are now the biggest shareholder in 393 companies, and investment com-
panies are the largest shareholder in 9 companies. This kind of concentration is
not possible in the Czech Republic where investment funds have been limited
to a 20% interest in any one company.
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PRIVATIZATION FUNDS HOLDING COMPANIES
AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES
Privatization funds played an important role in the mass privatization programs
in both the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Czech funds have not played the an-
ticipated role in corporate governance and it is widely known that fund man-
agers have ÒtunneledÓ money out of the funds for their own private use.
The greater ownership concentration in fund portfolios makes the Bulgarian
funds more like traditional holding companies. Bulgarian regulations also en-
couraged privatization funds to convert to holding companies and 76 out of to-
tal 81 former privatization funds are now holding companies. The rest convert-
ed to investment companies. The analysis shows that Bulgarian privatization
funds (now holding companies) appear to be more active in the governance of
the companies in their portfolios than their Czech counterparts.
CAPITAL MARKET INSTITUTIONS
The three main institutions which support the capital market are the Bulgarian
Stock Exchange Ð Sofia, the Central Depository and the State Securities
Commission. The legislation that was passed to support these institutions pro-
vides a good foundation. The most serious difficulties facing these institutions
comes from forces that are creating pressures that are slowing the development
of open and transparent markets.
For example, at the BSE-Sofia there has been a tension between trying to serve
the widest possible clientele and creating a transparent market. Many compa-
nies that were privatized through mass privatization have not provided the nec-
essary information required for public companies under Bulgarian law and
have not taken necessary steps to register on the stock exchange. For this rea-
son, the BSE-Sofia created two types of markets: an official market and a free
market. Unfortunately, some of the larger more liquid companies have decid-
ed to remain on the free market.
Government securities, municipal bonds and corporate bonds are supposed to
be listed on the bond market of the BSE-Sofia. Presently, there is no trading
with government bonds on stock exchange. The obstacles are mainly technical.
But developing a secondary market in government securities is a real possibili-
ty. This would expand the scope of trading on the BSE-Sofia and provide a
structure of interest rate levels that would become a basis for evaluation of riski-
er securities.
The first corporate bond was issued in August 1999. Sofia municipality has suc-
cessfully issued bonds in Luxembourg where the market is deeper. Two other
cities have applied to issue bonds and SvishtovÕs request was recently approved
by the SSC.
The BSE-Sofia uses a continuous order-driven trading system. Since order flow
is so small, continuous trading can cause large swings in prices. This fluctuation
has been controlled by putting constraints on price movements for securities
traded on BSE-Sofia. Given the illiquidity in the market there may be advan-
tages in splitting the market and creating call auctions for the shares in all but a
few companies that do not trade frequently.
CENTRAL DEPOSITORY (CD) 
All public companies have dematerialized shares, and the shareholder registra-
tion books for these companies are kept by the CD. Transactions are also set-
tled through the CD. The establishment of the CD has facilitated transactions in
securities, and eliminated many problems that have arisen in other transition
economies.
Membership in the CD is important since only members can interact directly
with the CD to register transactions and anyone registering a transaction must
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be represented by a member of the CD. Only members and duly authorized
persons have access to the CDÕs data and then only with respect to transactions
to which they are a party. This is unnecessarily restrictive and makes it difficult
to obtain important information.
SECURITIES LAWS AND THE STATE SECURITIES COMMISSION (SSC)
The repealed Law On Securities, Stock Exchanges and Investment Companies
(LSSEIC) from 1995 established the Securities and Stock Exchanges Commission
(SSEC) to ensure the protection of the interests of investors and to stimulate the
development of the securities market. Although most provisions of the LSSEIC
were broadly in harmony with relevant EU Directives, several provisions of the
LSSEIC needed modification if the law is to be consistent with EU standards.
The National Assembly enacted at the end of 1999 the new Law on Public
Offering of Securities (LPOS). This new law makes Bulgarian securities law
nearly compatible with the standards and requirements of the most important
EU directives and contributes to the institutional strengthening of the regulating
and controlling body, renamed into the State Securities Commission.
At this stage enforcement is a bigger challenge than the passage of good law.
Many provisions of the repealed LSSEIC had not been implemented in practice.
For example, information disclosure has been a serious problem. The LPOS as
well as preceding LSSEIC lays down formal requirements for the disclosure of
information to the SSC and to the BSE-Sofia, but many companies do not com-
ply. Many companies lack the motivation to disclose information since the po-
tential advantages and benefits provided by the chance to raise funds in the
capital market remain distant.
Accounting procedures and standards are another area where problems exist.
Important differences still persist between national and international account-
ing standards and shareholders cannot be confident that auditors in all cases
have fulfilled their obligations in good faith.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance is another area that needs improvement. There are im-
portant weaknesses in the Commercial Code that could be corrected and that
would improve the position of shareholders. Improvements could be made if
the Commercial Code was brought into more conformity with a recent OECD
(Avilov, et. al., 1999) report on corporate governance for transition economies.
Such changes would include changes like the following: (a) making it easier for
shareholders to obtain information on other shareholders so that shareholders
could organize opposition to management initiatives; (b) lowering the voting
requirements from 10 to 5 percent of the capital to call a general meeting; (c)
change of the voting rules to cumulative voting rules; (d) spelling out the duties
of members of the board of directors to specify codes of conduct and rules on
conflict of interest; (e) establish provisions for buying out ÒstrandedÓ minority
shareholders.2
Whatever the legal provisions a serious enforcement problem will remain. The
courts need to acquire a better understanding of company law and apply it ap-
propriately. The Ministry of Justice should provide special training for judges in
matters pertaining to corporate governance and control.
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2 The Corporate Governance Initiative (www.csd.bg/cgi), a coalition of Bulgarian non-govern-
mental organizations, established in the beginning of 1999 by the Association of Voluntary
Pension Funds, the Center for Economic Development, the Center for the Study of Democracy,
the InvestorÕs Union and the Security Holders Association, has developed a Policy
Recommentation Paper. Its aim is to facilitate the adoption of relevant corporate governance
standards and procedures.
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CONCLUSIONS
In preparation for integration into the EU, Bulgaria has established institutions
and laws that are largely in conformity with EU provisions. A much bigger chal-
lenge is bringing about better functionality.
In spite of efforts to improve the regulation of the capital market, serious prob-
lems remain. It is possible to create institutions that look like capital market in-
stitutions in the West but do not function effectively. Some key areas which
need attention are:
¥ Regulation of holding companies: The Czech experience demonstrates that
investment funds need to be closely monitored. The transformation of pri-
vatization funds into holding companies may be an appropriate change giv-
en the situation in Bulgaria, but there are dangers as well. Holding compa-
nies should be treated as financial institutions. They should be audited as fi-
nancial institution.
¥ Strengthening the BSE-Sofia: The BSEÐSofia definitely suffers from very low
trading levels. In connection to this questions have been raised as to
whether it is a viable institution. Furthermore, low liquidity has made it dif-
ficult to establish price integrity. (a) The Government could help the BSE-
Sofia by making more information about OTE trading available. Presently
these transactions are totally not transparent. If the CD releases trade infor-
mation on a timely basis, this would lower the incentive to trade OTE. (b)
Trading volume would also be higher if traders were convinced that they
can get best execution by trading on the exchange. Moving to call auctions
for illiquid shares may help. (c) Establishing a secondary market in govern-
ment securities would also increase activity on the exchange.
¥ Improving corporate governance and control: Good corporate governance
is key if the privatization process is going to be successful. Company law in
transition economies needs to be more restrictive and regulated environ-
ment than exists in Western countries. The recent OECD report provides
good guidelines for further review of existing laws. Because there is so little
experience with capital markets, training programs for regulators and judges
are extremely important. Reorganization of the court system so there are
specialized courts would help. This would enable judges to gain needed ex-
perience and make the training process easier.
All these changes need to be directed towards creating markets where compa-
nies can raise capital. The present situation is not adequate. Unless companies
see the capital markets as a place where they can raise new financial resources,
companies will not have the right incentives to provide information and partic-
ipate actively in the market. A market in new issues needs to be actively pro-
moted. While many important capital market institutions have been put into
place in Bulgaria, the market has serious weaknesses. Before integration into
the EU, the capital market needs to be strengthened and become a source of
investment capital.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the early stages of the transition period in Bulgaria (1992-1996), eco-
nomic policy was focused mainly on issues of macroeconomic stability and re-
structuring. While considerable attention was directed at restructuring the
banking system, other financial markets played no significant role. This changed
with the completion of the first wave of mass privatization in 1997. Under this
program, significant state owned entities were transferred to citizens either di-
rectly or indirectly through privatization funds. The mass privatization program
created pressure to create capital markets to trade the shares in the former state
companies. The shift in ownership also changed the economic climate. With
these new ownership patterns, successful economic performance now depends
on the development of a new legal and regulatory system that encourages the
new owners to restructure the former state enterprises and supports the devel-
opment of capital markets that can become a source of financing for future
growth.
1. MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY
While the period of transition has been difficult for the countries in Eastern
Europe, the macroeconomic performance of the Bulgarian economy has been
among the weakest. (See Table 1.) After a sharp decline in output at the begin-
ning of the transition, the economy began to grow slowly in 1994. But in 1996
and 1997 Bulgaria experienced a severe financial crisis and output fell again. In
July 1997 a currency board was established and the economy began to slowly
grow again. Initial evaluations for 1999 were for continued growth of over
2.5%.
TABLE 1. Basic Economic Indicators
Sources: Economics of Transition, Volume 5 (1), 1997 p.257 and Volume 6 (2) 1998
Until recently inflation has also been a serious problem. Prices were released in
February 1991. Prices jumped sharply and inflation for the year was 334% .
Inflation came down but remained at high levels. In the spring of 1994 the nom-
inal value of the lev fell significantly and inflation surged again. Inflation de-
clined to 62% in 1995, but the onset of the financial crisis in 1996 caused in-
flation to rise dramatically, reaching 240% per month in February 1997. With
the introduction of the currency board in mid 1997 the inflation was put under
control. Under the currency board inflation in 1998 was 1% per annum and in
1999 the inflation continued to be very low Ð around 6 %.
Bulgaria is a small country. Total GDP in 1998 was DM 21.6 billion ($ 12.3 bil-
lion). The foreign trade sector is important for the country. In 1998 exports were
$4.2 billion or approximately 35% of GDP. Before the transition began,
Bulgaria was heavily dependent on trade with the CMEA countries, especially
the Soviet Union. Over time trade with the former Soviet Union has declined
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP growth % -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.1 -10.9 -6.9 3.5
Inflation (CPI) % 79.2 63.9 121.9 32.9 310.8 578 1
Unemployment Rate 15.6 16.4 12.8 10.5 12.5 13.69 12.17
Basic Interest Rate (end period) 49 63 94 38.6 342 6.8 5.3
Government balance (cash) %
GDP
-13 -10.9 -5.8 -5.7 -8 -3.1 -1.1
Trade Balance (millions US dollars) -212 -885 -17 132 -35 381 -329
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and trade with the European Union has increased. In 1998 half of BulgariaÕs ex-
ports went to the European Union, less than 5% to the former Soviet Union.
Foreign investment in Bulgaria are still very low. Total foreign investment for the
period 1992 Ð 1998 is only $1.8 billion or about $225 per person.3 There were
several contributing factors. Bulgaria borrowed large sums in international mar-
kets during the 1980s. Unable to meet debt service requirements, Bulgaria de-
clared a moratorium on debt repayments in 1991. The moratorium was lifted
in 1994 when negotiations with the London Club were concluded. Other fac-
tors that discouraged foreign investors were the high levels of political and eco-
nomic instability. Since 1991, there have been five governments (and two pro-
visional governments). Along with these political changes there have been
many changes in the laws governing business activity. 
Since the currency board has been established, the internal economic and po-
litical climate has improved, but the international climate has deteriorated. The
financial crisis in Russia has reduced international investor interest in the re-
gion. The events in Kosovo have reinforced the perception that the Balkans is a
high risk unstable region. As a result foreign investment at this stage remained
at low levels.
2. STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY
Structural change has proceeded very slowly. Early privatization was focused
on the return of agricultural land and the restitution of urban buildings to for-
mer owners. The restitution of agricultural land was much more problematic
than originally anticipated. Small plots of land proved inefficient. Animal herds
declined when farmers received animals before they obtained the land to sup-
port them. Restitution of urban property proved more successful and provided
an avenue for the expansion of small retail and wholesale businesses.
Privatization of large scale enterprises proved to be a much more politically
sensitive issue. It is estimated that only between 5 and 7% of state enterprise
assets were privatized between 1992 and 1997.4 An additional 12-14% of state
enterprise assets were included in the first wave of mass privatization which
was completed in the summer of 1997. This brought total privatization to about
20% at the end of 1997. In 1998 and 1999, the pace of cash privatization ac-
celerated somewhat. By June 1999 about a third of state assets had been priva-
tized.5 If the contribution of the new private firms and agricultural production
by cooperatives is accounted for, the contribution of the private sector is close
to two-thirds of GDP.
There has been little restructuring of state enterprises. Managerial turnover has
been high. Managerial positions were part of the political spoils system and
Governments changed several times during the nineties. Short tenures have en-
couraged asset stripping. Only in 1998 and 1999 the Government has made a
more concerted effort to privatize the remaining large state enterprises through
cash sales, but because there has been so little investment or no investment at
all in these enterprises over the past ten years, the prices offered for these com-
panies have been very low.
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3 Total foreign investment for 1999 is expected to be $ 600-700 million or about $ 72-84 per per-
son. Total foreign investment includes privatization, green field and reinvestment, capital mar-
ket. Sourcre:Agency for Foreign Investment.
4 Many different numbers have been used to describe the percentage of privatization. An im-
portant distorting factor is that many firms have been partially privatized with the State retain-
ing a significant share of ownership. The figures used here include as private only those per-
centages of an enterprise that have been privatized. So if 25% of a company has been priva-
tized, then only 25% of its assets are included in the overall calculation of the privatized sec-
tor.
5 This percentage is based on total state assets. According to the current privatization law, some
assets are not eligible for privatization e.g. railroads, electric power companies, gas pipes, and
the nuclear power station. By May 1999, almost 50% of assets eligible for privatization had
been privatized.
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While Bulgaria quickly organized a two-tier banking system, the banking sys-
tem functioned very poorly. From the outset the banks were burdened by bad
loans which were carried over from the pre-transition period. There were sev-
eral failed attempts to recapitalize the banks. In the largest program in 1994 the
government replaced bad loans to enterprises with government (so called
ZUNK) bonds. However, banks made additional highly risky loans and there-
fore their balance sheets did not improve.
Very weak commercial bank balance sheets and large deficits of the budget
helped bring on the Bulgarian financial crisis in 1996-7. The full extent of the
banking problems were not known until reporting requirements were tightened
and enforced in 1995. Along with inadequate regulation during the period
leading up to the crisis, the BNB also provided liberal refinancing of the com-
mercial banks. The banks then loaned this money to enterprises or financed
private firms under vague conditions. In many cases these loans were a form of
implicit subsidy since there was little chance they would be repaid. In other
cases financing of private firms turned to be a form of bank resources tunnel-
ing. ÒUntil 1996, credit was expanded to the non-financial sector in Bulgaria to
a degree that was unprecedented relative to any other European transition
economy.Ó (OECD, 1999, p. 32) 
During the financial crisis, several banks were closed, and proposals were put
forward to establish a currency board. The currency board has restored confi-
dence and signalled a change in regime where there is much greater econom-
ic discipline. The situation in the banking sector has also improved dramatical-
ly. The banks have reduced their exposure to the non-financial sector and the
capitalization of the banks rose to 36.7% in 1998 (against the minimum re-
quirement of 10%) (OECD, 1999) When the currency board was established,
the banks initially did little additional lending to the non-enterprise sector and
expanded their holdings of cash and government securities. More recently
banks have taken a less conservative positions and have expanded their lend-
ing to the non-financial sector and reduced their cash holdings.
The establishment of the currency board, and the stabilization that came with
it, coincided with the end of the first wave of mass privatization, While the mass
privatization program had many distinct features, this first wave was modeled
after the Czech program. Citizens paid a small fee for vouchers which could be
used to bid for shares in state-owned enterprises in national auctions. As in the
Czech program, Bulgarian citizens could choose to transfer their vouchers to
privatization funds if they did not want to bid directly in the auctions.
Once the mass privatization auctions were concluded, there was increased
need to develop new capital markets. ÒBlock tradingÓ of shares began in
October 1997 and was substantial for several months, but more general trading
on the new stock exchange did not really begin until March 1998. Some delays
were due to technical problems in organizing of the exchange. Other problems
also made the start of the exchange market difficult.  New regulations had to be
passed in many of the company charters, where clauses for pre-emptive rights
of shares existed. Furthermore, the information that had been made available
for the auctions fell well short of the information needed to create a prospec-
tus under Bulgarian law for publicly traded companies. 
At first, trading volume on the stock market was high as a number of transac-
tions were concluded as a result of the tendency for restructuring and shares
consolidation. But in 1999 the volume of the average non-block trading has
been averaging about DM 220,000 per day (January through May) or about the
one-third the average trading level in 1998. The low volume of trading raises
questions about the viability of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE-Sofia),
whether the securities traded on the BSE-Sofia can be expanded or what its fu-
ture role might be in the capital market. 
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3. OUTLINE OF THE REPORT
The objective of this report is to contribute to the discussion of reform of the
capital markets in Bulgaria and prepare for accession into the European Union.
The process of mass privatization in Bulgaria was similar to the program imple-
mented earlier in the Czech Republic. As in Bulgaria the impetus for the de-
velopment in the Czech Republic came from the mass privatization program.
For these reasons it is useful to compare the process of capital market devel-
opments in the two countries. About the time that Bulgaria was completing the
auctions in the first wave of mass privatization, difficulties began to surface in
the Czech capital markets. This report includes recommendations for improve-
ments in the Bulgarian markets in hopes of avoiding problems that have arisen
in the Czech Republic.
The report is organized as follows. Section II presents the development of the
Bulgarian capital markets. It includes an analysis of the impact of the mass pri-
vatization process as an impetus to the development of the stock exchange and
describes some of the implications this has for the present performance of the
market. Section III provides an overview of the capital market. Indicators of size
and liquidity for the Bulgarian market are compared with indicators for other
transitional economies. The section points out the process of ownership con-
centration and examines its implications for the capital market. Section IV de-
scribes capital market institutions created to support and regulate the market. 
Section V studies the legal basis regulating the capital market. This section in-
cludes an extensive appendix where a detailed comparison of the Bulgarian
legislation, EU and Czech laws is provided. Section VI analyzes the laws per-
taining to corporate governance and makes recommendations for possible im-
provements. Section VII provides a brief overview of developments in insur-
ance and pension funds which at this stage play relatively small role for the cap-
ital market compared to the former privatization funds. Section VIII summarizes
the most important findings and provides policy recommendations. Section IX
concludes.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPITAL MARKET
IN BULGARIA
1. THE FIRST WAVE OF MASS PRIVATIZATION 
During the early years of transition Bulgaria attempted to privatize its state en-
terprise sector through cash sales and various forms of manager-employee buy-
outs. Many political conflicts arose over the proper course of action and the
process was very slow and cumbersome. Under Socialist leadership Parliament
passed a Program for mass privatization in Bulgaria at the end of 1995.
Ideologically it was introduced as a means of Òrestitution of laborÓ as a coun-
terpoint of the earlier governmentsÕ policy of Òrestitution of propertyÓ.
Compared to some other mass privatization programs (i.e. Poland), the
Bulgarian program was relatively liberal, restricting the role of the State and the
state bureaucracy. The first wave allowed the formation of privatization invest-
ment funds which have become an important ownership group. The program
was designed to be carried out in two separate ÒwavesÓ. The Government had
to design specific programs for each wave and these programs had to be sepa-
rately approved by Parliament. The Òfirst waveÓ was carried out in 1996-1997
by specially organized Center of Mass Privatization (CMP). The Government
declared that it was trying to achieve the following main goals:6
¥ acceleration of the privatization process;
¥ creation of a modern capital market and its infrastructure;
¥ involvement of a large segment of the population in the ownership, control
and the management of privatized companies;
¥ redirect economic policy to focus on long-run structural problems; recovery
of the state budget; improvement of the management of the state-owned
sector; and determining priorities for state directed investments.
Under the mass privatization program all adult Bulgarian citizens had the right
to purchase, for a small participation fee, a certificate (voucher book) with
25,000 Òinvestment bonds.Ó The Òinvestment bondsÓ could only be used to
purchase shares in the companies included in the program. These bonds were
not tradable and could only be transferred to close relatives. These restrictions
discouraged the establishment of a secondary market in Òinvestment bondsÓ.
On the other hand, the restrictions made it more important to establish a sec-
ondary market in shares.
The owners of certificates (voucher books) had two options. They could take
part in the centralized auctions and use their investment bonds to bid directly
for shares in one or more companies. Alternatively investment bonds could be
exchanged for shares in a privatization fund(s). With the received bonds the pri-
vatization fund then participated in the centralized auctions and acquired
shares. 
The total number of shares offered for mass privatization was 90.4 million from
1050 companies out of a total of 3701 state-owned companies. The program
included enterprises from all sectors of the economy except for infrastructure,
utilities, military and banking.
Companies participated in the program with different amounts of capital.
Basically, there were three classes of companies:
1. companies where 25% of the capital was offered for mass privatization.
Typically, these were large-scale enterprises with an important place in the na-
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6 Privatization program through investment vouchersÓ, adopted by Parliament on December 19,
1995.
tional economy. The State retained the remaining 75% to maintain control and
look for prospective strategic investors;
2. companies where 67% of the capital was offered. These were primarily
medium-sized enterprises although some large enterprises were also included
here. In those enterprises the State remained a majority shareholder (privatiza-
tion funds were allowed to hold up to 34%), and thus the State retained veto
power over important decisions in these firms.7
3. companies for which 70 Ð 90% of the capital was offered. These were medi-
um and small enterprises.
The distribution of companies included in the program is presented on Table.2.
TABLE 2. Distribution of Companies by Share of Capital Offered for Mass
Privatization
Source: CMP
At the conclusion of the auctions, 69.1 million shares of 1040 enterprises, or
76.4% of the total number of shares offered, were transferred to privatization
funds and individuals. By way of comparison, 93% of the shares offered in the
Czech program were transferred. The difference was due to different auction
procedures employed in the two auctions. 
The auctions succeeded in transferring between 12 and 14% of state assets to
the private sector. It is estimated that only 5-7% of state property was trans-
ferred by other schemes (mainly cash privatization) during the period from
1992 till end-1997. Thus the mass privatization scheme represented an impor-
tant step forward in the privatization process. Still the mass privatization
scheme was small when compared with the Czech program. In the Czech
Republic estimates vary, but somewhere between 65 % and 90% of the Czech
economy was privatized by the end of the second wave of mass privatization.
(Coffee, p. 71)
The difference here is important, because the Czech mass privatization was
viewed as far more important by Czech citizens. At one point the Czech capi-
tal market had a capitalization of $14 billion while the Bulgarian market has a
capitalization of only $900-950 million.
In the end, nearly 3.5 million Bulgarian citizens became shareholders. Of these
about 3 million individuals became shareholders in the 81 privatization funds
established during the process. The remaining 0.5 million acquired shares in the
enterprises included in the program.
While these participation rates are very high, they are far below the levels
recorded in the Czech Republic. As Table 3. shows, close to four-fifths of eligi-
ble Czech citizens participated in their voucher privatization program. On the
other hand, privatization funds are more important in the Bulgarian program.








up to 1/2 230 127,802,109 33,141,005
from 1/2 to 2/3 8 845,494 483,695
over 2/3 812 81,575,645 56,758,437
Total 1,050 210,223,248 90,383,137
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7 Initially, 65% of the capital in these enterprises was to be included in the mass privatization pro-
gram. Under the Commercial Law, one-third was enough to give the State veto power over all
key decisions. After the World Bank made a statement that a company is considered privatized
when its private owners hold control over all decisions, the participation of these companies
was increased to 67% (more than two-thirds) of their capital. Formally, this would have given
private owners full control of these companies. However, on the eve of the first centralized auc-
tion, the State changed the articles of association of many of these companies so that it still re-
tained veto power over key decisions even though it had only 33% of the shares.
This lead to more concentration of shareholdings in the Bulgaria market from
the opening of the market. Furthermore, once the voucher privatization auc-
tions were concluded, investment funds in Bulgaria were no longer bound by
the 34% limit on the percentage of shares they could hold in any one compa-
ny. When block trading began in October 1997, many funds quickly acquired
additional shares in companies where they had a strong interest.8 Czech funds
were formally limited to 20% ownership, although fund groups could acquire
as much as 40%. (Coffee, p. 121-22)
TABLE 3. Participation of the Population in Mass Privatization
* Data is only for the Czech Republic. First wave was carried out within
Czechoslovakia.
Data Sources: CMP; Mass Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union, The World Bank, 1995.
TABLE 4. Size of Privatization Funds by Type of Founders (mil. inv. bonds)
Source: Center for Mass Privatization 
One difference between the Czech and Bulgarian auctions is that Bulgaria did
not privatize banks in the mass privatization program while in the Czech case,
many question on issues of cross-ownership arose. Banks established privatiza-
tion funds and these funds, in turn, purchased shares in the founding bank.
(Coffee, 1998) Banks were founders of several large funds in Bulgaria, but this






Private banks and financial institutions 11 736 2,765 104
State banks and financial institutions 8 1,477 6,565 84
State organizations and enterprises not
in mass privatization
2 749 1,014 485
State enterprises in mass privatization 9 1,467 5,693 66
Labor unions 1 2,239 2,239 2,239
Cooperatives 2 2,075 2,645 1,505
Other 48 454 2,833 55
Total 81 775 6,565 55
Bulgaria Czech Republic*
I-wave I I -
wave
Eligible Population (millions) 6.5 7.6 7.6
Participants (millions) 3.5 5.9 6.2
Relative Share of Participants (%) 53.8 77.6 81.6
No. of Voucher Books Transferred to Funds (millions) 2.4 4.3 3.9
Rel. Share of Voucher Books Transferred to Funds (%) 80.5 72.8 62.9
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8 Many of these block trades had been negotiated much earlier. Before the voucher auctions be-
gan investment funds signed futures agreements where they agreed to purchase shares in the
auctions for one another or for other strategic buyers.
By way of contrast, in Russia the managers gained control of the firms. The
Bulgarian results in that respect are much more mixed. Table 4. identifies six
categories of founders of privatization funds. Nineteen funds were founded by
banks or financial institutions. Two bank-founded funds are among the biggest
with more than a billion investment bonds.9 Three other large funds (over one
billion investment bonds) were founded by enterprises involved in the auction.
As a whole we were able to identify a total of only nine funds clearly associat-
ed with an enterprise in the auction. So out of 1040 firms and 81 privatization
funds only nine enterprises in the auction had managers directly controling al-
so privatization funds.10
The mass privatization program created pressure to open the Bulgarian Stock
Exchange. Trading in shares of companies privatized through the mass privati-
zation program gradually began to develop. The inevitable consequence was
the emergence of the capital market, and the related necessity in creating its
appropriate institutions and regulations.
2. THE SECOND WAVE OF MASS PRIVATIZATION
The stock market opened after the first wave, but there was always the inten-
tion to have a second wave of mass privatization. The design of the first wave,
both before and after its implementation, had been controversial. The new
UDF government, which came to power in the spring of 1997, clearly did not
like the design of the first wave and even before it was completed, the
Government announced that there would be significant changes in the pro-
gram. 
The new Government raised a number of objections to the first wave, that can
be summarized to three arguments. On one hand there was concern that the
program created widely-dispersed ownership, that impedes the management.
Besides, the privatization funds were perceived to be unappropriate owners
since they brought no new capital to help restructure enterprises. Third, there
was arisk that funds would not be good proprietors of enterprises since they
lacked appropriate experience and expertise.
The second-wave program, which is currently ongoing, is built around new
principles. First, investment bonds can be used in a variety of ways. The bonds
can be used to make payment in different kinds of transactions. These include
manager-employee buy-outs, centralized auctions of state-owned enterprises
or as installment payments to pension funds (which would then use the bonds
to purchase shares). Second, bonds can be purchased over an extended peri-
od of time, above 2 years the possibilities for participation in the program are
more extended in time. Third, collective forms of investment are ruled out.
Citizens can participate individually or through pension funds or manager-em-
ployee companies (MECs), but they cannot transfer the bonds to specialized
privatization funds.
The short history of the program has revealed until now several shortcomings.
The program was designed to increase the funds available for management-em-
ployee buyouts, but strategic investors have shown little or no interest in most
of the enterprises. For these companies, privatisation by MEC is perhaps the on-
ly chance to preserve them as economic entities and avoid liquidation.
Furthermore, under present conditions in Bulgaria, there are many potential
problems since the manager-employee companies are the prevailing form of
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9 Unlike the Czech situation these two funds did not pursue strategies that were closely related
to their bank sponsors. In fact not before very long neither fund was controlled by its initial
sponsor.
10 Complete information about fund sponsorship, especially with regard to smaller funds is dif-
ficult to obtain, but Table 4 should be reasonably representative. The categories are by ne-
cessity somewhat arbitrary. Not accounted for here is that some funds were run by people
who had previously been managers of state enterprises. In additions some funds had CEOs
from several enterprises on the board and bought shares in these enterprises. (See Miller and
Petranov (2000) and Tchipev (1998)) 
ownership The capacity to restructure those companies is circumscribed, and
access to credit resources is limited. There has been a tendency to bid unreal-
istically high offer prices for these firms that shifts the real buyers, and this has
made it difficult to pay off shares later. ManagementÐemployee buyouts have
also been a preferred method of acquiring firms by back-stage players.
The use of investment bonds as payments to pension funds is also problemat-
ic. If the pension funds use these bonds to buy shares, then the greater part of
pension assets will be in risky securities offered by the state in the second wave.
What companies these will be is still unknown. At the same time, funds will
owe regular pension payments to subscribers. These problems will be further
exacerbated if people nearing pension age invest their bonds in pension funds
during the period when liquidity of Bulgarian capital market remains low.
The second wave of mass privatisation started in July 1998. After one year (30
June 1999), 976,000 people have registered. This is 15.2% of the eligible pop-
ulation and 27.9% of the participants in the first wave. BGL 244 billion in in-
vestment bonds have been acquired.
Thus far the auctions have mostly been for stock in enterprises which were in-
cluded in the first wave of mass privatisation. Some of this stock was not offered
in the first wave; other stock was not purchased in the first wave. These have
generally been small and medium enterprises which have attracted little inter-
est. Until now none of the large companies that are actively traded on the BSE-
Sofia have been offered in the second wave. Also absent from the second wave
is stock in enterprises which were not included in the first wave, but would cer-
tainly attract the interest of capital market investors, e.g. the Bulgarian
Telecommunication Company.
Until mid-1999 three centralized public auctions have been held by the Center
of Mass Privatization where state-owned stock can be purchased using invest-
ment bonds or cash. The results are presented on Table 5. and Table 6.
TABLE 5. Results of Centralized Public Auctions, minority stock
Source: CMP














1st - - - - - - -
2nd 50.49% 1 1 362,599 356,561 97.5 2.5 3,911,474
3rd 79.20% 1 1 18,249 11,771 99.8 0.2 393,069
Total 97.6 2.4
-
2 2 380,848 368,332 4,304,543
Number of
enterprises










1st 8.77% 31 28 164, 246 69 ,711 97.5 2.5 661, 643
2nd 14.53% 47 46 544, 843 244 ,696 96.6 3.4 3,161,925
3rd 16.06% 36 36 522, 443 229, 903 97.1 2.9 2,649,503
Total 96.9 3.1114 110 1, 231, 532 544, 310 6, 473, 071
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A total of 1,612,380 shares were offered. 56.6% of them were purchased. For
minority stock only 44.2% were purchased. In all, 10,5 billion investment
bonds were used in the auctions. This is only 4.3% of the investment bonds is-
sued before the auctions. Another 11,3 billion (4.6%) of investment bonds
were used for payments in management-buyouts. Cash payments for shares ac-
quired at the auctions account were only 2.8% of the total. Cash was used on-
ly when participants in the auctions did not have enough investment bonds.11
The most likely buyers of these shares, offered on centralized auctions are hold-
ing companies (former privatisation funds) which already have shares in the
companies as employees working in the companies. Thus far neither group has
been very active in the second wave. Holding companies have not been al-
lowed to collect investment bonds as they did in the first wave and cash pay-
ments do not make sense since 1 lev has greater value than 1 investment
bond.12 Furthermore, holding companies that have already acquired control of
a company do not need to purchase additional shares. Emplyees in the com-
panies have better alternatives as well. If they form a MEC, they could take ad-
vantage of special preferences which are more advantageous than participation
in the auctions. 
Unless there are changes in the second wave, it will not contribute to the de-
velopment of capital market in Bulgaria. Shares acquired are illiquid. Most in-
vestment bonds will be used in management-employee buyouts or invested in
pension funds. It is very likely that a high percentage of bonds will not be used
at all. If the program is to be have more impact on the capital market, more
shares in attractive companies need to be auctioned. 
3. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF STARTING WITH MASS PRIVATIZATION
FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CAPITAL MARKET
The origins of the capital market in Bulgaria have important implication for the
way that the capital market is functioning. Under normal circumstances com-
panies begin their lives as private companies and become publicly traded com-
panies when they need additional capital or they want to create a liquid mar-
ket for trading in their ownership rights. The impetus for becoming a publicly
traded company comes from the company itself and there are different costs to
that. The company must provide extensive information about its operations.
The original owners lose some degree of control since the new shareholders al-
so have voting rights. Sometimes firms revert to private ownership to avoid the
responsibilities of a publicly traded company.
Given the desire to raise additional capital and/or create a liquid market in eq-
uity shares, the penalties for failure to comply with disclosure regulations can
be severe. The market will punish fraudulent or inadequate financial disclosure
by reducing the price of shares on the secondary market making it more diffi-
cult for the firm to raise additional capital and reducing the value of the own-
ership shares of the founding members of the company.
The situation in Bulgaria is very different. The impetus for opening the stock
market came from the mass privatization program. Public trading of firm shares
began after the voucher auctions were completed. The stock market was es-
tablished to provide a location where shares could be traded. The management
of the enterprises did not initiate the changes. The firms did not become pub-
licly traded because they wanted to raise additional capital. Managers did not
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11 The system of auctions envisages a uniform price for all participants, which is formed as a
weighted average of all orders. Investors with offer prices lower than the price formed at the
auction should pay more.
12 Cash has greater value because it can be used in more than just privatization transactions.
Furthermore, Bulgarian Brady bonds can be used in payment for purchasing state enterprises.
These bonds sell at a discount and can be used in payment for state enterprises at their full
nominal value. Since Brady bonds can be substituted for investment bonds the value of in-
vestment bonds cannot exceed the price of Bradys.
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have an ownership stake in the firm before the voucher auctions (although they
may have acquired a stake later).
While the management of Bulgarian companies may have perceived few ben-
efits of being publicly traded, there were significant costs. The new owners
were often perceived to be a threat by the existing management who were now
thrown into a new environment. Furthermore, public disclosure of the firmsÕ
operations was costly. Not only is preparing the materials expensive, full dis-
closure makes it more difficult for the manager to manage the firm in ways that
can be personally beneficial.
Even if the manager is not trying to exploit the situation for personal monetary
gain, the manager may perceive the enhancement of share value as secondary.
It is also possible that persons related in some ways to the company are trying
to exercise pressure on the manager. At the end the manager may be more re-
sponsive to the demands of these stakeholders than the demands of share-
holders as a whole.
Even if managers acquire shares in the company, they may not be interested in
the company. The market of shares is so thin for most companies that attempts
to sell significant blocks will depress the price. Realistically the market for large
blocks works more like the sale of significant interests in a privately held com-
pany. To sell a significant interest requires identification of a potential buyer
who is interested in acquiring a large interest in the firm. These transfers will not
occur in open trading on a stock exchange.
The same situation exists for other large shareholders in Bulgarian companies.
These shareholders may have positions on the supervisory or management
board of the company. They are well-informed investors because of their posi-
tion on the board. They have little interest in public disclosure because these
large stakes cannot be effectively sold on an illiquid stock market. If they iden-
tify a potential buyer this buyer can become more informed without public dis-
semination of information. Thus the governing body is not a constituent for
public dissemination of information either, and the incentives are such that
even publicly traded companies have the incentive to act more like private
companies.
The danger is that minority shareholders will be left out because there is no
place for them to sell their shares (which was the reason for the establishment
of the stock market in the first place.)
III. OVERVIEW OF THE EQUITY MARKET
Unlike the Czechs authorities, who purposely attempted to minimize supervi-
sion of the equity markets, the Bulgarian authorities established three important
institutions to regulate the market. The Bulgarian Stock Exchange ÐSofia (BSE-
Sofia) was organized as a semi-private institution to facilitate trading in shares,
mostly from the mass privatization program. The BSE-Sofia was the only regis-
tered and licensed exchange. A Central Depository (CD) was also established
to register transfers and shareholding in the dematerialized shares in compa-
nies. But the most important institution is the State Securities Commission (SSC)
created under the Law on Securities, Stock Exchanges and Investment
Companies (LSSEIC) as Securities and Stock Exchanges Commission (SSEC) and
regulated in the Law on Public Offering of Securities as the regulatory body to
oversee the operations of the securities markets.13
1. GENERAL OVERVIEW
As a result of the mass privatization program block trading began in October
1997 and significant non-block trading on the BSE-Sofia began in March, 1998.
TABLE 7. Trading on the BSE Ð Sofia
Source: BSE-Sofia
A decision was made that all trading in companies that had participated in the
mass privatization program should take place on the BSE-Sofia. It was hoped
1998-1999 Transactions Total Shares Turnover (mil. BGL)
January`98 251 2,300,402 41,212
February`98 335 4,871,483 20,252
March`98 202 1,329,932 14,035
April`98 551 1,887,861 12,992
May`98 1907 3,624,446 28,594
June`98 2728 2,649,519 15,669
July`98 3111 2,207,045 21,050
August`98 2343 1,783,314 10,198
September`98 2191 1,157,816 11,418
October`98 2166 1,178,211 8,890
November`98 1812 1,309,128 8,165
December`98 1933 1,873,688 21,007
January`99 1621 977,505 5,081
February`99 1685 3,181,158 26,611
March`99 2774 2,005,470 19,234
April`99 1657 908,000 9,193
May`99 1481 935,469 11,069
JuneÕ98 1422 1,212,573 8,246
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13 The Czechs did not create a regulatory body like the SSEC until 1998, four years after the mar-
ket opened.
that this would create price integrity and transparency. Block trades can be ne-
gotiated off the exchange, but they have to be registered on the exchange. The
only transactions that can take place off the exchange are swaps or transactions
that take place between physical persons.
As will be outlined in more detail below (See IV.1.) , the BSE-Sofia set up both
an official market and free market segment within the exchange. Table 7. shows
the level of trading on the BSE-Sofia from the beginning of 1998 to June 1999
(See Table B1.-B2. in Appendix B for more detailed trading data). The small
number of transactions in the early part of 1998 reflects the fact that most trad-
ing during this period was block trades. The turnover, however, during the first
five months of 1998 was 60% higher than the comparable period in 1999, that
rises some concerns about the development of exchange trading.
FIGURE 1.
Stocks, as measured by the Warburg 30 Index of the largest market capitaliza-
tion stocks, also performed well during the early period, but have fallen con-
siderably below the highs they reached in May 1998 (See Table B3. for the
companies included in the index). In June-July 1998 the market was falling al-
ready, the decline accelerated after the Russian crisis in August and September
the same year. After the index was set at 100 in December 1997, it reached a
high of 165 in May 1998 and was at 67 in July 1999.14
In spite of the legal rules that might be expected to limit off-the-exchange trad-
ing (OTE), there has been substantial OTE trading.15 The law is designed to pro-
vide extra flexibility for trading to those individuals in rural areas who might
have difficulty trading on the BSE- Sofia. During the period before extensive
general trading began on the BSE-Sofia, this might not have been too surpris-
ing, but significant trading outside of the BSE-Sofia has continued. Table 8.
compares monthly trading levels on and off the BSE-Sofia. It is not possible to
compare the monetary value of exchange trading and OTE because the prices
of shares traded off the exchange are never registered. The number of OTE
transactions have exceeded the number of BSE ÐSofia transactions in every
month. At its peak in March 1998, the number of OTE trades were nearly sev-
enty-eight times the number of BSE-Sofia trades. At this point few companies
had been approved for trading on the BSE-Sofia what explains this unexpected
ratio. But even later this ratio varies between 3 to 5 for the whole period. The
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14 It should be noted that the index is weighted by market capitalization. Two stocks, Bulgartabac
Holding, the large tobacco holding company, and Neftochim, a large chemical company, to-
gether represent more than half the index. These together with the next five companies make
up three-quarters of the index. 
15 We have chosen the term Ôoff-the-exchangeÕ trading rather than Ôover-the-counterÕ trading to
emphasize the point that there is no formal trading mechanism like the NASDAQ system for
trading shares in the U.S.
greater balance since the transactions on the BSE-Sofia tend to be larger than
OTC transactions. Still the number of shares traded OTC during the January
1998 Ð June 1999 period was 33.9% higher than the number of shares traded
on the BSE. In addition, another 16 million shares were traded OTE during
1997.
Many of the transactions in the Czech market also occur OTE. The relative vol-
ume of this trading has varied over the years as regulations have changed. In the
first quarter of 1998 approximately 48% of the share turnover was OTE.
TABLE 8. Comparison of BSE-Sofia and Off-the-Exchange Trading
Month
Source: BSE-Sofia, CD
The size and volume of OTE trading raises serious questions about price in-
tegrity in the market. Prices of OTE transactions are not recorded so there is no
way to know how prices in the two markets compare.16 The amount of OTE
trading strongly suggests that there is a strategy on the part of some traders to
avoid the BSE-Sofia. Fees for trading on the BSE-Sofia are reasonable so traders
appear to be gaining some other kind of advantage by trading off the exchange.   
One reason some traders may choose to trade OTE is that they are gaining a
price advantage. In a market where many participants have little understanding
of how these markets function, some purchasers may be able to convince sell-
ers to sell to them OTE at prices below the price on the BSE-Sofia.17
Another possibility is that agents may wish to conceal their attempts to acquire



























Jan-98 8578 3893416 454 251 2300402 9165 34.18 1.69
Feb-98 10851 8309726 766 335 4871483 14542 32.39 1.71
Mar-98 15754 4038281 256 202 1329932 6584 77.99 3.04
Apr-98 10745 2730298 254 551 1887861 3426 19.50 1.45
May-98 8958 510986 57 1907 3624446 1901 4.70 0.14
Jun-98 8875 1205379 136 2728 2649519 971 3.25 0.45
Jul-98 9345 1521093 163 3111 2207045 709 3.00 0.69
Aug-98 9054 1026847 113 2343 1783314 761 3.86 0.58
Sep-98 8255 1067295 129 2191 1157816 528 3.77 0.92
Oct-98 7744 1173517 152 2166 1178211 544 3.58 1.00
Nov-98 7657 1612861 211 1812 1309128 722 4.23 1.23
Dec-98 5850 4635013 792 1924 1916688 996 3.04 2.42
Jan-99 5495 1869267 340 1621 977505 603 3.39 1.91
Feb-99 8472 1604314 189 1 685 3181158 1888 5.03 0.50
Mar-99 6 20 1658311 247 2 774 2005470 723 2.42 0.83
Apr-99 7793 1968762 253 1657 908000 548 4.70 2.17
May-99 4775 437261 92 1481 935469 632 3.22 0.47
Jun-98 6126 8199304 1338 1422 1212573 853 4.31 6.76
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16 One close observer of the market stated that the price difference in the two markets was 20%.
Without price data we were not able to confirm this.
17 In some instances investment funds have paid dividends. People living in rural areas have com-
plained that agents, not associated with the investment fund, asked them to sign documents to
receive their dividends. The documents turned out to be transfer documents.
not become public knowledge until after the firm is required to report major
shareholdings to the SSC.
Later in the report we will provide more detail on the availability of informa-
tion. While a great deal of information is collected by the BSE-Sofia, the Central
Depository and the SSC , important information is not easily available to the
public. If the lack of transparency is an important motivation for trading OTE,
then improving the transparency of OTE transactions is one way of encourag-
ing more trading on the BSE-Sofia.
GENERAL MARKET INDICATORS
Table 9. provides a general picture of the capital markets in Bulgaria when they
are compared with other capital markets Ð mainly in Central and Eastern
Europe and on the Balkans. 
TABLE 9. Equity Market Indicators, 1998.
Sources: Data for countries other than Bulgaria is from IFC, Emerging Stock Markets
Factbook, 1999. Bulgarian data is from BSE-Sofia. 
* Turnover figures for Bulgaria assume that average prices of off the exchange trading
are the same as prices on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange.
** P/E ratio for Bulgaria is for a small sample of companies with positive profits listed
on the Official Exchange and a few large companies traded on the free market. (See
Table B4 and B5 for P/E ratios and other indicators for individual companies)
As the table illustrates the number of companies on the capital market is rela-
tively large but this is a function of the mass privatization. Many of these com-



















261 23 9 39 -11.3
Hungary 55 31 35 115 17.0
Poland 198 53 6 12 10.7
Russia 237 5 2 33 3.7
Romania 5753 3 2 59 -19.4
Slovenia 28 13 4 28 205.3
Croatia 50 17 50 3 11.1
Estonia 26 9 17 180 25.9
Portugal 135 62 46 75 22.8
Greece 244 65 38 59 33.6
Turkey 277 17 36 204 7.8
Germany 700 28.3 33 118 20.7
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The large number of companies on the Romanian exchange is also an outcome
of the voucher privatization program in Romania. The number of companies
listed in the Czech Republic in 1998 is relatively small. It should be taken into
account that in 1995 there were more than 1600 companies in the Czech
Republic with listed shares.
The market capitalization evaluation is based on an unadjusted market capital-
ization figure of $950 million. (Czech Republic, $14.1 billion) This includes all
investment companies and holding companies and all shares in partially priva-
tized companies that are still owned by the State. (See Table B6.1-B6.2 for the
market capitalization of different segments) Because it is difficult to get accu-
rate figures on the net asset value of all holding companies, we can only ap-
proximate the value of these holdings. Table 10. shows how would look an ad-
justment of market capitalization estimating holdings and investment compa-
nies having double counting as well as the fact that the state participation is in
practice out of the capital market. With this adjustment the size of the market
would be lower than either Hungary or Poland. Given that 3.5 million people
participated in the mass privatization process a capitalization of this level would
be $121 (= 425/3.5) per person or a little more than one monthÕs wage. This is
a small amount even by Bulgarian standards. For this reason the financial im-
pact of the program has not been very significant for most citizens and they
donÕt have special interest in the development of the capital market.
TABLE10. Recalculation of Market Capitalization
The turnover ratios for both Òturnover to GDPÓ and Òturnover to market capi-
talizationÓ are also very low, although the turnover to capitalization ratio would
be more than twice as large if the adjusted market capitalization figures were
used. Because no data exist on the market prices of shares that are traded OTE,
these figures are necessarily approximations. If the average price of shares trad-
ed OTE are much lower than BSE-Sofia prices, this would reduce these ratios. 
These low turnover ratios are indicative of the low level of liquidity in the mar-
ket. The conclusion can be drawn also from the trading analysis of separate po-
sitions. Data on the turnover of individual companies shares are available only
for shares traded on the BSE-Sofia. Table 11. describes the trading levels for
companies on the BSE- Sofia. (A more detailed description of the different seg-
ments of the BSE ÐSofia is given in Sec. IV.1.) It can be seen that most compa-
nies have been traded very few times. Nearly 84% of companies (734 out of
876), registered on the BSE-Sofia were traded less than 15 times for the whole
estimated period from the start of the exchange trading. Twenty companies
have been traded more frequently and twelve of these are on the free market.
Total Market Capitalization $920 million
- State holdings (approx.) -$435 million
- Double counting for holding
companies and investment funds
- $60 million
Recalculated Market Capitalization $425 million
TABLE 11. Number of Transactions per Company on BSE-Sofia for the
Period 21.10.1997-15.6.1999
Source: BSE – Sofia
The low level of liquidity for most companies is also evident from looking at the
percentage of company shares that have been traded since the opening of the
BSE-Sofia.
FIGURE 2. Percentage of Shares Traded on the BSE
(No. of Companies in Each Category: Total 671)
Source: BSE – Sofia
As Figure 2. illustrates, for almost 45% of companies the number of shares that
are traded for the whole period since the opening of the exchange is less than
5% of the whole number of their shares.18 Only 26 companies have traded
more than 75% of their shares and these are almost all very small companies.
The notion that liquidity is low is reinforced by the fact that only 8 companies
have traded in more than half the sessions and only 18 have traded more than
40% of the time.
2. CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP
The low level of trading and liquidity on the BSE has occurred along with a
growing concentration of ownership in Bulgarian companies. Table 12. de-
scribes the present level of ownership concentration. The total number of com-
panies in this table is 1142 and includes not only the companies that partici-
pated in the mass privatization program but also the new holding companies
and investment companies. In the first wave of the mass privatization program,
the State retained more than 66.7% of the shares in 174 companies.
Furthermore, only three quarters of the total shares in the auctions were pur-
chased. Thus many of the companies in the first category in the table are com-
panies where the State is the major shareholder. Indeed the State is still the ma-











































Number of Transactions Total
Market <15 16 Ð 30 31 Ð 60 61 Ð 120 > 120
Official A 1 2 3
Official B 1 3 1 5
Official C 6 4 2 6 5 23
Free 728 49 34 22 12 845
Total 734 54 36 32 20 876
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18 The data includes trading on all 682 companies that have traded on the BSE-Sofia. We were
not able to obtain share data on 11 companies.
Still the concentration levels have increased since the mass privatization pro-
gram was completed. As indicated in the table more than half the companies
have a major shareholder who owns more than half the company. Even own-
ership of holding companies is becoming more concentrated. There were 81
privatization funds participating in the mass privatization auctions, yet after an
year and a half there are only 51 of those companies that do not have a major
shareholder with more than 10% of the shares.19
TABLE 12. Concentration of Ownership in Public Companies
Source: CD
The share holdings of the former privatization funds have also become more
concentrated. These funds have been presented with a choice to become a
holding company or become an investment company. Important characteristic
of the holding companies is that they can make loans to companies in which
they hold 25% or more of the shares.20 For investment companies an intention
to have more diversified portfolios is expected. According to statistics compiled
by the Central Depository, holding companies are now the biggest shareholder
in 393 companies and investment companies are the largest shareholder in 9
companies.
Table 13. shows the dynamics of investment portfolio characteristics of the
largest former privatization funds. These funds collected 60% of the investment
bonds in the first wave of the mass privatization. All of the funds in this group
with the exception of ÒZlaten LevÓ have chosen to become holding companies.
ÒZlaten LevÓ is actually splitting their portfolio into two parts: one part holding
company and one part investment company. As can be seen in the table, these
former privatization funds have restructured their portfolios in a way that they
sharply reduced the number of companies they hold and have almost uni-
formly increased the average share holdings in the companies in their portfo-
lios. Most of these changes occurred before mid- 1998.
This kind of concentration is not possible in the Czech Republic. Their funds
have been limited to a 20% interest in any one company. This limitation has
been criticized by commentators like Coffee (p. 122) who argue that this kind
of dispersed ownership makes good corporate governance more difficult.
Characteristics No. of
Companies
The major shareholder owns more than 66.7% of the capital 257
The major shareholder owns between 50% and 66.7% of the capital 357
The major shareholder owns between 33.3% and 50% of the capital 298
The major shareholder owns less than 33.3% of the capital 230
Including companies where the major shareholder owns less than
10% of the capital
51
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19 We would have liked to break down these numbers so that we could see more clearly the re-
lationship between ownership types and concentration of ownership. Unfortunately, the
Central Depository was only able to provide us with aggregates. Under present law, there are
severe restrictions on what the depository can make available.
20 In the present environment where the banks are providing little credit and interest rates on
loans are high, these loans can benefit both the holding companies and the companies in their
portfolios. The loans provide liquidity to the companies, and the holding companies which of-
ten have representatives on the board can evaluate the risk.
TABLE 13. Portfolios of the Largest Funds
Source: SSC, Relevant companies
This rapid move to greater concentration of ownership on the part of the for-
mer privatization funds supports the general perception among participants in
the capital market that much of the early trading reflected the activity of po-
tential strategic owners as they purchased shares in companies they wanted to
control. Having established control, trading volumes have fallen.
The low intensity of trading for many companies on BSE-Sofia it seems im-
probable that high concentrations of ownership could evolve out of this trad-
ing. But without more detailed data it is not possible to determine to what role
OTE trading has played in the consolidation of ownership.
3. PRIVATIZATION FUNDS HOLDING COMPANIES
AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES
Privatization funds played an important role in the mass privatization programs
in both the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. The Czechs have been disappointed
with the performance of these funds. They have not played the anticipated role
in corporate governance, and they have exploited the unregulated situation in
the Czech capital markets to take advantage of their shareholders.
In many of the cases managers of funds have ÒtunneledÓ money out of the
funds for their own private use. As a result of this and as closed-end funds,
No. of Companies Average Size of Holding
After the
Auctions




Mid 1998 End of
1998
AKB Fores 80 36 38 20.9% 32.0% 30.8%
Akzioner Favorit 97 67 60 9.6% 12.4% 14.2%
Albena Invest 84 N/A 29 17.4% N/A 36.4%
Bulgaria 88 50 19 17.0% 16.7% 45.8%
Bulgaro-Holandski 112 95 91 16.5% 18.7% 20.5%
Doverie 175 115 82 22.1% 27.3% 25%
Industrialen
Capital
21 10 9 17.1% 24.3% 23.6%
Melinvest 73 56 N/A 22.5% 24.6% 25.0%
Multigroup (MG)
Elit
36 27 N/A 18.8% 21.8% N/A
Neftochim Invest 34 22 N/A 20.1% 22.2% N/A
Orel Invest 38 24 24 14.6% 16.7% 15.0%
Petrol 66 33 N/A 21.2% 26.5% 27.0%
Severcoop Gumza 68 51 N/A 19.3% 24.1% N/A
Sveta Sofia 55 46 48 17.5% 17.4% 19.5%
Trud I Capital 91 61 54 20.1% 25.6% 27.8%
Youg 53 37 24 17.8% 17.4% 21.4%
Zentralen 49 21 21 14.3% 16.3% 20.5%
Zlaten Lev 67 45 36 17.2% 16.2% 15.4%
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Czech funds sold for deep discounts of the value to net asset value. Recent
changes in the Czech legislation is forcing these funds to ÔopenÕ gradually. This
opening process will occur over time and allows funds to charge a redemption
fee of 20% in the first year and 10% in the second year. (World Bank (1999),
p. 35)
Not all Czech funds will open, however. As the Czechs have increased the lev-
el of supervision, many Czech funds have chosen to become holding compa-
nies. By 1998 there were 131 conversions to holding companies, 338 invest-
ment companies remained. (World Bank (1999), pp. 30, 31) As holding com-
panies, they are not required to open and have none of the special reporting
requirements expected from financial institutions.
The situation in Bulgaria is somewhat different. The greater concentration of
ownership of companies in fund portfolios makes the Bulgarian funds more like
traditional holding companies. Bulgarian regulations also encouraged privatiza-
tion funds to convert to holding companies and 76 out of 81 funds are now
holding companies.21 Although direct comparisons are difficult, Bulgarian hold-
ing companies appear to be more active in the governance of the companies
in their portfolios. This may be a function of the larger stake that they have in
their companies. The large holding companies have significant holdings in sev-
eral companies and are often represented on the boards. Smaller funds are
concentrated in one or two companies and are very active in the governance
of these companies.
A direct comparison of price-to-NAV ratios in the Czech and Bulgarian markets
is difficult because so few shares of Bulgarian funds (now holding and invest-
ment companies) trade very much. The fifteen former privatization funds that
trade on the BSE-Sofia official market have an average price-to-NAV ratio of
0.51. The range for different funds varies from 1.0 to 0.23. These are steep dis-
counts but are somewhat better than the discounts on comparable Czech
funds.22 In 1996 the price-to Ð NAV ratio for large funds in the Czech Republic
was 0.37. This improved to 0.47 in 1997 after the announcement that they
would be required to open.
What is more disturbing than the significant discounts for the funds trading on
the BSE-Sofia is the low level of liquidity and the lack of information about the
large number of former privatization funds that do not trade on the BSE-Sofia.
It is difficult for shareholders in these funds to determine what the value of their
stake in these funds might be and to trade this value.
Since so few Bulgarian funds converted into investment companies, it would
not be very useful for Bulgaria to follow the Czechs and force funds to open.
Since almost all the funds are now holding companies, it would be much more
helpful to pass legislation which requires the holding companies to file reports
with the SSC that give a more complete picture of their financial holdings than
is presently required of other corporations. Then they can continue to be mon-
itored as financial institutions.
21 Zlaten Lev and Nadejda are the only two investment companies traded on the BSE-Sofia. The
others are small and are not traded on the exchange.
22 Discounts on closed-end funds are common. In the U.S. discounts have averaged about 10%.
IV. CAPITAL MARKET INSTITUTIONS
In this section we provide a more detailed analysis of the three main institutions
which support the capital market: the Bulgarian Stock Exchange ÐSofia, the
Central Depository and the State Securities Commission. The legislation that
was passed to support these institutions provides a good foundation. The most
serious difficulties facing these institutions come from forces that are creating
pressures that are slowing the development of open and transparent markets.
1. BULGARIAN STOCK EXCHANGE Ð SOFIA
The Bulgarian Stock Exchange-Sofia was established on 28 January 1991 under
the name First Bulgarian Stock Exchange. Trading in securities began in 1992.
By 1995 there were twelve stock exchanges registered, but the volumes were
very low and only 15 Ð20 companies, mostly banks, were traded on the ex-
changes.
In June 1995 the Law on Securities, Exchange and Investment Company (LSSE-
IC) was passed and actions were undertaken to create a regulatory structure
and reorganize the capital market. In January 1996, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SSEC) was established and the Central Depository opened in
August the same year. In 1995 several exchanges merged and the Bulgarian
Stock Exchange was founded. During the financial crisis, which began in 1996,
confidence in the market eroded and trading ceased in late 1996. In July 1997,
following the last auctions in the first wave of mass privatization, the Sofia Stock
Exchange and the Bulgarian Stock Exchange merged forming the Bulgaria Stock
Exchange-Sofia (BSE- Sofia). The BSE-Sofia is now the only securities market in
the country licensed under the repealed LSSEIC and opened for trading on 21
October 1997.
Normative regulations envisage that all securities transactions in shares of com-
panies participating in the mass privatization program must be executed on the
BSE-Sofia. The only two exceptions are transactions between two physical peo-
ple or swaps. Swaps can be exchanges of shares in publicly traded companies
or can be the exchange of shares for government securities. When large blocks
are traded, negotiations between the two parties usually take place off the ex-
change floor, but the transaction takes place on the exchange and the price is
registered by the exchange. When off-the-exchange (OTE) transactions take
place, the transfer is registered at the Central Depository, but the price is not
recorded. In spite of these restrictions, there are almost five times as many OTE
transactions as BSE-Sofia transactions (See Table 7). On the other hand, the
number of shares transferred in these OTE transactions tend to be smaller than
BSE-Sofia transactions.
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND MANAGING BOARDS OF BSE-SOFIA
BSE-Sofia is a joint-stock company. The State holds the largest stake (37.6%).
More than two-thirds of the remaining shares are held by financial institutions,
i.e. banks, investment intermediaries, financial brockerage firms, and insurance
companies. Pursuant to the legislation, non-State shareholders cannot directly
or through related persons hold more than 5% of shares in BSE-Sofia. 
BSE-Sofia has a one-tier system of management represented by a Board of
Directors. The Board of Directors is responsible for the current operation of the
exchange. All decisions concerning membership, securities trading, and sanc-
tions on members of the exchange are coordinated with a special committee in
accordance with the legislation. The committee is a five-member body, includ-
ing representatives of shareholders in the exchange, members of the exchange,
stock brokers and issuers of securities.
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MEMBERSHIP AND ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES
The BSE-Sofia operates under a system of regulations and requirements that
aim to guarantee transparency of transactions, equality among participants, and
strict performance of obligations.
Under the rules of the exchange members must:
¥ be investment intermediaries licensed to execute transactions in securities,
in accordance with the provisions of the law, and banks licensed for such ac-
tivity, in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Banks, and listed in
the registrar of SSC;
¥ not be members of any other stock exchange in the Republic of Bulgaria;
¥ be members of the Central Depository, or have contract with a member of
the Central Depository;
¥ hold not less than 1000 shares of the capital of the Exchange;
¥ have full-time or part-time labor contracts with a minimum of two stock bro-
kers.
Presently 78 Bulgarian institutions have been approved as members Ð 56 in-
vestment intermediaries and 22 banks. Among them 12 (5 investment interme-
diaries and 7 banks) are owned by foreign institutions.
The BSE-Sofia has established an arbitration court to hear claims against mem-
bers of the exchange regarding the settlement and execution of transactions.
The arbitration court decides disputes on the basis of law, stock exchange rules
and common stock trading practice. The chairman of the arbitration court is
elected by the general meeting of the exchange and serves for three years.
MARKET SEGMENTS
In establishing the BSE-Sofia there has been a contradiction between trying to
serve the widest possible clientele and creating a transparent market, because
the big amount of companies that were privatized through the mass privatiza-
tion program presented the BSE-Sofia with a problem. While these firms had
been required to provide financial information before the mass privatization
auctions began, this information was inadequate for tradable securities under
Bulgarian law. The law requires publicly tradable companies to produce a well
prescribed prospectus. If trading in shares were to begin quickly following the
mass privatization auctions, it would not have been possible for most compa-
nies to produce an adequate prospectus. To manage this problem, the BSE-
Sofia decided to create two types of markets: an official market and a free mar-
ket. These designations are designed to signal what kind of information is being
made available by the company. 
The Official Market for Shares
The official market for shares has been broken down into segments that are
largely based on the number of years of audited financial statements. The stan-
dards for listing in each segment are described in Table 14. At the end of June
1999, 3 companies are traded on segment ×AÒ, 5 companies on segment ×BÒ,
and 23 companies on segment ×CÒ.
TABLE14. Standards for Listing on the Official Market of BSE-Sofia
Source: Rules of operation of BSE-Sofia
The three companies on segment ÒAÓ are all industrial companies. ÒPolimeriÓ
and ÒOlovno Zinkov KompleksÓ are large companies privatized through the
mass privatization. ÒElkabelÓ, producer of industrial cables, was one of the few
companies privatized through sales of shares on the stock exchange. Segment
B has four pharmaceutical companies (minority stakes in the mass privatization)
and a private bank Ð ÒCCBÓ. Listed on the C segment are fifteen former priva-
tization funds, one private bank (ÒBRIBÓ), and ÒElektroimpexÓ another firm pri-
vatized through selling its shares on the stock exchange. The only important of
the industrial company on the C segment is ÒVarnenska KorabostroitelnizaÓ,
the Varna shipyard.23
The most important condition which differentiates the companies on different
segments of the official market is the number of years of audited financial state-
ments. This applies directly to privatization funds which have been converted
to investment or holding companies. Since they have existed for less than three
years, they do not qualify for the ÒAÓ or ÒBÓ segments of the market.
The other requirements have not created serious barriers to potential listings.
Neither the market capitalization requirement nor the constraint on the per-
centage of publicly traded shares is particularly limiting. The market capitaliza-
tion requirement for ÒCÓ segment trading is reasonably low ($280,000). Nearly
all firms in the mass privatization program had at least 25% of their shares of-
fered in the auctions so this is not a major constraint.
Most firms that are traded on the exchange have participated in the mass pri-
vatization and almost all of them have many shareholders. Delisting has oc-
curred, however. When the StateÕs stake in ÒMDKÓ, a large metalurgy compa-
ny producing copper, was sold to the Belgian company, ÒUnion MinierreÓ,
ÒUnion MinierreÓ bought out the remaining shareholders.
The last two conditions, positive financial results and payments of dividends,
have not prevented any firms from being listed, but they could in the future. On
one hand the requirement that firms have positive financial results has not been
enforced. On the other since state enterprises with positive profits were re-
quired to pay 50% of their profits in dividends to the Government, these firms
Official market
















minimum 25% minimum 10% minimum 10%
Number of
shareholders
minimum 500 minimum 250 minimum 250
Positive financial
results
for the last 3
years
for the last fiscal
year
-
Dividend At least once in
the last 3 years
- -
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23 Recently ÒVarnenska KorabosrtoitelnizaÓ has been moved to the Òfree marketÓ because the
company was announced insolvent.
automatically satisfy this requirement. It remains to be seen whether this re-
quirement will become a problem in the future or indeed be enforced.
The barriers to listing on the official market are very low, yet there are very few
firms on the official market. The problem lies in the origin of the market. Almost
all the firms have been privatized through the mass privatization process and
they do not see possibility of raising additional capital on the stock exchange.
As described in Section II.3., the firms do not have the incentive to participate
in the capital market. Participation is costly and the firms see few benefits. 
A similar pattern has developed on the Prague Stock Exchange. Between 1991-
1998, no private Czech company has carried out an initial public offering. As
Johnson and Shleifer (1999) point out, this contrasts sharply with the Warsaw
exchange where 136 non-privatizing companies have made public offering
over the same period and more than US $1 billion in new shares funds were
raised in 1998 alone.24
THE OFFICIAL MARKET FOR BONDS
There is also a fourth segment of the official market: the bond segment. The
BSE-Sofia is obliged to list on the official market all securities that are issued or
guaranteed by the State or the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB).25 In addition it
must list all securities issued by international institutions in which the Republic
of Bulgaria is a member.
While government securities, municipal bonds and corporate bonds are sup-
posed to be listed on the bond segment, presently, there are no trading with
government bonds. The obstacles to trading government securities are mainly
technical, because while the BSE-Sofia works with the Central Depository, the
registration and settlement of government securities are administered by the
BNB.New issues of government securities are handled by primary dealers that
have been selected by the Ministry of Finance. At present, these are mainly
large commercial banks. Secondary trade in government securities, however, is
not well-developed. Most secondary trades are executions of repurchase
agreements. A secondary market in government securities is a real possibility.
This would expand the scope of trading on the BSE-Sofia and increase the vol-
ume on the exchange. Since they are generally considered the asset carrying
the lowest risk, government securities are an important asset in most diversified
portfolios. At the same time the interest rate on government securities provides
an important basis against which riskier securities can be measured.
The market in government securities in Bulgaria is small at present. The gov-
ernment has initial surplus in the budget so the bonds that the government is is-
suing are for refinancing paper which is coming due. It should be noted that be-
cause of the importance of the government securities markets, several Asian
governments have issued government securities even though they did not need
the money to finance government expenditures.26
There are certain requirements as regards corporate bonds. To issue bonds on
the market corporations must meet the following conditions: (1) the issuer
should have completed no less than three fiscal years since the date of initial
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24 Johnson and Shleifer argue that failure of firms to raise additional capital on the Czech markets
is strong indicator of the problems that exist in the Czech markets. In explaining the contrast-
ing behavior in Poland and the Czech Republic, they focus on differences in the regulatory en-
vironment, not the methods of privatization. While the Bulgarian regulatory framework is far
from perfect, it is substantially stronger than the Czech framework was during this period. 
25 The internal rules of operation of BSE-Sofia in principle allow for trading securities issued or
guaranteed by BNB on the official market for bonds. At the same time, because of the regula-
tions related to the role of BNB as a Currency Board it canÕt issue or guarantee securities at this
stage.
26 It should be noted that the entire first section of the recent OECD (1998) report on capital mar-
kets in transition economies is devoted to government securities markets. In Russia government
securities were a major attraction for foreign investors.
registration; (2) the nominal size of the issue should be no less than BGL 100
million; (3) a minimum of 25% of the issue should be publicly offered.
Many market participants expressed the view that the opportunities for issuing
new bonds appear better than the opportunities for issuing new shares. Banks
are presently charging between 14-16% on new loans for working capital and
even higher for investment loans while deposit rates are 3-4%. Issuing bonds
would be a way of exploiting this big spread. Thus far there is only one issuer.
ÒProsoftÓ, a computer company, issued the first bond on the stock exchange in
August 1999. There is no collateral for the bond, but the issue is insured by one
of the largest insurance companies, and the company showed excellent finan-
cial results for 1998. As of November 1999, the success in selling the issue is still
limited.
It is important that the Commercial Code regulates that bonds may be issued
from the joint-stock companies if minimum two years after their listing in the
trade register are completed and if there are two annual fiscal reports accept-
ed by the general meeting.Another possibility is the issuance of municipal
bonds. Sofia municipality successfully issued a bond in Luxembourg where the
market is deeper. Two other municipalities have applied to issue bonds and the
SvishtovÕs request was recently approved by the SSC after completion of a long
procedure. The difficulty for municipalities issuing bonds is that their revenue
base is dependent on the central government so lenders have to take these ad-
ditional risks into consideration.27 Sofia was a special case since the municipal-
ity managers in the capital exert so much influence on the central government.
FREE MARKET
The free market is a single undifferentiated market. Companies listed on the
free market fall into three categories: a) companies that have not applied for
listing and registration on the official market, b) companies that have applied to
be listed and registered on the official market, but have been refused and c)
companies from the mass privatization, that do not meet the standards of the
official market are also listed.
PRIVATIZATION SEGMENT
Recently a privatization segment has been opened on BSE-Sofia. Until July 1999
the Government has used the free market of BSE-Sofia in order to offer state
owned shares for privatization. Primarily shares of companies which were in-
cluded in the Òfirst waveÓ of mass privatization were offered. (See Table B7. In
Appendix B) With the opening of a special segment where trading rules will dif-
fer from other segments the Government intends to use BSE-Sofia for privatiza-
tion more intensively.
TRADING SYSTEM
Trading sessions on the BSE-Sofia are held each working day. The BSE-Sofia us-
es a continuous order-driven system. Buy and sell orders are entered into an
electronic trading system that handles orders automatically. Standard types of
orders can be executed including limit, all or nothing, market, day, good till
cancelled.
There are advantages and disadvantages to using a continuous order-driven sys-
tem when markets are so illiquid.28 Since order flow is so small, continuous
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27 Svishtov attempted, unsuccesfully, to obtain bank guarantees or insurance for the loan. If prob-
lems arise, investors will have to go to court and sue the municipality which is cumbersome
process. The maturity of the bond is seven years and the bond will pay a variable interest rate
of base rate plus 3%. The investment intermediary that is organizing the subscription has an-
nounced that it intends to sell the bonds on the stock exchange.
28 See Pohl, Jedrzejczak and Anderson, ÒCreating Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe,
World Bank Technical Paper No. 295,Ó 1995, for discussion of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of various options.
trading can cause large swings in prices. Because they can be manipulated,
continuous markets have to be carefully monitored.
BSE-Sofia has been concerned with problems that have arisen on the trading
system. Cross-dealing, where the same broker is on both sides of the trade, has
been a problem. The electronic system was modified so that the trades did not
execute immediately. This made it possible for another broker to step into the
trade before both sides could be executed. Later this rule has been abandoned. 
Another problem have been all or nothing type or orders, because execution
priorities (price and time) are difficult to be followed in the presence of such or-
ders. To deal with this, the system is trying to execute all or nothing kind of or-
ders by accumulating counter-orders until the requested number of shares is
reached. 
Price volatility has been reduced by putting constraints on price movements for
securities traded on both the official and the free market. For the official mar-
ket prices were initially limited to a range within +/- 5% of the average-
weighted price of all transactions executed during the session when an issue
was last traded. Subsequently, this range was widened up to +/-15%. Price
limitations on orders executed on the free market were initially +/- 25%. They
were widened up to +/-30% as well. The trading system allows entering or-
ders that are outside these limits only in special cases arising from specific new
public information or from relatively long periods with no trading. 
Transactions involving large blocks of securities can be negotiated between
members off the floor. These ÒblockÓ trades must still be executed on the floor
of the BSE- Sofia. Securities must be approved for block trading. The Board of
Directors meets regularly, but not less than once a quarter, to review the list.
The list is published in the official bulletin of the Exchange. For each issue on
the block-trading list, the Board of Directors determines also the minimum
number of shares which form a package for block trading.
The price of block transactions cannot differ significantly from the price of floor
transactions. Price limitations relative to floor transactions for each issue on the
block-trading list are determined also by the Board of Directors. The price
range depends on market conditions and liquidity of the issue. Recent price
limitations are +/- 30% on the official market, and +/- 100% on the free mar-
ket.29
Fees collected by the exchange include membership fees, initial registration
fees, registration maintenance fees, and transaction fees. The transaction fees
are 0.2% of the value of share transaction, and 0.01% and 0.002% of the val-
ue of corporate bond and government security transactions, respectively. Initial
registration and registration maintenance fees depend on the value of the issue.
Given the very low levels of liquidity for the shares of all but a few companies,
BSE-Sofia should consider the possibility of following the lead of several other
stock exchanges in Europe and create two separate trading systems. Shares in
companies that trade frequently should continue to use the continuous order-
driven system that is presently in place. Shares in companies that trade infre-
quently could use a call auction system where orders might trade once a day.
This may improve the liquidity of the shares in companies that do not trade of-
ten.30
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29 Many of these trades violate provisions in the LSSEIC which require a public auction when ac-
quiring a major interest in a company. There has been no enforcement of this provision of the
law.
30 The Riga Stock Exchange went from a call auction system to a continuous order driven system
in 1997. This is one of the few examples we have where trading systems were changed. Kairys,
et. al., (1999) find that this change greatly increased overall trading on the Riga Stock Exchange,
but the volume of trading in low liquidity shares fell significantly.
CLEARING, SETTLEMENT AND GUARANTY FUND
The process of clearing and settlement starts from day T when the transaction
is executed. After the trading sessions the BSE-Sofia makes a gross-basis report
for the shares traded and for the related money transfers. It sends the report to
the Central Depository. The Central Depository checks the sellersÕ security bal-
ances and sends orders for executing money transfers to the banks where in-
vestment intermediaries keep their accounts. On day T+2, the Central
Depository receives confirmation from banks that transfers have been done and
executes settlement. On day T+3, the BSE-Sofia receives confirmation from
the Central Depository that the security transfers have been registered.
The adopted procedure practically executes each transaction without doing
clearing in advance due to the impossibility of clearing within the banking pay-
ment system. Such procedure requires relatively more money from the invest-
ment intermediaries to be involved in the process than actually needed and
makes their trading activity less flexible.
A Guaranty Fund has also been established by the BSE-Sofia to secure settle-
ment of floor transactions. All members of the BSE-Sofia must participate in the
Guaranty Fund. Members contribute 5% of the their average value daily vol-
ume during the last reporting period. However, block transactions are not guar-
anteed by the Guaranty Fund. If the seller is short of securities or the buyerÕs
account in the bank has insufficient funds, no settlement of the transaction
takes place.
DISCLOSURE RULES
According to LPOS issuers whose stock is listed on the BSE-Sofia are obliged to
provide extensive information to the market. These requirements are similar to
the reporting requirements of the SSC. (See discussion of general disclosure
rules in Section V.2.) The managing boards and the executive members of is-
suers whose stock is listed on the exchange are responsible for complete and
timely disclosure of information which might influence the market price of the
stock.
In reality few companies comply with this requirement. Those which are listed
on the official market have contracts with BSE-Sofia and provide information.
But only small fraction of the companies listed on the free market provide in-
formation to BSE-Sofia. Actually less than 70 companies out of about 850 listed
on the free market supply information on regular basis. It should be noted that
there are many companies which supply information to the SSC but donÕt sup-
ply information to the BSE-Sofia which calls for better coordination between
these important institutions.
At this stage BSE-Sofia has no legal mechanism to enforce compliance on is-
suers. The only measure it could take is to stop the their stock from trading
which in practice will hurt shareholders interest.
At the same time BSE-Sofia has surveillance and enforcement responsibilities
with respect to investment intermediaries. It has the responsibility to control
trade, to watch for manipulative trades and to inspect investment intermedi-
aries but the practical procedures are still not well established. BSE-Sofia can
impose fine on investment intermediaries or it can remove them temporarily
from trade.
2. INVESTMENT INTERMEDIARIES
The LPOS specifies that all transactions in securities must be executed by li-
censed investment intermediaries. Licenses for investment intermediaries are
obtained from the SSC with one exception Ð commercial banks. They obtain li-
censes for banking activity from the BNB. Once they have such banking license
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they donÕt need to apply for investment intermediary license. They have only
to register with the SSC that they carry out such activity.
The SSC is responsible for regulation of investment intermediaries. It is also re-
sponsible for regulation commercial banks with respect to their activities as in-
vestment intermediaries on the capital market. These regulations include capi-
tal adequacy and liquidity requirements, competency standards for managers,
and certified brokers on staff.
The SSC issues two types of licenses. A more limited license allows investment
intermediaries to perform brokerage services. A broader license allows inter-
mediaries to broker, deal on their own account and underwrite new issues.
According to the repealed LSSEIC investment intermediaries in Bulgaria were
permitted to combine trading activities with securities and portfolio manage-
ment activities for institutional investors. The potential conflict of interest was
widely discussed in professional circles. As a result of this the new LPOS in-
cludes requirements for the separatation of trading with securities from portfo-
lio management and assignes portfolio management to specialized Ômanaging
companiesÕ whose activities would also be regulated by the SSC.
In June 1999, there were 105 investment intermediaries, including commercial
banks registered (but not licensed) as investment intermediaries by SSC. Of
these only 73 are members of the BSE-Sofia and have trading posts on the ex-
change. To be a member the investment intermediary must be a shareholder in
the BSE-Sofia. To have a trading post the intermediary must also have two li-
censed brokers working on the exchange. To obtain a license brokers must pass
SSC exams.
Trading is dominated by a few large investment intermediaries. Seven or eight
major investment intermediaries control 55-65% of the transaction turnover on
the BSE-Sofia. The most active 20 intermediaries cover nearly 80% of BSE
turnover. With the low turnover on the BSE-Sofia, it is difficult to see how the
remaining intermediaries will remain in business.
3. CENTRAL DEPOSITORY 
The Central Depository (CD) was established as a joint-stock company in
August 1996. Under the LPOS and also under the repealed LSSEIC, all public
companies have dematerialized shares, and the shareholder registration books
of these companies are kept by the CD. Furthermore, since transactions are
cleared through the CD, it also acts as a transfer agent. The establishment of the
CD has facilitated transactions in securities, and eliminated many problems that
have arisen in other transition economies where the registration books have
been kept by companies.
Shareholders in the CD are the big commercial banks, the Bulgarian National
Bank (BNB), and the Ministry of Finance (MF). The CD has a five-member
Board of Directors. The BNB and MF have one representative each. The BNB
and MF have the power to veto decisions of the general meeting of sharehold-
ers.
Membership in the CD is important since only members can interact directly
with the CD to register transactions. Anyone else wishing to register their trans-
actions must be represented by a member of the CD. Members of the CD in-
clude investment intermediaries, investment companies, the stock exchange,
and foreign depository and clearing institutions. Members must meet specific
financial, technical and operational requirements. The financial requirements
include the maintenance of bank balances needed for settlement operations
and contributions to the Guarantee Fund.
The CD keeps the official shareholders registration books. All transactions,
whether they occur on the BSE-Sofia or off- the Ðexchange, must be recorded
at the CD. Since only members can interact with the CD, all transactions take
place through investment intermediaries. When transaction occur off the ex-
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change the investment intermediaries just present the documents demonstrat-
ing that a transaction has occurred between two individuals. The CD just regis-
ters it. Clearing the transaction is the responsibility of the two individuals. When
transactions occur on the BSE-Sofia, clearing and settlement occurs within
three days. The CD administers a Guarantee Fund that is used for preventive
measures and compensation of damages emerging out of the depositoryÕs ac-
tivities.
Each investor have a right to access the Central Depository registers through the
members of the CD only with respect to the owned by him shares, to the se-
curities transactions if he/she is a party, as well as with respect to all the data
from the Book of the shareholders or bond-owners in which he/she is a share-
holder or bond-owner (Art. 133 (1), LPOS). While it is really important to pro-
tect transactions data, it is difficult under these circumstances to receive infor-
mation on the changing structure of ownership in the economy. In this respect
it is more difficult to argue that aggregate data describing the structure of own-
ership in the economy should be so protected.
Presently the CD has performed well. There have been few disputes arising
from improper registration of shareholders, and there is growing confidence
that transactions will be settled expeditiously. 
4. THE STATE SECURITIES COMMISSION (SSC)
LEGAL STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SSC
The SSC was created to ensure the protection of the interests of investors and
to stimulate the development of the securities market. The SSC has regulatory
authority and control over: the issuance and transactions in securities; the es-
tablishment and the activity of stock exchanges; the establishment and activi-
ties of investment intermediaries and investment companies. 
The SSC is a seven person commission. The chairman and the members of the
SSC are appointed by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the
Minister of Finance for a period of five (5) years. Members can only be removed
after conducting an intentional crime prosecuted by the state with an effective
verdict on the infringement of the LPOS provisions or in case of inability to ex-
ercise duties for more than 6 months. The individual administrative acts issued
by the SSC can only be challenged before the Supreme Administrative Court. 
CONTROL EXERCISED BY THE SSC
The regulatory function of the SSC relates primarily to the drafting and enact-
ment of regulations under the powers prescribed in the law. Drafts of regula-
tions are then submitted to the Council of Ministers for final adoption. In most
cases the Council of Ministers has adopted, without major objections, the drafts
prepared by the SSC. 
In April 1998 the SSC was instrumental for the changes and amendments of LS-
SEIC, which was in force at that time, in some important aspects which had se-
rious positive impact on the organization of the capital market. These included
the definition of public company, public companiesÕ obligation to have only
dematerialized registered shares, public companiesÕ obligation to keep their
shareholdersÕ books only with the Central Depository. Also, the SSC played a
significant role in the drafting and enactment by the Parliament of the new
LPOS, that pursues as one of its aims to bring the legislation closer to the EC di-
rectives. It organized several public discussions of LPOS in the professional cir-
cles, as well. 
The most important activity of the SSC is licensing and supervision of agents
that come under its jurisdiction. Agents are required to file reports with the SSC
on a periodic basis and are obligated to notify the SSC when important changes
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occur. The SSC can also has the power to request information and/or make on
site inspections.
If the SSC finds violations of the law or the need to protect investors, the SSC
has the power to impose administrative sanctions including the suspension of
trading, the convening of meetings of corporate boards, and the withdrawal of
a license. The chairman of the SSC is empowered to impose administrative
penalties, in the form of fines in cases where infractions of the applicable rules
and regulations have been established.
V. SECURITIES LAWS
1. MAIN NORMATIVE ACTS REGULATING THE BULGARIAN
CAPITAL MARKET
The main normative acts regulating the capital market in Bulgaria are: The Law
On Public Offering of Securities (LPOS) (published in the State Gazette, num-
ber 114 of 1999); The Ordinance On The Prospectuses In The Case Of Public
Offering Of Securities (published in the State Gazette number 23 of 1996); The
Ordinance On The Licenses For The Carrying Out Of The Activity Of A Stock
Exchange, An Investment Intermediary And An Investment Company (pub-
lished in the State Gazette, number 23 of 1996); The Ordinance On The
Activity Of Investment Intermediaries (published in the State Gazette number
95 of 1997); The Ordinance On The Capital Adequacy Of Investment
Intermediaries (published in the State Gazette, number 95 of 1997); The
Ordinance On The Minimal Content Of Proxies Regarding General
ShareholdersÕ Meetings Of Public Companies (published in the State Gazette,
number 124 of 1997); The Ordinance on the Requirements in Respect of the
Physical Persons which Directly Conclude and Perform Transactions in
Securities and on the Order to Aquire the Right to Carry Out Such Activity
(published in the State Gazette, 8 of 1998). 
The repealed LSSEIC, adopted in 1995, was the first Bulgarian legislation de-
signed to regulate the securities market. The LSSEIC regulated the issuance of
securities, trading in securities, the establishment and activity of stock ex-
changes, investment intermediaries and investment companies. The LSSEIC es-
tablished requirements for disclosure of information by issuers of publicly trad-
ed securities, proxy solicitation and special rules for investor protection like dis-
closure of major shareholdings in companies whose shares have been subject
to a public offering. 
The LSSEIC also provided for the legal basis for the creation of the Securities
and Stock Exchanges Commission (SSEC), renamed in the new LPOS to the
State Securities Commission (SSC). The SSC is the designated authority with the
responsibility to ensure the practical functioning of the regulations under the
law. 
The LSSEIC and the Law on Privatization Funds provided a legal framework for
the mass privatization process. These laws enabled the mass privatization
process to proceed in a relatively well-regulated environment. The Law on
Privatization Funds introduced licensing requirements for the privatization
funds and rules for continuous monitoring of the funds by the SSEC at that time.
These regulations included compliance with provisions regarding the diversifi-
cation of fund portfolios and other restrictions and prohibitions designed to
protect the interests of investors.
During the past four years the experience with the LSSEIC has revealed a num-
ber of shortcomings. Although most provisions of the LSSEIC were broadly in
harmony with relevant EU Directives, several provisions of the LSSEIC needed
to be modified if the law is to be consistent with EU standards. In connection
to this the Parliament has enacted the new Law on Public Offering of Securities.
This new law makes Bulgarian securities law nearly compatible with the stan-
dards and requirements of the most important EU directives. The new law in-
creases the investigation capabilities and strengthen enforcement mechanisms
available to the SSC. The new law also grants the SSC wider powers with re-
spect to the activities of the stock exchange and the Central Depository. In ad-
dition, the SSC is granted broader possibilities to introduce ordinances; thus
providing more flexibility to respond quickly to changes that are occurring in
the market. Overall, the new law marks a serious step in the direction of im-
provement in the legal structure of the securities market and brings Bulgarian
law closer to respective EU requirements and practices. A more detailed com-
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parison of the currently in force LPOS, repealed LSSEIC, EU and Czech laws is
provided in Appendix A.
At this stage enforcement is a bigger challenge than the passage of good law.
While the laws are similar to laws in European countries, many provisions of the
LSSEIC were more appropriate for a developed market and had proven to be
inadequate or unsuitable for the reality of an emerging securities market. Many
provisions had not been implemented in practice. For example, while rules ex-
ist for auction offers for the acquisition and exchange of shares, these provisions
had never been enforced. Although the SSC is vested with substantial powers
to license and control the activities of market participants, it has not yet been
able to establish effective procedures for identification of violations. As a result
the SSC has not yet been able to demand strict adherence to established re-
quirements and rules, nor has it adequately penalized infractions. More flexi-
bility is necessary to accommodate the EU standards and the needs of the
emerging Bulgarian market. It should be noted that recently SSC has taken se-
rious measures to penalize investment intermediaries involved in illegal trans-
actions in order to keep confidence in the market and to protect investors. 
2. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
The LPOS lays down formal requirements for the disclosure of information to
the SSC and to the BSE-Sofia. The rules require that annual and six-month re-
ports be submitted and that additional reports be submitted at shorter intervals
when requested by the SSC. 
Issuers are required to submit an annual report within 90 days of the end of the
financial year. The annual report must contain data about the issuer and its
business, the members of its governing and supervisory boards, the persons
holding or controlling more than 10 per cent of the votes in the general meet-
ing, as well as any other information that may be required by the commission.
The six-month report must be submitted within 60 days following the mid-point
of the fiscal year and must contain a financial statement for the previous six
months and any other information requested by the commission. In both cases
the issuer must also publish a notice within seven days of submission of the re-
port. The notice, which must appear in two national daily newspapers and in
the official bulletin of the SSC, should describe the place, the time and a way
to obtain the report so that it can be inspected. 
The issuer is also obliged to provide information on a timely basis to the SSC
whenever: (a) there is any amendment to the Articles of Association; (b) there
are any alterations in the governing boards; (c) any contentious issues arising in
court proceedings; (d) execution of collateral proceedings have been institut-
ed; (e) insolvency proceedings have begun; (f) any resolution is put forth to
transform the company; and (g) any changes occur in the business which may
directly or indirectly influence the price or quotation of the securities. 
In spite of the legal requirements to file reports with the SSC, many companies
do not. According to information provided by the SSC only 860 out of 1142
public companies and investment intermediaries have submitted reports for
1999 in a timely manner. As this suggests, ensuring compliance with the statu-
tory requirements is a serious problem. Many companies lack the motivation to
disclose information, because the potential advantages and benefits provided
by the chance to raise funds in the capital market remain distant and, hence,
are not appreciated by the companiesÕ managers. 
Issuers are obliged to disclose information also to the BSE-Sofia when their se-
curities are trading there. But even less companies supply information to the
Exchange Ð only about 10% of the listed companies. This makes impossible to
obtain information from the BSE-Sofia on many companies, including some of
the largest and most liquid.
The existing legislation is not sufficiently clear and unequivocal regarding the
scope of information to be reported. The legislation does not spell out the lia-
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bility of members of the governing boards when reports contain false, incom-
plete or misleading information that damages shareholders. To ensure compli-
ance with the statutory requirements for disclosure of information, the SSC
needs to adopt ordinances that lay out the required contents of the regular re-
ports submitted by public companies and then impose administrative sanc-
tions.
According to the law, the SSC must make this information available to the pub-
lic, thereby ensuring investorsÕ access. In practice, however, access often has
been limited or provided in a form which makes it difficult to use. These prob-
lems exist at both the SSC and BSE-Sofia. Reports are not sufficiently uniform
and part of the information provided is not up-to-date. This makes comparisons
between companies difficult. In some cases access is further limited by cum-
bersome procedures which discourage all but the most aggressive clients.
While these problems make it more difficult for professional institutional in-
vestors, the effects are particularly damaging for the individual, non-profes-
sional, investors. 
Recent efforts have been made particularly by the SSC to improve significantly
the process of providing investors with information. It opened for the public an
Information Center. It is expected that access to information will continue to
improve with the future development of the Center and with the improvement
of the technical specifications of the register itself. 
Another important area is accounting procedures and standards. Present law
requires each joint-stock company to close the financial year after an audit by
a chartered accountant appointed by the general meeting of shareholders. This
requirement applies to all public and private joint-stock companies. Two im-
portant issues must be faced. First, important differences still persist between
national and international accounting standards. This makes it very difficult and
expensive for foreign investors to interpret Bulgarian financial statements. This
leads to the perception by foreign investors that Bulgarian companies are high
risk, effectively increasing the cost of financing for Bulgarian companies.
Second, liability of auditors vis-a-vis shareholders is not well established.
Shareholders cannot be confident that all auditors have always fulfilled their
obligations in good faith. This weakens the position of shareholders in their po-
sition as monitors and controllers of the companyÕs activities. From this per-
spective, a legislation that gives shareholders the right to sue auditors would
create pressure for better financial statements and would improve the position
of shareholders.
VI. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Good corporate governance arrangements need to be supported by good laws
and a high-quality judicial system. But this is not enough. It is equally important
that a tradition develops that supports moral and ethical conduct in business af-
fairs. Only then will there be a general climate which promotes good corporate
governance. 
Both the legal environment and the social environment are presently underde-
veloped in Bulgaria. The courts have no previous experience with issues relat-
ed to corporate governance in a market environment. The lack of tradition in-
creases the importance of more stringent and detailed regulation of governance
relations through company law.
Under the present Commercial Code, joint-stock companies (which include all
public companies traded in the capital market) are governed by a) a general
meeting of shareholders and b) board of directors (one-tier management sys-
tem) or supervisory board and managing board (two-tier management system). 
The Commercial Code specifies that the general meeting of shareholders in-
cludes all shareholders with voting rights. Shareholders can attend the meeting
either in person or by proxy. The general meeting has the powers to: 
¥ amend the Articles of Association;
¥ increase and reduce capital;
¥ transform and wind-up the company;
¥ appoint and remove the members of the board of directors (one-tier system)
and supervisory board (two-tier system);
¥ determine the compensation of the members of the board of directors or
the supervisory board
¥ appoint and remove chartered accountants (auditors);
¥ approve the issue of debentures;
¥ appoint liquidators in the event of winding up, except for the case of insol-
vent liquidation;
¥ exempt from liability the members of the supervisory board or the manag-
ing board (two-tier system), and members of the board of directors (one-tier
system);
¥ determine all other issues falling within its competence by virtue of the law
or of the Articles of Association.
As a general rule, the resolutions of the general meeting are passed by a simple
majority of the shares represented. The law specifies only three exceptions. A
two-thirds majority of the shares represented at a general meeting is required
for resolutions: (1) to amend the Articles of Association, (2) to transform the pur-
pose of the company or (3) to wind-up the company. 
The Articles of Association may provide for larger majorities for certain resolu-
tions, and this practice is common. Unfortunately such provisions can make it
more difficult to conduct business. When there are several large shareholders,
the specification of a supermajority in the Articles of Association to pass certain
resolutions can give a large minority shareholder the power to reject many res-
olutions. In some cases such supermajority provisions become in practice tan-
tamount to a unanimity rule .
The Commercial Code also defines special voting rules for some resolutions of
the managing board or the board of directors. Unanimity is required by the
board of directors (or preliminary consent of the supervisory board under the
two-tier system) when significant changes occur such as closing down or trans-
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ferring substantial parts of the enterprise, making substantial changes in the
companyÕs business, reorganising the company or opening a new branch.
There were important weaknesses in the Commercial Code and the repealed
LSSEIC which were corrected with the new LPOS. The most important are the
following: 
1. CONSTRAINTS ON SHAREHOLDER POWER
One area where the repealed LSSEIC made it difficult for shareholders to exer-
cise their rights as owners were the rules regarding attendance at the general
meeting. The old rules did not explicitly regulate the place and the terms for
holding a general meeting. Governing boards have convened general meetings
at unreasonably long intervals or have chosen a location that is difficult to reach
(e.g. locations that cannot be reached by public transportation). The LPOS has
introduced the requirements for the general meeting of the public company to
be held in the principal place of business of the company. The regular general
meeting should be held by the end of the first half-year after the end of the fis-
cal year.
Another problem which had existed is that it was difficult for shareholders to
organise in opposition to management. While the Central Depository is the
central registry also when the repealed LSSEIC was in force, shareholders
couldnÕt obtain information on other shareholders from the Central Depository.
The SSEC only provided information on shareholders who own more than 10%
of the shares in the company. At the same time, no rules required the man-
agement of a public company to provide information from their list of share-
holders. For these reasons, one or more shareholders of a given public compa-
ny who would wish to discuss the companyÕs business with other shareholders,
address proposals to them, or organise a meeting with other shareholders were
virtually unable to do so. The new LPOS introduced the requirement for the
Central Depository to provide data to the investors with respect to the owned
by them securities and transactions to which they are party as well as all the rel-
evant information from the Book of shareholders or the Book of the bond-own-
ers of the company in which they are respectively shareholders or bond-own-
ers.
Shareholders should also have the right to convene a general meeting and set
its agenda. A general meeting of a joint-stock company may currently be con-
vened by shareholders holding at least 10 per cent of the capital. This rule is the
same for all joint stock companies, whether public or not. In public companies,
especially, this rule makes it difficult for minority shareholders to protect their
own rights. Such difficulties are encountered not only by individual sharehold-
ers but also by institutional shareholders such as investment companies, pen-
sion funds and insurance companies have relatively small shareholdings. If the
requirement was lowered to 5% as in Germany and Austria, this would
strengthen the rights of minority shareholders. 
It should be underlined that the Law on Public Offering of Securities enables
shareholders holding in group or separately 5 % of the public companyÕs shares
to sue the governing body of a public company for its inability to act threaten-
ing the interests of the company to file an action against third parties. These
shareholders can bring an action in front of the regional court where the regis-
tration of the company took place for intentional crime or gross negligence re-
sulting from action or inaction of the companyÕs governing body.
Presently, minority shareholders have limited possibilities for nominating their
representatives to the governing boards of public companies. The existing leg-
islative rules make it possible for a member holding 50 (or less) per cent of the
companyÕs capital to virtually dominate the election of governing boards. One
way of alleviating this problem would be to establish a rule that ×cumulativeÒ
voting be used in the election of governing boards of public companies. If this
rule were adopted in conjunction with a rule which specified a minimum num-
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ber of board members, then minority shareholders should be able to obtain
representation on the governing boards. To further protect shareholder inter-
ests, the governing body should all stand for election at the same time so that it
is easier to remove a governing body which is not performing well. (Avilov, et.
al., 1999, Art. 117) 
2. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GOVERNING BOARDS
Governing boards play a crucial role in the supervision of the operative man-
agement. Due to this it is of central importance that the members of governing
boards conduct business in the best interest of the company and the share-
holders as a whole. In Bulgaria managers often behave as if they were sole pro-
prietors or consider only the interests of a subset of all the shareholders.
The Commercial Code and LPOS does not spell out the responsibilities of the
governing boards and fails in this respect to draw a distinction between public
and private joint-stock companies. Presently liability of members of governing
boards is limited to three months wages. Sanctions are limited to cases of fail-
ure to comply with reporting requirements pertaining to the commercial regis-
ter and regulatory requirements of the SSC.
The duties of the board of directors should be spelled out more clearly in the
Commercial Code taking into account the directorsÕ needs to have sufficient
discretion to manage the company. The Commercial Code should describe the
basic responsibilities of the board. A recent study by Avilov, et. al. (1999) sug-
gests that company law in transition economies should specify codes of con-
duct Òanchored on the concepts of good faith and interest of the company.Ó31
(Art. 121). Furthermore, these rules Òshould be applied together with more spe-
cific rules on conflicts of interest.Ó (Art. 121)
Presently, some Bulgarian companies suffer because controlling shareholders
siphon off funds to companies that are owned by controlling shareholders. For
example, the public company might sign a ÒsweetheartÓ contract with a com-
pany wholly-owned by controlling shareholders. Under present law this is not
illegal per se. If the Commercial Code were amended, then this would violate
both the code of conduct and conflict of interest provisions.
A problem of corporate governance in Bulgaria is the participation of the gov-
ernment as major shareholder in a large number of commercial companies.
This participation often results in unnecessary politicising of purely economic
decisions. At present, there is no uniform governmental policy with respect to
its role as shareholder. The existing legislation is obsolete and fails to take into
account recent changes in the ownership structure of enterprises. . There is no
consistency in the way various ministries approach their role as representatives
of the State. The result of all this is lower efficiency. A solution is completion of
the privatisation process, but until this is accomplished, the government will re-
main a peculiar factor in terms of corporate governance.
3. ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
Protection of minority rights is particularly difficult in Bulgaria, because the
mass privatization program created very diffuse ownership patterns. Given the
lack of adequate traditions in protecting shareholdersÕ rights and the fact that
the owners and managers of companies still have very short-term horizons, it is
particularly important to legally protect the position of minority shareholders.
The LPOS envisaged new provisions in that respect. One of the most sensitive
areas where minority shareholdersÕ protection is important is the possibility that
majority shareholders will try to dilute the value of minority holdings.
Therefore, the LPOS envisaged that in case of the increase of the capital each
shareholder has the right to obtain shares corresponding to his/her sharehold-
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governing boards are liable if they do not act with Òthe care of a diligent and conscientious
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ings in the capital before it has been increased. This right cannot be revoked
with the resolution of the general meeting. In case of the increase of the capi-
tal of the public company there is a possibility for a general meeting to take a
decision to issue rights, and each shareholder can obtain rights corresponding
to his/her shareholdings before the increase of the capital. LPOS does not allow
for the capital to be increased with non-monetary contributions or under the
condition that a person buyes the emission. Furthermore, a person making a
take-over bit resulting from the acquisition of a more than 50 per cent of the
voting rights in the general meeting, has a right to register a take-over bit to buy
shares of the other shareholders, if subsequently this person acquires directly or
via related persons more than 90 per cent of the voting rights in the general
meeting. This person is also obliged upon request to buy the shares of each of
the other shareholders. The provisions allows minority shareholders to liquidate
their investment under the fair market conditions in case they are not interest-
ed in keeping the shares of the company. 
4. ENFORCEMENT
A serious problem for Bulgaria is the lack of an adequate judicial infrastructure
for settling complex business disputes. This also fully applies to issues of corpo-
rate governance. The entries in the court registers, the protection of sharehold-
ersÕ rights, the liability of the management are only some of the issues giving rise
to contradictory case-law. The Ministry of Justice should provide special train-
ing for judges in matters pertaining to corporate governance and control.
Any single law itself is not sufficient. For example, conflict of interest laws can
be passed which prevent members of governing boards from voting on agree-
ments which involve other companies in which they have an interest. Unless
other members of the governing body object, it is unlikely that these conflicts
of interest will be brought to light. If other members of the governing body are
also liable or if other shareholders have access to information about these ac-
tions, then they are less likely to occur. Still the laws will not be effective unless
the courts enforce them. This requires that the judiciary have sufficient training
to discern what the fundamental issues are. 
However, improvement in legal framework and the involvement of govern-
mental agencies alone will not be enough to solve the problems of corporate
governance. There are many aspects of corporate governance where legal re-
strictions are not appropriate, but codes of conduct could provide guidence in
a situation where there is so little previous experience and practice. The active
commitment of non-governmental organisations and professional associations
should be promoted. These organizations can lay the foundation of positive
norms of behaviour.32
For example, at present there are no rules or criteria concerning who should
serve on corporate boards, nor is there any attempt to regulate what the bal-
ance should be between internal and outside directors. There is also a lack of
understanding of how boards should be structured e.g. committees for com-
pensation, appointments, internal audit. Seldom is there any link between the
direct results of a companyÕs business and the compensation of the members
of its governing boards.
It would be inappropriate to legislate such matters, but it would be extremely
helpful if shareholders and other participants in the governance process had ad-
ditional guidelines to assistant them in organizing effective structures to en-
hance the value of firms. Non-governmental institutions can play an important
role in this area.
50 CSD Reports/ÄÌ‡ÎËÁË 5
32 As Stiglitz (1999) states: ÒThe social and organizational capital needed for the transition cannot
be legislated, decreed, or in some other way imposed from above. People need to take an ac-
tive and constructive role in their self Ðtrasnaformtion; to a large extend, they need to be in
the driverÕs seat.Ó (p. 9)
VII. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
Insurance companies and pension funds are relatively small, at present, and
they are not an important participants on the capital market, but there is no
doubt they will become increasingly important in the future.
1. INSURANCE COMPANIES
In 1998, the insurance sector underwent fundamental restructuring. The
Insurance Supervision Directorate undertook licensing of insurance companies
in accordance with new amendments to the Law on Insurance. A number of in-
surance companies could not meet the new capitalisation requirements, and
the new requirements regarding the origin of capital, and legitimacy of activity
of major shareholders. As a result, the sector has significantly restructured.33
At present, 16 general insurance companies and 6 life insurance companies are
in operation. The sector is highly concentrated. The three largest general insur-
ance companies (including two state-owned) hold 61.3% of the market; the
five largest, 75.2%. Life insurance is even more concentrated. The biggest com-
pany, the State Insurance Institute, controls 76.6% of the market.
Revenues from premiums in the general insurance sector were BGL 198 billion
in 1997 and BLG 226 billion in 1998. Life insurance premiums were BGL 20 bil-
lion in 1997 and BGL 27 billion in 1998. Notwithstanding the 14.1% increase
in general insurance premiums and 35% increase in life insurance premiums,
financial resources controlled by insurance companies are still relatively small.
Total revenues from insurance premiums were 1.27% of GDP in 1997 and
1.18% of GDP in 1998. This compares with 2.9% of GDP (1995) in the Czech
Republic, and 1.6% in Greece, which has the smallest insurance sector in the
EU.
Pursuant to the Law on Insurance, insurance companies must obey certain re-
strictions in their investment policy. These restrictions apply to both general
and life insurance. Insurers are allowed to invest only on the territory of
Bulgaria in the following instruments: securities issued or guaranteed by the
state; real estate; bonds issued or guaranteed by municipalities; securities list-
ed on the stock exchange; bank deposits and loans extended against life insur-
ances. The maximum volume of investments is 5% in bonds, and 10% in list-
ed securities (but not more than 5% of the companyÕs capital). Under Bulgarian
law, there are two additional restrictions: (1) Investment in securities in one
company which exceed 10% of capital must receive approval from the
Insurance Supervision Directorate. (2) Foreign investments must receive explic-
it permission from the Minister of Finance.
At present, insurance companies participate in the capital market in a very lim-
ited way. Few financial instruments meet the investment needs of insurers. Low
liquidity and the low activity level of the stock exchange also discourage par-
ticipation. The insurance companies also lack the expertise, information and
knowledge necessary to invest in risky capital market assets. Because special
permits are required, insurance companies do not invest at present abroad as
well. The result is that insurance companies are mainly invested in medium-
term and long-term government securities. Government securities account for
50-55% of the consolidated investment portfolio of insurance companies.
Another 40-43% of their assets are in bank deposits and barely 1% in shares. 
2. PENSION FUNDS
After the start of economic reforms in 1991, voluntary pension funds emerged
first in early 1994. These funds began operations without any specific regulation
or legal basis. At the beginning of 1999, there were 30 (all private) registered
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pension funds in Bulgaria, but only 12 are actually in operation. It is estimated
that pension funds have attracted about 200,000-250,000 people, or nearly 6-
8% of the total number of employed people.
In July 1999, the Law on Supplementary Pension Insurance (LSPI) was passed.
Pursuant to the law pension funds must now be licensed by a State Agency of
Insurance Supervision (SAIS) Ð a new body established by LSPI. The Agency is
created to be the regulating body for the pension funds focusing entirely on this
new field. It will supervise the activity of pension funds and pension companies.
The Agency is not yet in existence Ð the appointment of members to the SAIS,
the creation of an operating framework and the development of licensing pro-
cedures will take time. Pursuant to the provisions of LSPI, pension funds will
have to meet specific requirements and obey certain restrictions in their in-
vestment policy. Investment instruments will be limited to: securities issued or
guaranteed by the state; stock or corporate bonds traded on the official capital
market; municipal bonds; real estate; foreign government securities or corpo-
rate stock and bonds; and other instruments as decided by the management.
Pension funds must invest at least 50% of their assets in government securities
or bank deposits. Investment in corporate securities, stock and bonds, cannot
exceed 10%. The same restriction of 10% applies to investment in municipal
bonds and real estate. At most 10% of their assets can be invested in foreign
securities. Investments in other instruments shall not exceed 5% of fundÕs total
assets. These restriction will force pension funds, like insurance companies, to
orient their portfolios entirely toward domestic markets. 
Pension funds are estimated to have about BLG 20-25 billion (0.11% of GDP)
in assets. The sector is highly concentrated. The largest fund holds about 45%
of the market; the five largest almost 65%. These funds are almost entirely in-
vested in government securities (84.8% ) and bank deposits 6.2% (1998 fig-
ures). Although the stock exchange has been operating for only a short time,
pension funds have already invested 8.6% of their assets in securities, which is
close to the maximum permitted under the newly adopted law.
OVERVIEW
Insurance companies and pension funds have conservative investment policies
dictated by strong restrictions which limit the scope of their investments. The
capital market is still not capable of providing the financial products necessary
for these institutions to build proper investment portfolios. There are only a
couple of municipal and corporate bonds available, and list of appropriate se-
curities is very short because of low liquidity and high risk. 
At the present stage of development of financial system in Bulgaria, insurance
companies and pension funds are not important players on the capital market.
This notwithstanding, they can be expected to expand their markets gradual-
ly.34 The groundwork for an adequate legal framework has been established.
Their need for investment instruments will inevitably stimulate the develop-
ment of the capital market. This is likely to occur even faster if the arrangements
for using investment bonds to provide supplementary pension insurance in the
Ôsecond waveÕ of mass privatisation is widely applied. (See Section II.2.).
34 Vitas (1998, p.18) argues that given political commitment institutional investors can provide a
strong stimulus to the development of securities market.
VIII. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. CHANGES TO THE LEGAL STRUCTURE
Further Strengthening of the SSC: Banks were automatically given licenses to func-
tion as intermediaries. To act as a reasonable enforcement agency, it must be
clear that the SSEC has the right to revoke these licenses even if they did not
initially grant them. 
Improve Ownership Disclosure Practices: Presently firms are required to report
ownership if the ownership exceeds 10%. In Poland for example firms must re-
port if the ownership levels exceed 10, 20, 33, 50, 66 and 75. More detailed
knowledge of ownership levels would assist the courts and the SSEC in enforc-
ing the securities laws.
Regulation of Holding Companies: Problems in the Czech Republic have demon-
strated that holding companies need to be carefully monitored. At present
there are no special provisions for holding companies. Holding companies
should be treated like financial companies. Laws should be passed which give
special regulatory authority to either an existing regulatory body or a newly cre-
ated regulatory body to supervise the activities of holding companies and de-
velop reporting requirements similar to the requirements for other financial in-
stitutions.
Functioning of the judiciary: New laws must be supported by a well-trained and
experienced judiciary. There are numerous examples where the laws are well
constructed, but their enforcement is a problem. More resources need to be di-
rected at training the judiciary. This training cannot fully substitute for experi-
ence, however. The establishment of special courts to deal with issues of bank-
ruptcy and company law would help promote better capital markets.
Neutral tax laws: Income from government securities and bank deposits is not
taxed, but income from dividends and capital gains are taxed. Tax neutrality
would create a more level playing field and make it easier for the capital mar-
ket to compete with other financial institutions. 
Abandoning preferences for individual investors: Currently, the Ministry of Finance
is offering government securities with preferential (higher) interest rates to indi-
viduals. Institutional investors cannot purchase these securities. These prefer-
ences distort the market competition, distord the financial markets and dis-
courage intermediation. 
Normative Regulations on Municipal Bonds: There is already need to provide fund-
ing to municipalities through the bond market. This can be an important area
for capital market expansion. These can be important assets in pension fund
and insurance portfolios. Three cities have already issued or have requested to
issue bonds. There are serious problems since municipal budgets are not fully
independent from the national budget and municipalities do not have clear le-
gal control over the funds raised through these offerings. New laws that clarify
borrowersÕ obligations would make it easier for this market to expand. The LS-
SEIC and the new LPOS are directed at regulation of primarily corporate bonds,
and these regulations do not address the special issues related to municipal
bonds. 
2. MARKET TRANSPARENCY
Release of more ownership information by Central Depository: The Central
Depository has extensive information on the ownership concentration levels.
This is valuable information for researchers and for participants in the capital
market. Present laws restrict the availability of this information. These laws
should be reviewed and altered in order to encourage greater dissemination of
information. 
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Accounting Standards: Shareholders and potential investors need information to
accurately access the financial condition of publicly-traded companies. It is es-
pecially difficult for foreign investors to determine the financial condition of
Bulgarian firms when the accounting conventions differ from international ac-
counting standards. Efforts should be made to bring Bulgarian accounting stan-
dards into conformity with international practice.
3. EXPANDED TRADING ON THE BULGARIAN STOCK EXCHANGE-SOFIA
Release of information on share transactions by Central Depository: Presently OTE
trades are hidden from public view. If the Central Depository made timely re-
ports on the volume of shares traded, the lack of transparency would be re-
duced and this would encourage more trading on the BSE-Sofia. 
Movement away from continuous order trading for all shares: The BSE-Sofia uses a
continuous order trading system. Most of the companies traded on the BSE-
Sofia have very illiquid markets for their shares. If the BSE-Sofia adopted a call
auction system for all but a few companies, market participants might feel more
confident they are receiving best execution and the liquidity of the market may
improve.
Trading in government securities: At present Bulgaria does not have an active sec-
ondary market in government securities. At the same time interest rates on gov-
ernment securities should provide a benchmark interest rate for the rest of the
market. Now that clearing arrangements for securities trading have been estab-
lished for other types of bonds, it should be possible for trading in Government
securities, including ZUNK bonds, to begin on the BSE-Sofia. This will benefit
the further development of Government securitiesÕ market, this will also bene-
fit the exchange since there will be more instruments traded on the exchange.
The Government should take the necessary measures to make at least selected
categories of Government securities available for trading on the BSE-Sofia. 
4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Company law: Earlier in the report we describe a number of areas where com-
pany law can be improved. The recent OECD report (Avilov, et.al. ,1999) argues
that company law in transition economies needs to be more restrictive than
company law in the EU. It is particularly important that minority shareholder
rights be protected. The OECD report should be used as a basis for further eval-
uation of company law in Bulgaria to bring company law in Bulgaria into
greater conformity with the basic guidelines outlined in the report. 
Improve the accounting/auditing systems: Accurate information on company per-
formance is important to both shareholders and potential investors. The
Institute of Certified Expert Accountants presently has a monopolistic position
for the certification of accountants. The SSC might encourage the establishment
of another certification agency so that shareholders have more choices in find-
ing reputable accountants. Furthermore if auditors were held legally liable for
the reports they submit, this would put more pressure on the auditors to im-
prove the accuracy of the reporting.
Company law (special conditions): Because of the high concentration levels of
ownership in Bulgarian firms and the large number of small firms that are pub-
licly traded, special emphasis should be given to legal provisions which would
encourage companies to become private. These changes would help protect
ÔstrandedÕ minority shareholders by requiring owners with large stakes to buy-
out minority shareholders. The possibility of creating a new legal status for pri-
vate companies with a small number of shareholders should also be investigat-
ed.35
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in recognition of the fact that the these companies were not originally created as partnership
among friends.
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Completion of privatization: The State still has large ownership positions in many
important companies. In many instances representatives of government agen-
cies which hold positions on corporate boards are active in decision making. At
the same time the government has provided no clear guidelines for how these
representatives should vote. This problem can be eliminated if the Government
proceeds more quickly with further privatization.
5. FURTHER PRIVATIZATION
Supply policy of the mass privatization. The Òsecond waveÓ of mass privatization
has proceeded very slowly and has had little effect on the capital market.
Participation has been low because interest in the program has largely been
limited to insiders of the companies that are being privatized. 
Several important changes could make generate more participation from a
wider segment of the population and lead to further development of the capi-
tal market. In the first wave well-regulated privatization funds played an im-
portant role in increasing interest in the program. If the second wave allowed
similar institutions to participate (as pension funds are presently allowed to do),
the program could move forward more quickly. It is difficult for most citizens
to participate effectively in the privatization process except through intermedi-
aries. If additional intermediary possibilities are not permitted, semi-official
schemes for collective investment could emerge or many people will be disap-
pointed and will not participate in the program.
The second wave has also offered, to this point, only a small number of shares
in remaining state companies. The Government has now had an opportunity to
access the prospects for further cash privatization. It should be prepared to ex-
pand the sale of additional shares in important companies. By offering more of
the remaining shares from cash privatization or other shares on the stock ex-
change, the Government can encourage the development of the capital mar-
ket.
Introducing ADRs (GDRs): The Bulgarian capital market is not deep enough to of-
fer large companies for sale. The Government should consider introducing
large and attractive companies that are still state-owned (Bulgartabac, Bulgargas
etc.) into international markets through ADRs (GDRs). This will increase in-
vestorsÕ interest in Bulgarian companies and the Bulgarian market.
IX. CONCLUSION
The impetus for the development of the capital market in Bulgaria was the first
wave of mass privatization. Unlike the Czech Republic, Bulgaria planned for a
more regulated market. From the beginning there was a Securities, Stock and
Exchange Commission, a Central Depository and stock exchange. The
Bulgarian Stock Exchange Ð Sofia was established as the only registered stock
exchange. To create price integrity, regulations required that all but a few spe-
cial types of share transactions be posted on the stock exchange.
Efforts to improve the regulation of the capital market are continuing. A new
Law on Public Offering of Securities enacted by the Parliament approximate
the Bulgarian securities law to securities law in the field of securities market of
the European Union. 
In spite of these efforts serious problems remain. It is possible to create institu-
tions that look like capital market institutions in the West but do not function
effectively. A similar problem arose earlier in the transition. The two-tier bank-
ing system in Bulgaria had the same institutional form as banking systems in the
West, but underlying problems contributed to the financial crisis in 1996-97. As
the recent events in the Czech Republic demonstrate, problems in capital mar-
kets can also contribute to poor economic performance. 
Because most companies traded on the capital markets in Bulgaria were priva-
tized through the mass privatization program, building open transparent capi-
tal markets is a particularly challenging task. Without the incentive to raise ad-
ditional capital through the markets, companies do not have the same incen-
tives to provide information to the market that would be present in a normal
capital market. Still there are significant steps that can be taken to improve the
performance and openness of the markets.
The Czech experience demonstrates that investment funds need to be closely
monitored. The transformation of privatization funds into holding companies
may be an appropriate change given the situation in Bulgaria, but there are
dangers as well. It is particularly difficult for diffuse stockholders to monitor the
activities of holding companies, and the holding company structure creates op-
portunities for abuses. Regulators need to be aware of these problems so that
the tunneling observed in the Czech Republic is constrained. (Because present
information is so limited it is difficult to know how much tunneling has already
taken place in Bulgaria.) Holding companies should be treated as financial in-
stitutions. They should be audited and required to provide reports appropriate
for a financial institution.
The Bulgarian Stock Exchange Ð Sofia suffers from very low trading levels.
Questions have been raised as to whether it is a viable institution. Because of
these economic pressures the exchange has made compromises that have led
to the creation of a confusing array of alternative markets. In spite of these com-
promises and laws designed to support trading on the exchange, substantial
trading is occurring off-the-exchange. Low liquidity of most companies has
made it difficult to establish price integrity. Block trades, while registered on the
exchange, often have posted prices that bear little relation to the actual prices
in the transaction. Off-the-exchange transactions are not recorded at all. In this
way there is little price integrity in the market. Potential investors have to be
discouraged in such an environment.
To be successful the BSE-Sofia has to increase the volume of trading. To in-
crease trading in shares, it needs to convince traders that they can get best ex-
ecution by trading on the exchange. If the exchange is able to attract more of
the OTE trading, volume on the exchange could in practice double.
Because of these pressures the BSE-Sofia is not in a strong position to carry out
its responsibilities as a private institution that regulates the security markets. A
greater burden must be placed on the SSC to monitor the activities of the mar-
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kets and insist on full disclosure under its mandates. Fortunately, the SSC has
been given important administrative powers which can be used to promote fair
and transparent markets. These powers are considerably strengthened in the
new Law on Public Offerings of Securities. It is important that the SSC use these
powers.
Unless companies see the capital markets as a place where they can raise new
capital, companies will not have the right incentives to provide information and
participate actively in the market. The present situation is exactly like this.
Without sufficient liquidity, issuers of new securities will not want to come to
the market. For example, Sofia municipality sold its new bonds in Luxembourg.
Without better information investors will turn elsewhere.
A market in new issues needs to be more actively promoted. The SSC has tak-
en a careful and deliberate stance in approving new issues. This is a wise course
in the beginning, but it is also important that new proposals be processed ex-
peditiously so that potential issuers are not discouraged by bureaucratic red
tape. The financial services organizations Ð banks and investment intermedi-
aries should be encouraged to broaden their professional competence and ac-
tivity in showing businesses in need of low-cost, long-term capital how they can
obtain it through a properly managed public offering of either debt or equity. 
Good corporate governance is key if the privatization process is going to be suc-
cessful. Corporate governance is an area where there is serious disagreement
about the best institutional arrangements. This limited report does not attempt
to analyze these issues in depth. More needs to be understood first about de-
veloping ownership patterns in Bulgaria. The information presented in this re-
port suggests that a highly concentrated ownership pattern is evolving where a
few shareholders are gaining control of many companies. Once these patterns
are better understood consideration should be given to changes in the com-
mercial code which will encourage better governance structures within firms
and better protection of minority shareholders. 
New institutions and new laws alone do not make a well-functioning capital
market. Laws and regulations must be enforced. There is a disturbing trend to
enforce only certain laws and procedures. For instance, the requirements for
public offerings are universally ignored. Selective enforcement is extremely
dangerous. If laws are not applicable, they should be changed. The regulatory
authorities and the courts have an important role here. Because there is so lit-
tle experience with capital markets, training programs for regulators and judges
are extremely important. Given the complexity of these laws, creating courts
that specialize in these disputes could be an effective way of training judges in
these areas. 
This report only attempts to provide an overview. While many important capi-
tal market institutions have been put into place in Bulgaria, the market has se-
rious weaknesses. The market needs to be strengthened if it is to become a
source of investment capital, and the privatization program is to succeed.
Bulgaria has established the required institutions, but integration into the EU re-
quires better functionality as well.36
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APPENDIX A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE BULGARIAN
CAPITAL MARKET IN THE LIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND CZECH EXPERIENCE
This appendix provides a more detailed comparison of European Union (EU),
Czech, and Bulgarian law. Also included is an analysis of the relationship be-
tween the European and Check Laws on one hand and the repealed Law on
Securities, Stock Exchanges and Investment Companies (LSSEIC) and the new
Law on Public Offering of Securities (LPOS) on the other (the latter published
in the State Gazette, Ü 114, 1999). After four years of functioning of the re-
pealed LSSEIC and the experience collected, this analysis is based primarily on
the status of the law provisions and on the shaped during the enforcement
process guidelines for their further approximation with the requirements envis-
aged in the EU directives, as well on the level reached in accomplishing this aim
with the new LPOS.
1. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
THE EU REGIME
The European Union regime for regulation of disclosure of information in case
of listings and public issues consists of the following Directives: Directive 79/279
Co-ordinating The Conditions For The Admission Of Securities To Official
Stock Exchange Listing, which stipulates the minimum standards for listing of
corporate issues on recognised stock exchanges; Directive 80/390 Co-ordinat-
ing The Requirements For The Drawing Up, Scrutiny And Distribution Of
Listing Particulars, which sets out the requirements regarding the information
necessary for securities to be admitted to official listing; Mutual Recognition
Directive 87/345 which sets out the conditions for securities to be admitted si-
multaneously, or within a short interval to an official listing on stock exchanges
in two or more member states; Directive 89/298 Co-ordinating The Conditions
For The Drawing Up, Scrutiny And Distribution Of Prospectuses When
Transferable Securities Are Offered To The Public, which sets out the regime
for disclosure of information for initial public offering of securities; Directive
82/121/EEC On Information To Be Published On A Regular Basis By Companies
The Shares Of Which Have Been Admitted To Official Stock Exchange Listing.
THE BULGARIAN AND THE CZECH LAW
Both the Bulgarian law and the Czech law require that a prospectus be pub-
lished when securities are admitted for official listing on the stock exchange.
The repealed LSSEIC, unlike the Directives, did not differentiate between the
obligation to publish a prospectus in the case of admission of securities to offi-
cial listing on the stock exchange and cases of ÒordinaryÓ initial public offering
of securities off the exchange (i.e. on the primary market). If securities have
been sold through public offering, the company cn could have applied for an
official listing on the basis of the same prospectus, duly updated for occurred
changes in the data. However, if the initial public offering has not been made,
for the admission of securities for trading on the stock exchange the issuing of
the prospectus was required as it is in the initial offering. Both the repealed LS-
SEIC and the Czech legislation are restrictive compared to the Directives re-
garding exemptions from the prospectus requirement. For example, the re-
pealed LSSEIC and Czech legislation do not provide for exemptions from the
prospectus requirement regarding issues that are of small overall market price
on all traded securities or of high value on individual participation of the in-
vestors in the subscription. Regarding authorisation of omission of certain data
from the prospectus the repealed Bulgarian law appeared close to the
Directives, although it was still more restrictive with regard to the discretionary
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powers of the competent authority than the EU regime. Concerning the con-
tent of the prospectus and the procedure of its confirmation by the controlling
body, the repealed Bulgarian law was close to, although not fully, compatible
with Directive 89/298/EEC. However, the LSSEIC in effect did not comply with
the EU requirements concerning the manner in which a prospectus should be
brought to the attention of the public.
The repealed Bulgarian law was more restrictive than Czech law regarding the
definition of a public offer. However, LSSEIC did not follow the Directive
89/298/EEC in full. The Directive, in contrast to the repealed Bulgarian Law,
provides for an exemption from the public offer requirements in cases where
offers are made to persons in the context of their trades, professions or occu-
pations, or where offers are made to a restricted number of persons.
The repealed LSSEIC appeared to be much closer to EU requirements for dis-
closure of periodic issuer information since it obligated issuers of publicly trad-
ed securities to submit annual and half yearly reports, as well as to announce
the submission thereof in an appropriate manner.
Guidelines for making the repealed Bulgarian Law consistent with EU law and level of
approximation reached in the new LPOS:
a) The LSSEIC did not differentiate between the requirements regarding disclo-
sure of information for admission of securities to official listing and primary
public offerings of securities. Possible explanation for this approach is that the
repealed LSSEIC did not regulate the differentiation between the primary and
the secondary public offering of securities.
On the contrary, the LPOS brings in the difference between the definition of
Òprimary public offeringsÓ on one hand and Òtrade with securitiesÓ on the oth-
er. The Òprimary public offeringÓ is an offering corresponding to the require-
ments of public offerings of:
1. securities subject to listing from their issuer or authorized by him/her invest-
ment intermediary (subscription), or
2. securities for primary trading from the investment intermediary according to
the concluded with their issuer underwriting contract;
3. share of an open-ended investment company for primary selling from their
managing company or from the authorized investment intermediary.
On the other hand trading with securities is:
1. public offering of an issued securities not including the case of primary sell-
ing from an investment intermediary according to the concluded with the issuer
underwriting contract (secondary public offering);
2. transaction with securities resulting from a secondary public offerings.
3. conclusion of transactions or offers to conclude transactions for purchase
and/or 
selling of securities not under the conditions of the public offering, when:
i) securities have been issued by the public companies or other issuers, and
ii) person making the offer or being a party to the transaction is a legal person
or a sole proprietor;
1. public offering for acquisition by consideration or an invitation to offer
proposition for transfer by consideration of securities under the conditions of
public offerings.
The LPOS keeps the introduced with the repealed LSSEIC definition of a Òpub-
lic offerings of securitiesÓ as an Òoffer for transfer by consideration or an invita-
tion to offer acquisition by consideration of securities for:
1. at least 50 persons, or
2. non-defined number of persons, including through the mass media.Ó
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According to the law there is a public offering also when the person that is not
an investment intermediary or an owner of securities takes part in the offering
of public securities.
According to the LPOS the primary public offerings is allowed if the issuer or its
investment intermediary publish a prospectus and a notice according to the re-
quirements of the law. As regards the trading with securities, the LPOS envis-
ages that the securities for which the prospectus for primary public offerings
have not been issued are accepted for trading on the official market if the short
prospectus is offered. 
b) In the repealed LSSEIC prospectuses were also required for small placements
of securities as well as for high value of individual participation of certain in-
vestor in the subscription. In this respect the LPOS do not include any exemp-
tions from the obligation to offer prospectus. In view of the forthcoming
amendments of the law, possible exemptions according to the Directive
89/298/EEC can be discussed. 
c) The LSSEIC did not provide for sufficient exemptions from the prospectus re-
quirement, i.e. when the offer is made to a restricted number of persons, or
when persons are engaged in a particular trade. The LPOS allows for more cas-
es when the prospectus might not be offered, for example in case of securities
that are offered only to institutional investors, for shares of a public company
that are offered for listing only to its shareholders and/or persons working on a
labor contract. In this respect the new Bulgarian legislation marks a substantial
step ahead in view of its approximation with the requirements of the EU
Directives. Furthermore, in the law it is explicitly said that there is no public of-
fering when:
1. the securities are offered in case of liquidation, executive proceedings or
bankruptcy proceedings in a way, regulated in another law.
2. shares are offered for listing only to the shareholders in the company and/or
employees working on the labor contracts, if they are less than 300 persons.
d) The LPOS envisages wider possibility for so called ÒclosureÓ of the public
company. Thus, a company cease to be public with the decision of the SSC to
remove it from the registry of the commission, if: 1. If the general meeting of
the company takes the decision to remove it from the registry under the con-
dition that 14 days before that:
i) the number of shareholders is under 50 persons, or
ii) the capital is less than 200 000 BGL;
2. The company is terminated or a bankruptcy proceedings have begun.
1. A take-over bid has been made under the Article 146 (6) of the law.
After the decision of the SSC on the removing from the registry, the shares of
the company can not be traded on the regulated market of securities.
It can be expected that the new regime of ÒclosureÓ of a public companies will
bring the practice of establishing and functioning of the public companies in
Bulgaria closer to the respective practices in other European countries. 
e) The LPOS did not give broader powers to the SSC to exempt certain data
from inclusion in the prospectus on grounds of public interest or of issuersÕ in-
terests. In fact, the scope of powers of the SSC in that respect remained as it
used to be in the repealed LSSEIC Ð if the SSC considers that the information
might cause damage to the issuer and this does not mislead the investors as re-
gards the circumstances that are important for reaching the aim of an improved
informing of investors. In view of a possible future amendments in the legisla-
tion an improved harmonization with the European standards can be reached.
g) The LSSEIC did not regulate adequately the manner in which the prospectus
is brought to the attention of the public. In contrast, the LPOS includes the de-
tailed requirements in that respect. The issuer is obliged to offer prospectus to
64 CSD Reports/ÄÌ‡ÎËÁË 5
the public by its publishing in the press in a form of a brochure or in an other
appropriate form. The requirements for an offering of a prospectus to the pub-
lic, deadlines, methods and places of dissemination of the prospectus, an oblig-
atory publishing of the resume of the prospectus in the press or delivery of an
information included in the prospectus with the information agency can be de-
termined in an Ordinance. In that respect, it can be considered that the
European requirements on this issue are met.
See Table A1 for a detailed comparison of disclosure requirements between the
EU, Czech regime, the repealed LSSEIC and the new LPOS. 
2. UNDERTAKINGS FOR COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT
IN TRANSFERABLE SECURITIES (UCITS)
The EU Regime and the Bulgarian regime according to the repealed LSSEIC and the
new LPOS
The EU legislation Directive 85/611/EEC On The Co-ordination Of Laws,
Regulations And Administrative Provisions Relating To Undertakings For
Collective Investment In Transferable Securities (the UCITS Directive) requires
the Member States to adapt their national legislation to facilitate the circulation
of UCITS throughout Europe, subject to comparable minimum guarantees. This
Directive does not only deal with the harmonisation of organisational rules ap-
plicable to UCITS, but also streamlines the administrative control on UCITS.
This was one of the first areas in which the Òhome country control ruleÓ was put
into force: the authorisation of a UCITS in one member state is valid for the en-
tire Community. The UCITS will not be subject to control in other member
states once it has been authorised by the competent authorities of the member
state in which its primary palace of business is situated. The state of authorisa-
tion is bound to the minimum level of regulation, contained by the Directive. 
Guidelines for making the repealed Bulgarian law consistent with EU law and the lev-
el reached by the LPOS to meet this aim:
a) In the LSSEIC the capital of the open-ended investment companies was not
adequately regulated as variable capital. Therefore, it was practically impossi-
ble to operate an open-ended investment company. The LPOS regulates that
the capital of an open-ended investment company can be increased or de-
creased following the changes in the net value of its assets, also including as a
result of a sold shares or redemption of own shares. Thus, regulation of an
open-ended investment companies was made consistent with the European
model of functioning of this type of institutions.
b) The functions of the bank-depository according to the repealed LSSEIC were
not consistent with the requirements of Directive 85/611/EEC. The LPOS makes
a substantial progress in that respect by following closely the European model,
that includes substantial responsibilities for maintaining and managing the ac-
tivities of the investment company on behalf of the bank-depository as well as
increased controlling function of the bank-depository in the management of the
company. 
c) The repealed LSSEIC followed in an insufficient way the European regula-
tions on the types of securities in which the assets of the investment company
can be invested and on its portfolio diversification and risk spreading. The
LPOS almost fully incorporates the requirements of the Directive 85/611/EEC in
that respect.
d) The repealed LSSEIC did not regulate adequately the requirements for the
composition of a prospectus in case of public offering of shares in an open-end-
ed investment company. In the LPOS additional requirements were supple-
mented in order to meet the requirements of the Directive 85/611/EEC. They
were mainly as regards the content of the prospectus and on its updating after
every change in the included data;
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e) Rules of the repealed LSSEIC regarding publication of the issuance, selling
and price in case of redemption of own shares of an open-ended investment
company were to be made more precise. The LPOS reached this goal both on
one hand by introducing clear rules on calculation of the values and on the oth-
er, by requiring their publication in a daily newspaper indicated in the prospec-
tus at least two times per month.
f) The rules of the repealed LSSEIC on management of an open-ended invest-
ment company were to be streamlined as far as they regulated the possibility to
chose between the management by the governing body of the company ac-
cording to the Commercial code and management by the investment interme-
diary according to the concluded management contract. The LPOS envisages
more detailed regulation that is in conformity with the Directive 85/611/EEC
and requires the activities of an open-ended investment company to be gov-
erned only by a managing company according to concluded contract, and for
the ×closed-endÓ investment company Ð by a managing company or by the
governing body of the investment company.
g) Rules on suspension of redemption according to the repealed LSSEIC were
not stringent enough to meet the requirements of the Directive 85/611/EEC.
The LPOS fully meets the requirements of the Directive in that respect.
See Table A2 for a detailed comparison between the requirements of the
Directive 85/611/EEC, the repealed LSSEIC and the new LPOS. 
3. INVESTMENT SERVICES
EU Directive 93/22/EEC On The Investment Services In The Securities Field
(ISD) is the foundation of the EU single market in securities market activities.
Directive 93/22/EEC establishes a single passport regime under which invest-
ment firms authorised in one Member State can conduct securities business in
any other Member State, whether as a branch or by way of provision of ser-
vices. An investment firm must be authorised. To be eligible, investment firms
must meet the minimum standards set by the Directive and enforced by the
competent authorities in the Member States. An investment firm is defined as
a physical or legal person engaged in one or several of the transactions defined
in the annex to Directive 93/22/EEC. 
Furthermore, the license implies that Member States must open up the access
to their stock exchanges or other organised markets to all investment firms in
the EU that engage in trading with securities. Securities market organisers may
not discriminate against firms of other member states, provided that these firms
are effectively established, whether as a branch or as a subsidiary. 
Each Member State must indicate which authorities will be competent to su-
pervise compliance of investment firms. These authorities must be public enti-
ties or entities appointed by public authorities.
For purposes of comparison we distinguish three main areas: (i) functions of in-
vestment firms and the securities with which they operate; (ii) licensing (autho-
risation and revocation) requirements; and (iii) requirements for a regulated
market. The detailed comparisons between the European Laws, Check Law, re-
pealed LSSEIC and LPOS are also laid out in Tables A3i, A3ii and A3iii.
(i) Functions of investment firms and types of securities Ð subject of transactions
Guidelines for making the repealed Bulgarian law consistent with EU law and level of
approximation reached in the new LPOS:
a) The repealed LSSEIC did not differentiate between core and non-core activ-
ities of an investment firms (investment intermediaries, according to the estab-
lished Bulgarian legal definition), as it is required in the Directive 93/22/EEC.
LPOS lays down this differentiation, regulating on the one hand the main trans-
actions forming the core activities of the investment firms and on the other Ð
listing the activities that an investment firm can pursue in addition to its main
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business. In that respect it can be concluded that the European requirements
are met.
b) The repealed LSSEIC did not regulate explicitly the rights to acquire shares
or bonds by subscription or exchange as securities. Regardless of this, their
qualification as securities was taken out from the category of Òother documents
and rights related to shares and bondsÓ as part of the definition ÒsecuritiesÓ ac-
cording to the law. The LPOS introduces clear definitions by explicitly defining
in the supplementing rules the category of Òother rights related to shares and
bonds or other debt securitiesÓ as Òrights, warrants, options, futures, contracts
for difference and othersÓ. The rights are defined as Òsecurities, giving right to
list a number of shares in connection with a decision to increase the capital of
the public companyÓ. In this respect there are no doubts that the LPOS as it is
formulated and following the European model treats the rights to acquire shares
by subscription as securities.
c) According to the repealed LSSEIC the money market instruments were not
classified as securities. The LPOS follows the same pattern and does not regu-
late the legal status of those instruments in view of the special legislation regu-
lating securities. Due to this, doubts remain on how far the money market in-
struments fall within the rules of the LPOS. Thus, it can be concluded that there
is a certain disparity between the European Laws on securities and the model
accepted in the Bulgarian Law.The repealed LSSEIC did not include definition
of derivatives. The LPOS following the old laws on securities keeps the same
approach and introduces in the supplementary rules the definitions of Òwar-
rantÓ, ÒoptionÓ, ÒfuturesÓ, Òcontracts for differencesÓ and Òterm transactionsÓ.
(ii) Licensing requirements (for authorization and revocation) for an investment firm
Guidelines for making the repealed Bulgarian law consistent with EU law and level of
approximation reached in the new LPOS:
a) The repealed LSSEIC did not regulate questions related to the need for an in-
dependent professional audit. The LPOS did not regulate the aspect of func-
tioning of the investment firms either (investment intermediaries). 
b) The repealed LSSEIC did not include adequate requirements and procedures
for approval of certain changes in the status of an investment firms (investment
intermediaries) by the SSEC, that would assure the competent authority that li-
censed investment firms (investment intermediaries) are in compliance with the
law and regulations at all times. Following the European rules the LPOS makes
progress in that respect as far as it introduces the requirement for prior approval
from the SSC as a condition for changes in the companyÕs structure, for acqui-
sition by one person of more than 10 per cent of the shareholdings participa-
tion or shares of an investment intermediary or acquired participation, that
would allow this person to control it, and also subsequent acquisition of a
shareholdings participation by the same person and changes in the general con-
ditions applicable to contracts with clients. 
c) The repealed LSSEIC did not have adequate provisions for refusal to grant a
license for an investment firm (investment intermediary) or for the revocation
of an issued license. The LPOS broadens these provisions making them consis-
tent with the established model in the Directive 93/22/EEC.
(iii) Regulated markets
The UCITS Directive 85/611/EEC mentions regulated markets as markets which
operate regularly, are recognised and are accessible to the public. Directive
93/22/EEC explicitly indicates the essential elements of a regulated market Ð
openness and access, as well as regular functioning. The market should oper-
ate on the basis of predetermined rules, which must be prescribed or approved
by the competent regulatory and controlling body. A regulated market must
comply with specialised requirements for transparency and disclosure of infor-
mation. Investors should be provided with price data at the start of each day
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based on the previous dayÕs trading, including high/lows and weighted average
prices. Additionally, for continuous markets, the market should ensure regular
price and volume reports during the day. Each Member State is required to
draw up a list of regulated markets for which it is the home Member State and
which comply with its regulations.
The LSSEIC did not introduce the notion of a regulated market, however, it re-
ferred to the notion of a stock exchange and the notion of an Òorganised OTC
marketÓ. A stock exchange was defined as an organised market for securities
which ensures its members and their clients equal access to market information
and equal conditions for participation in trading. An organised OTC market was
defined as a securities market which:
1. functions on the basis of established rules for access, for admission of secu-
rities, for carrying out of trading, and disclosure of information;
2. ensures to its members equal access to market information and equal con-
ditions for participation in trading;
3. provides a unified system for distance trading.
Both the stock exchange and an organised OTC market were subject to licens-
ing by the SSEC.
The LPOS defines a Òregulated marketsÓ as an official market of a stock ex-
change and also an unofficial market of securities. An unofficial market can be
organised by the stock exchange itself or by a joint stock company the share-
holders of which are investment intermediaries. An unofficial market and stock
exchange under the LPOS should comply with the requirements in relation to
a regulated market according to the Directive 93/22/EEC, the most important
being the regular formation of contracts for purchase and selling of securities,
regular announcement of information on the concluded transactions, equal ac-
cess to the market information and equal conditions for the trading to all the in-
vestment intermediaries, functioning on the basis of the approved by the SSC
rules. It can be concluded that with the coming into force of the new LPOS a
full approximation of rules on regulated markets of securities with the EU re-
quirements was reached. 
4. DISCLOSURE OF MAJOR SHAREHOLDINGS
EU legislation on disclosure of major shareholdings in a listed company which
shares are traded on the stock exchange is contained in Directive 88/627/EEC
On The Information To be Published When A Major Shareholding In A Listed
Company Is Acquired Or Disposed Of.. Both the repealed LSSEIC and the
Czech Commercial Code are nearly compatible with Directive 88/627/EEC.
The new Bulgarian Law is more compatible with the EU Directive with the
adoption of a threshold setting up an obligation for disclosure of shareholdings
in cases when the companyÕs shares are accepted for trading on the regulated
market of the stock exchange at 5 per cent or number multiple to 5 per cent
from the number of voting rights in the general meeting of the company. See
Table A4 for a comparison. 
5. INSIDER DEALING
The repealed LSSEIC followed Directive 89/592/EEC very closely regarding the
rules on trading with inside information in connection with definitions of Òin-
side informationÓ ÒinsidersÓ, and Òinsider dealing offencesÓ. It even adopted a
more stringent approach by defining members in the management of an issuer
as insiders per se, regardless of whether they effectively possess inside informa-
tion or not. On the contrary, Czech law defines insiders slightly more narrowly
and restricts the definition of an insider to persons who are ÒauthorisedÓ to pos-
sess inside information, whereas the Directive 89/592/EEC does not require
such a relationship. The repealed Bulgarian law was more stringent than the
Directive in that it defined ÒsecondaryÓ insiders as persons who have acquired
68 CSD Reports/ÄÌ‡ÎËÁË 5
information directly or indirectly from a Òprimary insiderÓ, without the require-
ment that they have done this knowingly. The LSSEIC basically followed
Directive 89/592/EEC regarding the nature of the offence of insider dealing (the
prohibitions with respect to the insiders). In that respect the Bulgarian legisla-
tion is much clearer than the Czech law, which simply defines insider dealing
as trading in the securities or making use of unpublished confidential informa-
tion for personal benefit.
The new LPOS follows the same approach as the repealed LSSEIC in the defi-
nitions of Òinside informationÓ, ÒinsidersÓ and makes the definition of Òsec-
ondary insidersÓ compatible with the Directive 89/592/EEC. Due to its compat-
ibility with the European standards the prohibitions on the insiders according to
the LPOS are analogous with the one existing in the repealed LSSEIC. The LPOS
extends protection against insider dealing to any regulated market (i.e. includ-
ing any unofficial market), not just on a stock exchange.
Enforcement is a problem. The authorities need the capability to monitor and
control trading or create better conditions for practical implementation of the
regulations on inside information. The new LPOS has expanded considerably
the powers of the SSC by providing for a possibility to request data and trading
information also on concluded transactions with securities from the stock ex-
change and from the Central Securities Depository. Furthermore, according to
the LPOS each person that concludes transactions with securities that are trad-
ed on the regulatory markets is obliged to declare before the investment inter-
mediaries whether he/she possesses inside information. The LPOS regulates the
increased capacity to investigate and identify insider trading related offences by
setting up that the Council of Ministers must adopt an Ordinance on measures
for prevention and revealing of transactions and activities infringing the relevant
legal requirements. 
Table A5 compares the various regimes in more detail.
5. CAPITAL ADEQUACY
The Capital Adequacy Directive 93/6/EEC sets the minimum initial capital for
investment firms. The capital requirement for firms not dealing on their own ac-
count and not holding client assets is XEU 50 000; for firms which do hold client
assets and undertake singly or in combination, mandate in order routing, order
execution and/or portfolio management, XEU 125 000; and for all other firms,
XEU 730 000.
The Bulgarian Ordinance On The Capital Adequacy Of Investment Interme-
diaries sets the minimum initial capital for investment firms, dealing for their
own account at BGL 250 Thousand, and for firms acting only on behalf of
clients at BGL 90 Thousand. The Ordinance takes into account all the require-
ments of the Directive, relating to position risk, settlement/counterparty risk,
settlement/delivery risk, foreign exchange risk, own funds and large exposures.
However, due to the very low liquidity of the market, it is doubtful whether
capital adequacy of licensed investment intermediaries is maintained at all
times and whether regular and timely reports are made to the SSC.
6. MONEY LAUNDERING
The Money Laundering Directive 91/308/EEC provides for the establishment of
adequate rules against money laundering in order to avoid the financial sector
being used for disguising proceeds from criminal activities in general and drug
offences in particular.
The Bulgarian Law On Measures Against Money Laundering (published in the
State Gazette, number 85 of 1998) defines Òmoney launderingÓ as the prepara-
tion, carrying out and receiving of the result of acts through which money or
other properties, as well as the proceeds thereof, which are in the possession
of a person through or in relation to a crime, are entered in the economic cir-
culation and the result of their use is accounted for and taxed. The Law speci-
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fies four concrete types of Òmoney launderingÓ. The Law creates a regime for
monitoring of transactions, which may involve Òmoney launderingÓ. Financial
institutions are required to identify the principals in transactions exceeding a
specified threshold and to report unusual transactions to the Financial
Investigation Office at the Ministry of Finance. Addressees of the measures,
provided for in the Law are banks and non-banking financial institutions, insur-
ance companies, investment companies and investment intermediaries, pri-
vatisation organs and privatisation funds, persons who conduct auctions and
leasing activity, operators of gambling clubs, political parties, non-profit organ-
isations and others. These institutions are required to adopt internal rules de-
signed to provide for effective implementation on the internal level of the
adopted legislation.
The Bulgarian law, like the case with Czech Money Laundering Act 61/1996,
follows much of what is provided in the Directive 91/308/EEC. However, the
practical implementation of the adopted provisions remains very unsatisfacto-
ry.
7. THE EU AND THE BULGARIAN RULES ON INVESTOR COMPENSATION
The Investor Compensation Directive 97/9 requires each member state to en-
sure that one or more compensation funds are in operation, and that all in-
vestment firms and credit institutions must belong to a fund. The funds must
cover claims arising from the liability of an investment firm to repay money
owed or belonging to investors, or to return securities to their owners. The
funds do not have to cover professional and institutional investors, state bodies
and supranational institutions.
Like the case with Czech law, the Directive 97/9 is not yet implemented in
Bulgarian law. The Law On Guaranteeing Deposits In Banks provides for a de-
posit guarantee fund, but that relates to another EU directive (the Directive on
Deposit Guarantee Funds of May 1994).
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TABLE A1. Disclosure of Information
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necessitates a prospectus, to
be confirmed by the SSC and
published in accordance with
the conditions and
procedures laid down in the
Law.
1.2. Exemptions from the requirement
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Member States may allow the
authorities responsible for
checking the listing particulars to
provide partial or complete
exemption from the obligation to
publish listing particulars in the
following cases:
Czech law does






prospectus is to be
provided:
The new LPOS now in effect
provides that a prospectus
may not be prepared and
submitted:
1. where securities for which
admission to official listing is
applied for are:
(a) securities which have been the
subject of a public issue;
(b) securities issued in connection
with a takeover offer;
(c) securities issued in connection
with a merger, acquisition,
division, the transfer of all or part
of an undertakingÕs assets and
liabilities or as consideration for
the transfer of assets other than
cash; and where not more than 12
months before the admission of
the securities to official listing, a
document regarded by the
competent authorities as
containing information equivalent
to that of listing particulars
provided for by the Directive, has
been published in the same
Member State;
2. where the securities for which
admission to official listing is
applied for are:
(a) shares allotted free of charge to
holders of shares already listed on
the same stock exchange; or
(b) shares resulting from the
conversion of convertible debt
securities or shares created after an
exchange for exchangeable debt
securities, if shares of the company
whose shares are offered by way of
conversion or exchange are
already listed on the same stock
exchange; or
(c) shares resulting from the
exercise of the rights conferred by
warrants, if shares of the company
whose shares are offered by way of
conversion or exchange are
already listed on the same stock
exchange; or
(d) shares issued in substitution for
shares already listed on the same
stock exchange if the issuing of
such new shares does not involve
any increase in the companyÕs
issued share capital
and where appropriate, the
information provided for in
Chapter 2 of Schedule A is
published in accordance with
Articles 20 (1) and 21 (1).
3. where the securities for which
admission to official listing is
1. for securities
issued or guaranteed








of Bulgaria is a
member;









4. in case of
conversion of bonds




This applies both to
the prospectus in the
case of initial public
offering off the
exchange, as well as




listing on the stock
exchange.
Moreover, if one
class of shares has
been admitted to









1. the number of the
offered new shares is
less than 10% of the
number of shares of
the same class
already admitted to
1. in respect of securities,
issued or guaranteed by the
state or the Bulgarian National
Bank;
2. in respect of securities,
issued by international
organizations of which the
Republic of Bulgaria is a
member;
3. in respect of shares which
are distributed between the
shareholders in case of
transformation of part of the
profit in share capital without
payment of their value;
4. in case of conversion of
bonds in shares, in case for
the bonds a prospectus has
been published;
5. in case of issuance of
rights.
6. in respect of securities
which are offered only to
institutional investors;
7in respect of futures and
options subject to a public
offering on the stock
exchange;
8.
in respect of shares of a
public company which are
offered for subscription only
to its shareholders and/or
persons under labor contract;
9. in respect of shares offered
as a result of a merger,
acquisition or tender offer.
The SSC may authorize the
partial or full exemption from
the obligation to publish a
prospectus for a primary
public offering when:
1. the number of the offered
new securities is less than
10% of the number of
securities of the same class
which have already been
admitted to trading; and
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applied for are:
(a) shares of which either the
number or the estimated market
value or the nominal value or,
in the absence of a nominal
value, the accounting par value,
amounts to less than 10% of the
number or of the corresponding
value of the shares of the same
class already listed on the same
stock exchange; or
(b) debt securities issued by
companies and other legal
persons which are nationals of a
Member State and which:
- in carrying on their business,
benefit from State monopolies,
and
- are set up or governed by a
special law or pursuant to such
a law or whose borrowings are
unconditionally and irrevocably
guaranteed by a Member State
or one of a Member StateÕs
federated States; or
(c) debt securities issued by
legal persons, other than
companies, which are nationals
of a Member State, and
- were set up by a special law,
and
- whose activities are governed
by that law and consist solely in:
(i) raising funds under state
control through issue of debt
securities, and
(ii) financing production by
means of the resources which
they have raised and resources
provided by a Member State,
and
- the debt securities of which
are, for the purposes of
admission to official listing,
considered by national law as
debt securities issued or
guaranteed by the State; or
(d) shares allotted to employees,
if shares of the same class have
already been admitted to
official listing on the same stock
exchange; shares which differ
from each other solely as to the
date of first entitlement to
dividends shall not be

















2. the investors already
dispose of the information ,
which corresponds to the
requirements regarding
disclosure of information in
case of public offering of
securities;
3. for the same class of shares
a prospectus has been
confirmed not more than one
year ago;
4. in other cases, provided for
by way of an ordinance,
provided that the investors
already dispose of the
information, corresponding to
the requirements regarding
disclosure of information in
case of public offering of
securities or such information
is not necessary for the
assessment of the economic
and financial position of the
issuer and the rights attaching
to the securities.
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1.3. Authorization of omissions of










1.3. Authorization of omissions of
certain information from the
prospectus:
The competent authority may
authorize omission from the listing
particulars of certain information
if it considers that:
(a) such information is of minor
importance only and not such as
will influence assessment of assets
and liabilities, financial position,
profits and losses and prospects of
the issuer; or
(b) disclosure of such information
would be contrary to the public
interest or seriously detrimental to
the issuer, provided that, in the
latter case, such omission would
not be likely to mislead the public
with regard to facts and
circumstances, knowledge of
which is essential for the





of a prospectus to




The SSEC may grant
an exemption
regarding some of
the data which must






interests of the issuer
provided that this





The SSC may authorize
omission from the prospectus
of certain data if it considers
that such information can be
detrimental to the interests of
the issuer, provided that this
would not be likely to mislead
the investors in relation to
circumstances which are of
relevance to the assessment of
the economic and financial
position of the issuer and of
the rights attaching to the
securities.
1.4. Manner in which the listing
particulars should be brought to the
attention of the public:
1.4. Manner in
which the prospectus
should be brought to
the attention of the
public:
1.4. Manner in which
the prospectus should
be brought to the
attention of the public:
1.4. Manner in which the
prospectus should be brought to
the attention of the public:
Listing particulars must be
published either:
- by insertion in one or more
newspapers circulated throughout
the Member State in which the
admission to official listing of
securities is sought, or widely
circulated therein, or
- in the form of a brochure to be
made available, free of charge, to
the public at the offices of the
stock exchange or stock exchanges
on which the securities are being
admitted to official listing, at the
registered office of the issuer and
at the offices of the financial
organizations retained to act as the
latterÕs paying agents in the
Member State in which the




The LSSEIC did not
regulate adequately
the manner in which
the prospectus
should be brought to
the attention of the
public. The Law










issued by the SSEC,




The issuer is required to
arrange for access of the
public to the prospectus by
way of publishing it in the
press, by way of a brochure
or in another appropriate
manner. The advertising
materials and publications in
relation to the public offering
of securities should indicate
the place where the
prospectus is available to the
public. Such materials may
not contain false or
misleading information, as
well as information which
contradicts the information
contained in the prospectus.
The Law provides for the
possibility for the issuance of
a regulation to introduce
additional requirements
concerning the availability of
the prospectus to the public,
inclusive methods, deadlines
and places for distribution of
the prospectus, printing of a
minimum number of copies
of the prospectus, obligatory
publication of a summary of
the prospectus in the press
etc.








1.5. Updating of information in
the prospectus
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Every significant new factor
capable of affecting assessment of
the securities which arises between
the time when the listing
particulars are adopted and the
time when stock exchange dealings
begin shall be covered by a
supplement to the listing
particulars, scrutinized in the same
way as the latter and published in
accordance with procedures to be






the SSEC about all
changes occurred in





SSEC until the taking
of the decision by











the prospectus if in
the period between
the issuance of the
confirmation and








the data in the
prospectus every six
months and at each
change of the data,
which may influence
the price of the
securities.
The issuer is required to
inform the SSC about all
changes occurred in the
period from the submission of
the application for the
approval of the prospectus by
the SSC until the taking of the




issuance of the confirmation
of the prospectus.
The issuer is required to
introduce the necessary
amendments in the
prospectus if in the period
between the issuance of the
confirmation and the
deadline of the subscription
or sale the issuers becomes
aware about changes that
necessitate such amendments.
The SSC and the regulated
market on which the
securities of the issuer are
being traded should be
informed about the
amendments. The issuer is
required to introduce
amendments in the
prospectus if until the
deadline of the validity of the
prospectus the issuer learns
about changes that necessitate
such amendments.




2. Periodic disclosure of
information





EU regime requires disclosure of
annual information by way of an







reports is to be
made public,




to the SSEC an
annual report in a
period of 90 days









the persons that own
or control more than




l fi i l
The issuer is required to
submit to the SSC an annual
report in 90 days from the
end of the financial year. The
annual report should contain
data about the issuer and its
activity, the members of its
management and controlling
bodies, the persons which
own or control more than
10% of the votes in the
general shareholdersÕ
meeting, an audited annual
financial statement, as well as
other information determined
by way of an ordinance;
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annual financial









to be included in the
annual report.
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TABLE A2. Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities
The EU regime The repealed LSSEIC The Law On Public Offering Of Securities now
in effect (LPOS)
Definition ofUCITS Definition ofUCITS Definition ofUCITS
The Directive defines a UCITS as an
undertaking:
Ð the sole object of which is the collective
investment in transferable securities of capital
raised from the public and which operate on
the principle of risk-spreading, and
Ð the units of which are, at the request of
holders, re-purchased or redeemed, directly or
indirectly, out of the undertakingsÕ assets.
The repealed LSSEIC defined the investment
companies as joint stock companies licensed
under the conditions and the order of the law,
with a subject matter of activity the investing in
securities, except for securities of its founders.
The LPOS defined the investment company as a
joint stock company, licensed under the
conditions and the procedures of the law, with
a subject matter of activity investing in
securities on the basis of risk spreading,
through money collected by way of a public
offering of securities.
FormofUCITS FormofUCITS FormofUCITS
Form of UCITS Ð either under the law of
contract (as common funds managed by
management companies) or trust law (as unit
trusts) or under statute (as investment
companies)
Under the repealed LSSEIC investment
companies could only be organized in the form
of joint stock companies.
The Law provides that the investment company
may be organized only in the form of a joint
stock company.
Management of UCITS Management of UCITS Management of UCITS
Management of UCITS Ð either by a
management company or, if the UCITS has
been organised in the form of a company, by
its board of directors
Management Ð investment companies are
managed either by their board of directors or
by an investment intermediary pursuant to a
management contract.
The Law provides that the investment company
of an open-ended type is to be managed only
by a management company pursuant to a
management contract. Investment companies of
a closed-ended type could be managed either
by their management body (management board
or board of directors) or by a management
company pursuant to a management contract.
Functions of the depository Functions of the depository Functions of the depository
The Directive provides for a clear
differentiation between management and
depository functions. A unit trustÕs assets must
be entrusted to a depository for safe keeping. A
depository must, moreover:
(i) ensure that the sale, issue, repurchase,
redemption and cancellation of units effected
on behalf of a unit trust or by a management
company are carried out in accordance with
h l d h f d l
The repealed LSSEIC provided that the securities
acquired by an investment company and the
cash should be held in the Central Securities
Depository or in a bank-depository. The bank-
depository cannot be a creditor or a guarantor
of the investment company. The bank-
depository should segregate the securities and
cash of the investment company, held by it
from its own assets and should maintain a
i h f
The Law now in effect provides that the
uncertificated securities owned by the
investment company should be recorded in the
register of the Central Securities Depository,
and the cash and the other securities should be
held in a bank-depository. The bank-depository
is obligated to maintain a separate accounting
for the cash and the other assets of the
investment company. It should segregate the





the law and the fund rules;
(ii) ensure that the value of units is calculated in
accordance with the law and the fund rules;
(iii) carry out the instructions of the
management company, unless they conflict
with the law or the fund rules;
(iv) ensure that in transactions involving a unit
trustÕs assets any consideration is remitted to it
within the usual time limits;
(v) ensure that a unit trustÕs income is applied
in accordance with the law and the fund rules.
An investment companyÕs assets must be
entrusted to a depository for safe-keeping.
A depository must, moreover:
(i) ensure that the sale, issue, repurchase,
redemption and cancellation of units effected
by or on behalf of a company are carried out in
accordance with the law and with the
companyÕs instruments of incorporation;
(ii) ensure that in transactions involving a
companyÕs assets any consideration is remitted
to it within the usual time limits;
(iii) ensure that a companyÕs income is applied
in accordance with the law and its instruments
of incorporation.
separate accounting therefor
p y g g
assets of the investment company from its own
assets.
The bank-depository is obligated:
Ð to ensure that the sale, issue, repurchase,
redemption and cancellation of the shares of
the management company are carried out in
accordance with the law and the investment
company rules;
Ð to ensure that in transactions involving a
companyÕs assets any consideration is remitted
to it within the legally determined time limits,
unless the counterparty is in default or there are
sufficient grounds to consider that the
counterparty is in default;
Ð to ensure that a companyÕs income is
collected and applied in accordance with the
law and its instruments of incorporation.
Ð to dispose of the assets of the investment
company only on the basis of instructions of
the authorized persons, unless such
instructions contradict the law, the by-laws of
the company or contract for depository
services;
Ð to report regularly to the investment company
in respect of the entrusted assets and the
operations carried out.
Assets of a UCITS Assets of a UCITS Assets of a UCITS
Securities eligible for investment purposes Ð
only transferable securities which are traded on
stock exchanges or negotiated in a recognised,
regulated and open markets may be used for
investment purposes, without distinction as to
nationality. However, for non-EEC securities,
the stock exchange or market has to be
approved by the competent authority of the
member state or has to be laid down in the
rules of the fund.
The repealed LSSEIC provided that the property
of the investment company of an open ended
type should consist of:
(i) securities admitted to stock exchange trading;
(ii) government securities;
(iii) shares of other investment companies;
(iv) movable and immovable property, insofar
as it is necessary for the direct carrying out of
the activity of the company;
(v) cash.
The assets of an investment company of an
open ended type should consist of:
(i) securities, admitted to trading on a regulated
market;
(ii) government securities;
(iii) securities which are not traded on a
regulated market;
(iv) shares of other investment companies;
(v) movable property, insofar as it is necessary
for the direct carrying out of the activity of the
company;
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Shareholdings in one single issuer Ð an
investment company may not acquire any
shares carrying voting rights which would
enable it to exercise a significant influence over
the management of any issuing body
An investment company of an open ended type
may not acquire more than 10% of the votes in
one and the same company
An investment company both of an open ended
and a closed ended type may not acquire a
shareholding in the voting shares of one issuer
which can allow the investment company or
the members of its managing or controlling
organs, inclusive the management company or
the members of its managing or controlling
organs, to exercise control over it.
Suspension of redemption Suspension of redemption Suspension of redemption
Suspension of redemption Ð only in
exceptional cases where circumstances so
require, and having regard to the interests of
unit holders
The repealed LSSEIC provided that an
investment company may temporarily suspend
the redemption of its shares under the
conditions and the procedure, laid down in its
founding documents. In such case it should
i f h SSEC b i d i i i h
The investment company of an open ended
type may temporarily suspend the redemption
of its shares under the conditions and the
procedure, laid down in its by-laws, but only in
exceptional cases, if the circumstances so




Diversification of portfolio Diversification of portfolio Diversification of portfolio
Management of UCITS Ð in a spirit of risk
spreading
(i) a UCITS may invest no more than 10% of its
assets in transferable securities other than those
referred to in the foregoing table row;
(ii) a Member State may provide that a UCITS
may invest no more than 10% of its assets in
debt instruments which, for the purposes of the
Directive, shall be treated, because of their
characteristics, as equivalent to transferable
securities;
(iii) an investment company may acquire
movable and immovable property which is
essential for the direct pursuit of its business;
(iv) a UCITS may not acquire either precious
metals or certificates representing them.
The LSSEIC provided that investments in
securities, which have not been admitted to
stock exchange trading may not exceed 10% of
the capital of the investment company;
- investments in shares of other investment
companies and in movable and immovable
property may not exceed 5% of the capital and
jointly 10% of the capital of the investment
company;
The investment company may not invest more
than 5% of its capital in securities issued by
one and the same issuer, except for investments
in government securities;
The SSEC may permit to an investment
company to invest up to 10% of its capital in
securities, issued by one and the same issuer, if
the aggregate value of those investments does
not exceed 20% of the capital of the investment
company.
Investments in securities which are not traded
on a regulated market may not exceed 10% of
the assets of the investment company of an
open ended type;
Investments in shares of other investment
companies and in movable property may not
exceed 5% , and jointly 10% of the assets of
the investment company;
The investment company of an open-ended
type may not invest more than 5% of its assets
in securities issued by a public company or
another issuer, the securities of which have
been admitted to trading on a regulated
market;
The investment company of an open-ended
type may not invest more than 20% of its assets
in one issue of government securities;




inform the SSEC about its decisions in three
days.
require and the suspension is justified in view
of the interests of the shareholders.
Rules on valuation Rules on valuation Rules on valuation
The rules on the valuation of assets and the
rules for calculating the sale or issue price and
the repurchase or redemption price of the units
of a UCITS must be laid down in the law, in the
fund rules or in the investment companyÕs
instruments of incorporation.
The repealed LSSEIC provided that the by-laws
of the investment company should contain
rules on the conditions and order for
calculating the value of the shares in case of
redemption; However, the LSSEIC did not
contain any provisions regarding valuation of
assets and rules on calculating the sale or issue
price of the shares.
The LPOS provides that the by-laws of the
investment company should contain the
conditions and order for calculation of the net
asset value, the issue value and the value of the
shares in case of redemption, as well as of the
dividend in case distribution of dividends is
provided for. Both the issue value and the
redemption value are based on the net asset
value and should be determined at least twice
in the week at equal time intervals.
Disclosure requirements Disclosure requirements Disclosure requirements
The directive provides for disclosure
requirements in the form of a prospectus in the
case of initial public offering of shares, as well
as periodic disclosure in the form of annual
reports and half-yearly reports.
The repealed LSSEIC required investment
companies to disclose information in the form
of a prospectus in the case of public offering of
its shares, and periodic information in the form
of an annual and half Ð yearly report.
The LPOS requires investment companies to
disclose information in the form of a
prospectus in the case of public offering of
shares, and periodic information in the form of
annual reports, half yearly reports, monthly
balance sheets and quarterly balance sheets.
Publishing of prices Publishing of prices Publishing of prices
The Directive requires publishing of prices at
least twice monthly, particularly the issuance
price, the sale price, the redemption and/or
repurchase price of the units or certificates.
The investment company should announce in
the SSEC and in the media the issue price of its
shares, and in case it is of an open ended type Ð
the redemption price of its shares. Such
announcements should be made at each issue,
sale and redemption, but not less than twice in
the month.
The investment company of an open ended
type is obligated to announce in the SSC at least
twice in the week at equal time intervals the
issue and the redemption price of its shares as
well as to publish them in one central
newspaper, as indicated in the prospectus, at
least twice in the month. .
Prohibitions Prohibitions Prohibitions
Neither an investment company, nor a
management company or depository acting on
behalf of a unit trust may grant loans or act as
guarantor on behalf of third parties, or carry
out uncovered sales of transferable securities.
However, this shall not prevent such
undertakings from acquiring transferable
securities which are not fully paid up.
The repealed LSSEIC prohibited the investment
companies to take or grant loans, to engage in
short sales.
An investment company may not acquire
transferable securities, which have not been
fully paid up.
The Law now in effect prohibits the investment
company to grant loans or to be a guarantor of
third parties obligations.
The investment company may not:
Ð acquire securities which have not been fully
paid up;
Ð sell securities which it does not own;
Ð invest in securities issued by its founders or
persons related with them and/or persons that
control the investment company or persons
related with them..
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The Czech laws The Law On Public Offering Of Securities (LPOS)
Investment firms activities Investment
intermediary activities


























of securities for its
own account or for
the account of the
issuer;
Act as dealer;
Arrange issues of securities;








Act as broker Ð execute transactions for the account of clients;
Underwrite issues of securities for its own account;
Individual portfolio management;
Holding of securities and money of clients in a depository
institution (custodian activity);
Intermediation in respect of conclusion of securities
transactions;
The investment intermediaries licensed to carry out the
transactions listed hereinabove are also entitled to carry out the
following transactions and services:
Ð Provision of investment advice in relation to securities;
Ð Consultation and analysis of companies in relation to the
financing of their activity, capital structure, industrial strategy
and related issues, as well as consultations and services in
relation to transformation of companies and transactions in
respect of acquisition of enterprises;
Ð Preparation of prospectusses for public offering of securities;
- Representation of owners of securities before the issuer of the
securities and at general meetings of the owners of such
securities;
Ð Provision of non-bank loans for the purchase of securities and
for securities lending under conditions and order determined by
an ordinance.
Definition of securities Definition of
securities
Definition of securities Definition of securities
1 (a) Transferable securities;
(b) Units in UCITS;
2. Money market instruments;
3. Financial futures contracts
(including cash settled
transactions);















Transferable rights registered in accounts with the Central
Securities Depository (uncertificated securities), or documents
incorporating transferable rights (certificated or materialized
securities) which due to their nature can be offered publicly,
like:
(a) shares;
(b) bonds and other debt securities;





5. Interest rate, currency and
equity swaps;
6. Options to acquire or
dispose any of the above and








(f) Coupons from bearer
securities;






rights and obligations derived
from securities or relating to
exchange traded
commodities, and from
currency, interest rate and
exchange rate indices and
related contracts]
(c) other rights related to shares, bonds or other debt securities.
Definition of Òother documents and rights, related to shares,
bonds or other debt securitiesÓ: warrants, options, rights,
forwards, futures, contracts for difference etc;
Definition of debt securities:- transferable claims for
predetermined or subject to determination income against the
issuer of the securities, occurred as a result of money or other
property rights lent to it. Debt securities may express other rights
too, insofar as this does not contradict the law.
Definition of futures:- standardized security, traded on regulated
securities markets and expressing the right and the obligation for
purchase or sale of a specified number securities on a fixed
price at a fixed date;
Definition of option: Ð security incorporating the right for the
purchase or sale of a specified number of securities at a fixed
price until the expiration of a specified term or on a specified
date.
The Law now in effect defines as securities also the investment
contracts, in respect of which investors provide money or other
property rights to another person without direct participation in
their management, with the aim to realize profit.
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Principal licensing requirements Principal licensing requirements now in effect
1. Provision for segregation of
customer assets;
1 Segregation required under
amended law;
1. Segregation required under
LSSEIC
1. Segregation of customer assets
2. Independent professional
audit;
2. Not specified in the Act; 2. Not specified in the LSSEIC 2. Not specified in the Law;
3. Reputable and competent
management;
3. All employees to be suitable
and qualified;
3. Reputable and competent
management
3. Reputable and competent management;
4. Provision of business plan; 4. Provision of business plan; 4. Provision of business plan 4. Provision of business plan;
5. Approved controllers
and>10% shareholders;
5. Not required except for
foreign interest;
5. Approved controllers and
>10% shareholders
5. Approved controllers and >10%
shareholders
6. Adequate capital in accord
with Directive 93/6;
6. Basic capital specified:
regulations in preparation;
6. Basic capital specified:
capital adequacy regulations in
place, compatible with
Directive 93/6
6. Basic capital specified: capital adequacy
regulations in place, compatible with EU
Directive 93/6;
7. Observance of official
prudential rules;
7. General rules of conduct in
amended law, further
regulations to follow;
7. Observance of official
prudential rules;
7. Observance of officical prudential rules;
8. Observance of official rules of
conduct.
8. Arrangement to prevent
abuse of conflict of interest.
8. Observance of promulgated
official rules on conduct;
arrangement to prevent abuse
of conflict of interests;
8. Observance of promulgated official rules
on conduct; arrangement to prevent abuse of
conflict of interest;
9. General terms for client
contracts safeguarding the
interests of investors
9. General terms for client contracts
safeguarding the interests of investors;
10. Shareholders with more than 10% of the
capital have not used borrowed funds in
relation to their contribution in the capital.




Grounds for refusal of authorization Grounds for refusal of license Grounds for refusal of license Grounds for refusal of license
1. Insufficient capital;
2. The management is not of
adequate repute or experience;
3. Other conditions specified in
national law.
1. The material, personnel and
organizational prerequisites for
conducting activities as a
dealer in relation to the
business plan and the activities
for which a license is applied
are not ensured.
1.Insufficient capital;
2. The management is not of
adequate repute or experience;
3. Controllers and/or persons
owning more than 10% of the
votes in the company
potentially can influence
negatively the security of the
company or its operations;
4. The general conditions for
customer contracts do not
safeguard sufficiently the
interests of the investors.
1. Insufficient capital;
2. The management is not of adequate repute
or experience;
3. Controllers and/or persons owning more
than 10% of the votes in the company
potentially can influence negatively the
security of the company or its operations;
4. The general conditions for customer
contracts do not safeguard the interests of the
investors;
5. Persons owning more than 10% of the
votes in the general shareholdersÕ meeting of
the applicant have made their contributions
with borrowed funds;
6. The applicant does not comply with other
requirements, laid down in the law and the
acts on its implementation;
7. The applicant has presented false data or
documents with false content.
Bulgaria’s Capital M
arkets in the Context of EU
 Accession: A Status Report
85
The EU regime Bulgarian Law and Practice Czech Practice
1. Regulation Ð i.e. under the EU regime a
regulated market is subject to regulations, issued
or approved by the competent authority on the
operation of the market, access to the market,
listing and admission to dealing.
1. The LPOS defines regulated markets for
securities as the official stock exchange market
and the unofficial securities market, on which or
through which:
Ð transactions for the purchase and sale of
securities are concluded and proposals and
invitations for conclusion of such transactions
are made regularly, by way of attendance or
through a uniform system without attendance;
and
Ð information about the concluded transactions
and the proposals for conclusion of such
transactions is being regularly announced.
The LPOS provides that a regulated market, be it
the official stock exchange market or an
unofficial securities market should function on
the basis of rules approved by the SSC.
At present the only regulated market in the
country is the Bulgarian Stock Exchange Ð Sofia.
The Bulgarian Stock Exchange Ð Sofia has the
authority, among other things, to regulate its
members and requirements for official listing of
securities.
1. The Prague Stock Exchange has the authority
to regulate its members and listing. The RM-
system does not have members and is not in a
regulatory relationship with its customers.
2. Price integrity Ð i.e. no fragmentation. 2. Prices are uniform since there is no other
regulated market apart from the Bulgarian Stock
Exchange, i.e. organized off-exchange market.
2. Different prices can occur on different
markets, though there is increasing convergence.
3. Regular opening, associated with regularity of
disclosure by issuers.
3. The Bulgarian Stock Exchange operates
regularly, and its Rules require regular disclosure
of information by the issuers the securities of
which are admitted to trading. The LPOS
provides that the stock exchange can require that
the public companies and the other issuers the
securities of which are admitted to the official
market, to provide information which the stock
3. The RM System and the Prague Stock Exchange
operate regularly




exchange deems necessary for the carrying out of
the stock exchange trading or the protection of
the investors.
4. Open to the public Ð i.e. available for the
execution of orders on behalf of the public and
without discrimination between investors.
4. The Bulgarian Stock Exchange is available for
the execution of public orders, and without any
discrimination between the investors.
4. Both organized markets are available for the
execution of public orders and the RM system
permits the public direct access
5. Transparent and liquid Ð i.e. in accord with
the Investment Services Directive.
5. In accordance with the Investment Services
Directive, the LPOS requires that the stock
exchange should distribute in the beginning of
the working day in an appropriate manner
information about the traded volumes, the
minimum and maximum price, the average
weighted price, as well as the price as of the
closing of the preceding working day. The Law
provides that the stock exchange can apply
special rules for disclosure of information in case
of securities transactions of a big volume, in case
of transactions with unliquid securities and in the
case of debt securities. The Bulgarian Stock
Exchange reports on-market transactions
promptly
5. Both markets report on-market transactions
promptly but official reporting of Òdirect tradesÓ
is not reliable intra-day
6. Recognized. 6. Recognition, for EU purposes is for the
European Commission to decide.
6. Recognition, for EU purposes is for the
Commission to decide
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EU Regime Czech Regime The repealed LSSEIC The Law on Public Offering of
Securities (LPOS)
Requires any person who directly or
indirectly acquires or disposes
major shareholdings in a listed
company to inform the company
and the competent authority.
The Directive also sets up the
disclosure threshold.
Commercial Code requires
disclosure of ownership changes
which cross the thresholds of 10,
20, 30, 50, 65 percent.
Securities Law requires the issuer to
disclose in prospectuses stakes of 10
percent or more, which are known
to the issuer.
Requires disclosure of ownership
changes (direct or indirect) in a
publicly traded company, when
they cross the thresholds of 10 or a
multiple thereof. Requires
prospectuses to disclose ownership
stakes of 10% or more which are
known to the issuer.
The public company, the SSC as
well as the respective regulated
market on which the companyÕs
shares are admitted to trading,
should be notified about every
person whose voting right reaches,
crosses or falls below:
1. 5% or a multiple thereof of the
number of the votes in the general
shareholdersÕ meeting of a company
the shares of which have been
admitted to trading on the official
stock exchange market;
2. 10%, 1/4, 1/3, 1/2 or 3/4 of the
number of the votes in the general
shareholdersÕ meeting of a
company, the shares of which have
been admitted to trading on an
unofficial securities market.
For the purpose of the notification
the voted attached to the following
shares should be added to the votes
attached to the shares directly
owned by the person referred to
hereinabove:
1. shares owned by the spouse and
the minors of the person referred to
hereinabove;
2. shares owned by a company, in
respect of which the person referred
to hereinabove exercises control;
3. shares owned by other persons in
their own name, but for the account
of the person referred to
hereinabove;
h d b i h




4. shares owned by a person with
which the person referred to
hereinabove has concluded a
written agreement to follow a
common policy in respect of the
management of the respective
company by way of joint exercising
of the voting rights owned by them;
5. shares provided by a person with
which the person referred to
hereinabove or a person controlled
by it has concluded a written
agreement, providing for the
temporary transfer of the voting
rights attached to such shares;
6. shares provided by the person
referred to hereinabove as security,
except for the cases when the
secured creditor exercises the voting
rights;
7. shares deposited with the person
referred to hereinabove with
transfer of the voting rights without
special instructions by the
shareholders.
The LPOS contains specific
provisions as to the person subject
to the notification obligation for
each particular scenario.
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EU Regime Czech Regime The repealed LSSEIC The LPOS now in effect
Definition of inside information Definition of inside
information
Definition of inside information Definition of inside information
Defines inside information as:
information, not known to the
public, that relates to precise
information, and relates to one or
more issuers of securities, or to
one or more securities, and which
if disclosed, would have a
significant influence on the price





Defined inside information as all kind of
data, for which there exists no obligation
to be publicly disclosed or which have still
not yet been publicly disclosed, and which
relate to one or more issuers or their
securities, or to other such data, if their
public announcement is likely to influence
significantly the price of securities,
admitted to trading.
Defines inside information as all kind of
data, for which there exists no obligation for
their public announcement or which have
not yet been publicly announced, which
relate to a public company or to an issuer of
securities traded on a regulated market, or to
the securities themselves, if their public
announcement is likely to influence
significantly the price of securities traded on
a regulated market.
Definition of insiders Definition of insiders Definition of insiders Definition of insiders
Defines insiders as:
persons who possess inside
information by virtue of
membership in the management
of an issuer, or by virtue of an
investment in the issuer, or by
virtue of employment, profession
or duties.
Defines insiders as:








financial position of a





1. each member of a managing or
controlling body of the issuer of securities
traded on the stock exchange;
2. each member of a managing or
controlling body or general partner in a
company, which is a related person with
the issuer of securities traded on the stock
exchange;
An insider is also a person owning directly
or through related persons more than
10% of the votes in the general
shareholdersÕ meeting of the issuer, if it
has access or disposes of inside
information, as well as any other person
which due to its profession, activity,
obligations or relatedness with the issuer
or with the insiders referred to here in
above has access or disposes of inside
information.
Defines insiders as:
1. each member of a managing or
controlling body of a public company or an
issuer of securities traded on a regulated
market;
2. each member of a managing or
controlling body or general partner in a
company, which is a related person with the
respective public company or the issuer of
securities traded on a regulated market;
An insider is also a person owning directly
or through related persons more than 10%
of the votes in the general shareholdersÕ
meeting of the public company or the issuer
of securities traded on a regulated market, if
it has access or disposes of inside
information, as well as any other person
which due to its profession, activity,
obligations or relatedness with the public
company or the issuer of securities traded on
a regulated market or with the insiders
referred to hereinabove has access or
disposes of inside information.




Definition of secondary insider Definition of secondary
insider
Definition of secondary insider Definition of secondary insider
Defines secondary insiders as:
persons who have knowingly
acquired inside information from
primary insiders.
Same as EU regime A secondary insider is defined as a person,
which, without being an insider owns
inside information, the direct or indirect
source of which is an insider.
A secondary insider is defined as a person
which, without being an insider, knowingly
owns (disposes of) inside information, the
direct or indirect source of which is an
insider as referred to hereinabove.
Prohibited activities Prohibited activities Prohibited activities Prohibited activities
Prohibited activities:
1. use of inside information for
oneÕs own behalf;
2. transmission of inside
information except for the normal
business purpose of the receiver;
3. recommendation to trade,
without giving the information,
but with the use, by the advisor,
of the inside information.
Prohibited activities:







1. to trade on the stock exchange or off the
exchange for its own account or for the
account of another person in the securities
to which the inside information owned by
it relates;
2. to disclose the inside information
owned by it to another person, which is
not an insider, without the permission of
the general shareholdersÕ meeting of the
issuer, to which such inside information
relates;
3. to recommend to another person on the
basis of the inside information owned by
it, to trade on the stock exchange on its
own account or for the account of another
person, in the securities to which the
inside information owned by it relates.
Regarding secondary insiders only the
prohibition to trade on the stock exchange
or off the exchange in securities to which
the owned inside information relates,
apply.
Prohibited activities:
1. to acquire or to transfer for its own
account or for the account of another person
securities, in respect of which disposes of
inside information;
2. to disclose the inside information owned
by it to another person, which is not an
insider, without the permission of the general
shareholdersÕ meeting of the company, to
which the inside information relates;
3. to recommend to another person on the
basis of the inside information owned by it,
to acquire or to transfer for its own account
or for the account of another person the
securities, to which the inside information
owned by the insider relates.
Regarding secondary insiders, only the
prohibition to acquire or to transfer for its
own account or for the account of another
person the securities, to which the inside
information disposed of relates, applies. Each
person, which concludes a transaction in
securities that are traded on regulated
securities markets, is obligated to declare
before the investment intermediary whether
it disposes of inside information or not.
Scope of protection Scope of protection Scope of protection Scope of protection
Protection against insider trading
only as far as securities admitted
to trading on a regulated market
are concerned.
Not clear, since the
nature of the offence of
insider dealing should
be clarified itself.
Protection against insider trading only on
stock exchanges.
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TABLE B1. Indicators of Trade on BSE Ð Sofia
Source: BSE-Sofia












































Jan.98 1 92 96 964 2 123,3 19 147,8 195 44 21 394 376,3 665 285,9 115 2 182 044 38712,1
Feb.98 1 57 49 017 1 023,0 18 973,7 294 103 900 516 5 633,2 1 541 946,3 175 3 921 950 13595,4
Mar.98 1 44 100 957 2 095,5 17 494,1 322 130 703 632 10 509,2 1 823 671,3 28 525 343 1430,8
Apr.98 1 31 93 890 1 930,4 17 311,4 384 488 1 264 566 9 071,1 2 507 881,1 32 529 405 1990,8
May.98 1 25 281 740 5 280,3 17 581,2 1040 1 797 1 930 156 20 072,9 3 115 501,3 85 1 412 550 3240,9
Jun.98 4 110 67 884 1 484,1 48 102,9 983 2 618 2 581 635 14 185,3 3 094 227,7 0 0 0,0
Jul.98 6 403 206 283 619,0 102 857,0 983 2 708 2 000 762 20 430,7 2 644 287,4 0 0 0,0
Aug.98 8 401 530 334 2 250,7 121 337,6 983 1 942 1 252 980 7 947,1 1 869 589,9 0 0 0,0
Sep.98 10 465 175 142 537,0 182 417,1 983 1 726 982 674 10 881,3 1 654 719,7 0 0 0,0
Oct.98 11 705 373 230 690,1 304 243,5 982 1 461 804 981 8 199,8 1 223 562,7 0 0 0,0
Nov.98 16 618 530 775 625,3 321 843,8 983 1 194 778 353 7 539,8 1 215 334,0 0 0 0,0
Dec.98 19 430 460 889 1 399,4 243 401,2 979 1 486 1 120 233 17 884,2 1 092 452,6 8 335 566 1836,6
Jan.99 19 656 152 143 513,7 236 122,4 980 956 378 950 335,7 1 411 344,8 9 446 412 4231,4
Feb.99 22 638 213 061 500,4 238 522,3 869 1 032 392 673 6 844,8 1 435 658,4 15 2 575 424 19265,8
Mar.99 25 753 180 772 426,8 268 532,1 844 1 994 515 179 4 155,2 1 451 865,5 27 1 309 519 14651,9
Apr.99 29 689 302 946 6 735,3 267 334,8 844 962 172 088 1 035,1 1 383 886,8 6 432 966 1422,6
May.99 30 574 168 773 382,4 302 369,0 847 889 286 044 1 287,2 1 346 819,3 18 480 652 9399,5
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TABLES B2. Indicators of Trade on BSE Ð Sofia, perentage distribution
TABLE B2.1: Listed Companies
(% of total)









Jan.98 0,51 99,49 100
Feb.98 0,34 99,66 100
Mar.98 0,31 99,69 100
Apr.98 0,26 99,74 100
May.98 0,10 99,90 100
Jun.98 0,41 99,59 100
Jul.98 0,61 99,39 100
Aug.98 0,81 99,19 100
Sep.98 1,01 98,99 100
Oct.98 1,11 98,89 100
Nov.98 1,60 98,40 100
Dec.98 1,90 98,10 100
Jan.99 1,90 98,10 100
Feb.99 2,47 97,53 100
Mar.99 2,88 97,12 100
Apr.99 3,32 96,68 100










Jan.98 36,65 17,53 45,82 100
Feb.98 17,01 30,75 52,24 100
Mar.98 21,78 64,36 13,86 100
Apr.98 5,63 88,57 5,81 100
May.98 1,31 94,23 4,46 100
Jun.98 4,03 95,97 0 100
Jul.98 12,95 87,05 0 100
Aug.98 17,11 82,89 0 100
Sep.98 21,22 78,78 0 100
Oct.98 32,55 67,45 0 100
Nov.98 34,11 65,89 0 100
Dec.98 22,35 77,23 0,42 100
Jan.99 40,47 58,98 0,56 100
Feb.99 37,86 61,25 0,89 100
Mar.99 27,14 71,88 0,97 100
Apr.99 41,58 58,06 0,36 100
May.99 38,76 60,03 1,22 100
Source: BSE-Sofia Source: BSE-Sofia
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Jan.98 4,22 0,93 94,85 100
Feb.98 1,01 18,49 80,51 100
Mar.98 7,59 52,91 39,50 100
Apr.98 4,97 66,98 28,04 100
May.98 7,77 53,25 38,97 100
Jun.98 2,56 97,44 0,00 100
Jul.98 9,35 90,65 0,00 100
Aug.98 29,74 70,26 0,00 100
Sep.98 15,13 84,87 0,00 100
Oct.98 31,68 68,32 0,00 100
Nov.98 40,54 59,46 0,00 100
Dec.98 24,05 58,45 17,51 100
Jan.99 15,56 38,77 45,67 100
Feb.99 6,70 12,34 80,96 100
Mar.99 9,01 25,69 65,30 100
Apr.99 33,36 18,95 47,68 100
May.99 18,04 30,58 51,38 100
Source: BSE-Sofia










Jan.98 5,15 0,91 93,93 100
Feb.98 5,05 27,82 67,13 100
Mar.98 14,93 74,88 10,19 100
Apr.98 14,86 69,82 15,32 100
May.98 18,47 70,20 11,33 100
Jun.98 9,47 91 0 100
Jul.98 2,94 97 0 100
Aug.98 22,07 78 0 100
Sep.98 4,70 95 0 100
Oct.98 7,76 92 0 100
Nov.98 7,66 92 0 100
Dec.98 6,63 84,68 8,70 100
Jan.99 10,11 6,61 83,28 100
Feb.99 1,88 25,72 72,40 100
Mar.99 2,22 21,60 76,18 100
Apr.99 73,27 11,26 15,48 100
May.99 3,45 11,63 84,92 100
Source: BSE-Sofia
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Jan.98 2,80 97,20 100
Feb.98 1,22 98,78 100
Mar.98 0,95 99,05 100
Apr.98 0,69 99,31 100
May.98 0,56 99,44 100
Jun.98 1,53 98,47 100
Jul.98 3,74 96,26 100
Aug.98 6,09 93,91 100
Sep.98 9,93 90,07 100
Oct.98 19,91 80,09 100
Nov.98 20,94 79,06 100
Dec.98 18,22 81,78 100
Jan.99 14,33 85,67 100
Feb.99 14,25 85,75 100
Mar.99 15,61 84,39 100
Apr.99 16,19 83,81 100
May.99 18,33 81,67 100
Source: BSE-Sofia
TABLE B3. Companies Included in the Warburg Ð 30 Index
(end of June)
Ranking Stock Name Sector MC US$
mln.
Weight
1 Bulgartabac Holding Tobacco 134,5 26,13%
2 Neftochim Chemicals 128,6 24,98%
3 Solvay-Sodi Chemicals 45,9 8,91%
4 Blagoevgrad BT Tobacco 35,6 6,91%
5 Sopharma Pharmaceuticals 26,9 5,22%
6 Petrol Chemicals 16,7 3,24%
7 Kremikovtsi Steel 16,4 3,19%
8 Albena Resorts 15,2 2,96%
9 Pharmacia Pharmaceuticals 11,4 2,22%
10 Zlatni Piassatsi Resorts 10,6 2,05%
11 Chimco Fertilisers 7,8 1,52%
12 Polimeri Chemicals 7,6 1,48%
13 Biovet Pharmaceuticals 7,6 1,47%
14 Neochim Fertilisers 6,6 1,29%
15 Antibiotic Pharmaceuticals 6,5 1,26%
16 Alen Mak Pharmaceuticals 6,0 1,17%
17 Troyapharm Pharmaceuticals 5,8 1,12%




20 Elkabel Engineering 3,1 0,60%
21 Slanchev Briag Resorts 2,5 0,48%
22 Alumina Metals 2,3 0,45%
23 Agropolychim Fertilisers 2,1 0,42%
24 OCK Metals 1,8 0,36%
25 Yambolen Chemicals 1,7 0,32%
26 Varna Shipyard Engineering 1,4 0,28%
27 Plovdiv BT Tobacco 1,3 0,25%
28 Sviloza Chemicals 0,9 0,17%
29 Agrobiochim Fertilisers 0,8 0,17%






























Official Elkabel 01.12.1998 870 355 21 131 234 75 837 153 4 402 504 9 000 1,78 0,10 0,37
Market Polimeri 14.9.1998 5 772 611 130936129 57 322 511 614 969 4 278 40,16 0,43 0,19
A Olovno Tsinkov Kompleks 04.5.1998 210 334 43 258 676 98 746 739 72 735 13 200 38,17 0,03 0,06
Official Antibiotik 17.12.1998 1 906 198 50 806 393 55 311 702 -827 898 6 400 neg* 0,22 0,24
Market Elma 11.9.1998 835 475 11 328 859 25 206 252 642 132 2 486 3,23 0,08 0,18
B Troyafarm 17.12.1998 391 045 21 895 029 37 198 533 3 681 577 41 000 4,35 0,43 0,73
Central Cooperative Bank 01.3.1999 15000000 na na na 1 000 na na na
Farmatsia 04.6.1999 663 531 37 874 990 83 557 291 10 081 372 34 650 2,28 0,28 0,61
Sofarma 05.10.1999 942 717 52 861 628 78 679 201 23 492 742 56 221 2,26 0,67 1,00
Official Albena Invest Holding 11.9.1998 5 500 000 16 611 833 8 322 281 3 305 770 1 331 2,21 0,88 0,44
Market BRIB 22.6.1998 1 000 000 na na na 17 442 na na na
C Dobrudzha Holding 17.7.1998 2 962 181 696 070 448 804 235 588 230 2,89 1,52 0,98
Doverie Holding 07.6.1998 6 574 924 20 847 658 25 627 237 9 241 374 1 597 1,14 0,41 0,50
Himmash 08.10.1998 665 674 3 570 570 3 128 763 -208 444 3 300 neg 0,70 0,62
"Zlaten Lev" Investment
Company
14.12.1998 6 481 959 24 290 746 7 140 482 5 574 766 1 573 1,83 1,43 0,42
Melinvest Holding 29.6.1998 3 641 000 10 807 944 993 900 656 433 1 911 10,60 7,00 0,64
* neg - negative profits
Source: BSE-Sofia
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M G Elit Holding 14.9.1998 22 912 977 10 828 669 7 068 520 788 114 120 3,49 0,39 0,25
Neftochim Invest Holding 11.9.1998 2 289 147 13 476 400 5 739 793 2 347 423 2 180 2,13 0,87 0,37
Petrol Holding Group 22.6.1998 6 002 756 34 840 345 8 879 117 5 130 802 2 175 2,54 1,47 0,37
Razvitie Industria Holding 23.11.1998 980 925 1 429 130 748 544 89 742 782 8,55 1,02 0,54
Kostenets 02.1.1999 236 277 6 191 359 9 987 061 305 245 3 144 2,43 0,07 0,12
"Nadezhda" Investment
Company
02.1.1999 551 836 1 976 069 1 889 213 1 432 371 1 200 0,46 0,35 0,34
Elektroimpex 03.2.1999 3 500 25 435 973 30 255 761 1 245 059 2 810 143 7,90 0,33 0,39
Stara Planina Holding 03.4.1999 1 750 000 9 334 559 4 340 526 831 185 1 850 3,90 0,75 0,35
Severokoop Gamza Holding 03.1.1999 2 673 899 11 480 049 4 677 448 2 793 762 2 059 1,97 1,18 0,48
Bimas 15.2.1999 187 385 2 203 493 8 935 423 -1 161 730 8 000 neg 0,17 0,68
AKB Corporation Holding 11.9.1998 2 843 483 4 008 368 9 151 268 1 275 613 1 000 2,23 0,31 0,71
Aktsioner Favorit 04.6.1999 2 211 000 15 591 038 3 511 454 2 891 180 1 600 1,22 1,01 0,23
Varnenska Korabostroitelnitsa 30.11.1998 2 302 553 13 322 434 196221357 3 351 058 1 367 0,94 0,02 0,24
Industrial Holding "Bulgaria" 17.8.1998 17 500 000 21 106 377 5 110 300 614 575 1 205 34,31 4,13 1,00
Source: BSE-Sofia






























Free Solvei Sodi 15.12.1997 5 236 089 160 167
960
171530423 2 865 008 14 228 26,00 0,43 0,47
Market Himko 02.4.1998 13628275 18 058 894 79 129 150 -46157769 1 195 neg* 0,21 0,90
Neftochim 15.12.1997 13545743 21 108 232 1623400519 89 306 485 17 005 2,58 0,14 10,91
Albena 20.5.1998 4 273 126 66 330 561 55 407 323 7 535 652 6 078 3,45 0,47 0,39
Bulgartabak
Holding
19.5.1998 7 367 222 25 962 065 27 125 934 3 440 842 33 270 71,23 9,04 9,44
Blagoevgrad BT na 1351313 81 317 319 212273445 25 558 034 41 674 2,20 0,27 0,69
Sofia BT na 608 435 24 432 914 62 567 473 5 391 213 17 833 2,01 0,17 0,44
Source: BSE-Sofia
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TABLE B6.1: Market Capitalization (mil. BGL)
Market Segment
Month A B C Free Total
Jan.98 19 147,8 0,0 0,0 665 285,9 684 433,8
Feb.98 18 016,9 0,0 0,0 1 541 946,3 1 559 963,3
Mar.98 17 505,2 0,0 0,0 1 823 671,3 1 841 176,4
Apr.98 17 311,4 0,0 0,0 2 507 881,1 2 525 192,4
May.98 14 905,9 0,0 10 484,4 3 115 501,3 3 140 891,5
Jun.98 19 111,1 0,0 36 393,9 3 094 227,7 3 149 732,6
Jul.98 20 018,2 0,0 88 967,7 2 644 287,4 2 753 273,2
Aug.98 18 573,4 0,0 103 879,3 1 869 589,9 1 992 042,6
Sep.98 66 242,3 0,0 119 930,3 1 654 719,7 1 840 892,3
Oct.98 196 529,9 0,0 107 666,4 1 223 562,7 1 527 758,9
Nov.98 153 492,2 6 725,4 114 413,3 1 215 334,0 1 489 964,8
Dec.98 50 030,5 12 962,9 169 360,9 1 092 452,6 1 324 806,8
Jan.99 51 198,9 34 773,4 150 240,1 1 411 344,8 1 647 557,2
Feb.99 46 354,1 30 644,9 161 523,3 1 435 658,4 1 674 180,7
Mar.99 48 340,2 57 653,2 162 538,8 1 451 865,5 1 720 397,6
Apr.99 44 120,7 67 940,5 155 237,6 1 383 886,8 1 651 185,5
May.99 36 223,5 122 202,5 143 943,0 1 346 819,3 1 649 188,2
Source: BSE-Sofia
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Market Segment
Month A B C Free Total
Jan.98 2,80% 0,00% 0,00% 97,20% 100,00%
Feb.98 1,15% 0,00% 0,00% 98,85% 100,00%
Mar.98 0,95% 0,00% 0,00% 99,05% 100,00%
Apr.98 0,69% 0,00% 0,00% 99,31% 100,00%
May.98 0,47% 0,00% 0,33% 99,19% 100,00%
Jun.98 0,61% 0,00% 1,16% 98,24% 100,00%
Jul.98 0,73% 0,00% 3,23% 96,04% 100,00%
Aug.98 0,93% 0,00% 5,21% 93,85% 100,00%
Sep.98 3,60% 0,00% 6,51% 89,89% 100,00%
Oct.98 12,86% 0,00% 7,05% 80,09% 100,00%
Nov.98 10,30% 0,45% 7,68% 81,57% 100,00%
Dec.98 3,78% 0,98% 12,78% 82,46% 100,00%
Jan.99 3,11% 2,11% 9,12% 85,66% 100,00%
Feb.99 2,77% 1,83% 9,65% 85,75% 100,00%
Mar.99 2,81% 3,35% 9,45% 84,39% 100,00%
Apr.99 2,67% 4,11% 9,40% 83,81% 100,00%
May.99 2,20% 7,41% 8,73% 81,67% 100,00%
TABLE B6.2: Market Capitalization, distribution
Source: BSE-Sofia
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TABLE B7. Companies Privatised by the State through the Bulgarian Stock Exchange















Elkabel 60 522 214 19 584 10 227 038 976
Himmash 67,5 449 343 3 034 1 363 306 662
Elektroimpex 64 2 236 2 810 143 6 283 479 748
Minority Interest
Kramex - Sofia 26.4 62 705 3 200 200 656 000
Terma - Tutrakan 26.4 23 474 2 500 58 685 000
Panayot Volov - Shoumen 26.4 43 117 2 000 86 234 000
Vereya - Stara Zagora 8 1 241 2 200 2 730 200
Niva - Kostinbrod 24 52 613 4 010 210 978 130
Dobrudzhanska Mebel -
Dobrich
24.4 25 095 2 500 62 737 500
Bimas - Rouse 16.4 30 732 14 320 440 082 240
Orfei - Batak 11 2 915 4 100 11 951 500
ZMM - Sliven 29,76 84 092 2 400 201 820 800
Katrik 61 - Kavarna 6 942 8 611 8 111 562
ZMMMetalik - Pazardzhik 23 23 000 12 100 278 300 000
Mayak - Dobrich 26 44 100 2 880 127 008 000
Mikrodvigateli - Etropole 22 7 555 4 500 33 997 500
ZIIU Standard - Blagoevgrad 21.4 4 000 4 300 17 200 000
Mlechna Promishlenost -
Vratsa
19 10 891 2 500 27 227 500
Tekstilni Vlakna - Gorna
Oryahovitsa
26.4 2 392 20 000 47 840 000
Frigo Plod - Vresovo 19 16 459 8 470 139 407 730
Primorets Tourist - Bourgas 26.12 14 687 11 840 173 894 080
Triko - Omortag 26,3 12 356 7 340 90 693 040
Bertex - Berkovitsa 26,4 5 198 4 347 22 595 706
Agrokomb - Doulovo 33.16 30 460 1 300 39 598 000
Ardino - Ardino 25,5 10 389 1 470 15 271 830
Ralin Tex - Dolni Rakovets 26 13 655 1 280 17 478 400
Elektrometal - Pazardzhik 25 8 077 1 150 9 288 550
Lesko - Sliven 8 3 024 2 000 6 048 000
Venets - Oreshets 25,1 9 048 3 000 27 144 000
Amatitsa 1 088 3 500 3 808 000
Total 1 517 098 20234612654
Source: BSE-Sofia
